# The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending

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**Abstract**

Technology-based ("FinTech") lenders increased their market share of U.S. mortgage lending from 2% to 8% from 2010 to 2016. Using market-wide, loan-level data on U.S. mortgage applications and originations, we show that FinTech lenders process mortgage applications about 20% faster than other lenders, even when controlling for detailed loan, borrower, and geographic observables. Faster processing does not come at the cost of higher defaults. FinTech lenders adjust supply more elastically than other lenders in response to exogenous mortgage demand shocks, thereby alleviating capacity constraints associated with traditional mortgage lending. In areas with more FinTech lending, borrowers refinance more, especially when it is in their interest to do so. We find no evidence that FinTech lenders target marginal borrowers. Our results suggest that technological innovation has improved the efficiency of financial intermediation in the U.S. mortgage market.

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# I Introduction

The U.S. residential mortgage industry is experiencing a wave of technological innovation as both start-ups and existing lenders seek ways to automate, simplify and speed up each step of the mortgage origination process. At the forefront of this development are FinTech lenders, which have a complete end-to-end online mortgage application and approval process that is supported by centralized underwriting operations, rather than the traditional network of local brokers or "bricks and mortar" branches. For example, *Rocket Mortgage* from Quicken Loans, introduced in 2015, provides a tool to electronically collect documentation about borrower's income, assets and credit history, allowing the lender to make approval decisions based on an online application in as little as eight minutes.

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, FinTech lenders have become an increasingly important source of mortgage credit to U.S. households. We measure "FinTech lenders" as lenders that offer an application process that can be completed entirely online. As of December 2016, all FinTech lenders are stand-alone mortgage originators that primarily securitize mortgages and operate without deposit financing or a branch network. Their lending has grown annually by 30% from $34bn of total originations in 2010 (2% of market) to $161bn in 2016 (8% of market). The growth has been particularly pronounced for refinances and for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), a segment of the market which primarily serves lower income borrowers.

In this paper, we study the effects of FinTech lending on the U.S. mortgage market. Our main hypothesis is that the FinTech lending model represents a technological innovation that reduces frictions in mortgage lending, such as lengthy loan processing, capacity constraints, inefficient refinancing, and limited access to finance by some borrowers. The alternative hypothesis is that FinTech lending is not special on these dimensions, and that FinTech lenders offer services that are similar to traditional lenders in terms of processing times and scalability. Under this explanation, there are economic forces unrelated to technology that explain the growth in FinTech lending (e.g., regulatory arbitrage or marketing).

It is important to distinguish between these explanations to evaluate the impact of technological innovation on the mortgage market. If FinTech lenders do indeed offer a substantially

different product from traditional lenders, they may increase consumer surplus or expand credit supply, at least for individuals who are comfortable obtaining a mortgage online. If, however, FinTech lending is driven primarily by other economic forces, there might be little benefit to consumers. FinTech lending may even increase the overall risk of the U.S. mortgage market (e.g., due to lax screening). In addition, the results are important for evaluating the broader impact of recent technological innovation in loan markets. Mortgage lending is arguably the market in which technology has had the largest economic impact thus far, but other loan markets may undergo similar transformations in the future.[1]

Our analysis identifies several frictions in U.S. mortgage markets and examines whether FinTech lending alleviates them. We start by examining the effect of FinTech lending on loan outcomes. We focus particularly on the time it takes to originate a loan as a measure of efficiency. FinTech lenders may be faster at processing loans than traditional lenders because online processing is automated and centralized, with less scope for human error. At the same time, this more automated approach may be less effective at screening borrowers; therefore, we also examine the riskiness of FinTech loans using data on loan defaults.

We find that FinTech lenders process mortgages faster than traditional lenders, measured by total days from the submission of a mortgage application until the closing. Using loan-level data on the near-universe of U.S. mortgages from 2010 to 2016, we find that FinTech lenders reduce processing time by about 10 days, or 20% of the average processing time. In our preferred specifications, this effect is larger for refinance mortgages (14.6 days) than purchase mortgages (9.2 days). The result holds when we restrict the sample to non-banks, indicating that it is not solely due to differences in regulation. The results are also robust to including a large set of borrower, loan, and geographic controls; along with other tests we conduct, this suggests that faster processing is not explained by endogenous matching of "fast" borrowers with FinTech lenders.

Faster processing times by FinTech lenders do not result in riskier loans. We measure loan risk using default rates on FHA mortgages, which is the riskiest segment of the market in recent years. We find that default rates on FinTech mortgages are about 25% lower than

[1] Many industry observers believe that technology will soon disrupt a wide range of loan markets including small business loans, leveraged loans, personal unsecured lending, and commercial real estate lending (Goldman Sachs Research, 2015).

those for traditional lenders, even when controlling for detailed loan characteristics. There is no significant difference in interest rates. These results speak against a "lax screening" hypothesis, and instead indicate that FinTech lending technologies may help attract and screen for less risky borrowers.

We also find that FinTech lenders respond more elastically to changes in mortgage demand. Existing research documents evidence of significant capacity constraints in U.S. mortgage lending.[2] FinTech lenders may be better able to better accommodate demand shocks because they collect information electronically and centralize and partially automate their underwriting operations. To empirically identify capacity constraints across lenders, we use changes in nationwide application volume as a source of exogenous variation in mortgage demand and trace out the correlation with loan processing times.

Empirically, we find that a doubling of the application volume raises the loan processing time by 13.5 days (or 26%) for traditional lenders, compared to only 7.5 days for FinTech lenders. The result is robust to including a large number of loan and borrower observables, restricting the sample to nonbanks, or using an interest rate refinancing incentive or a Bartik-style instrument to measure demand shocks. The estimated effect is larger for refinances, where FinTech lenders are particularly active. We also document that FinTech lenders reduce denial rates relative to other lenders when application volumes rise, suggesting that their faster processing is not simply due to credit rationing during peak periods.

Given that FinTech lenders particularly focus on mortgage refinances, we next study their effect on household refinancing behavior. Prior literature has shown that many U.S. households refinance too little or at the wrong times (e.g., Campbell, 2006; Keys et al., 2016). FinTech lending may encourage efficient refinancing by offering a faster, less cumbersome loan process. We examine this possibility by studying the relationship between the FinTech lender market share and refinancing propensities across U.S. counties.

We find that borrowers are more likely to refinance in counties with a larger FinTech lender presence (controlling for county and time effects). An 8 percentage point increase

[2] Fuster et al. (2017b) show that increases in aggregate application volumes are strongly associated with increases in processing times and higher interest rate margins, thereby attenuating the pass-through of lower mortgage rates to borrowers. Sharpe and Sherlund (2016) and Choi et al. (2017) also find evidence of capacity constraints, which they argue alter the mix of loan applications that lenders attract.

in the lagged market share of FinTech lenders (which corresponds to moving from the $10^{th}$ percentile to the $90^{th}$ percentile in 2015) raises the likelihood of refinancing by about 10% of the average. This increase in refinancing appears to be most pronounced among borrowers estimated to benefit from refinancing. Our findings suggest that FinTech lending, by reducing refinancing frictions, increases the pass-through of market interest rates to households.

We also analyze cross-sectional patterns in who borrows from FinTech lenders. We find that FinTech borrowing is higher among more educated populations, and surprisingly among older borrowers who may be more familiar with the process of obtaining a mortgage. We find little evidence that FinTech lenders disproportionately target marginal borrowers with low access to finance. We find no consistent correlation between FinTech lending and local Internet usage or speed; similarly, using the entry of Google Fiber in Kansas City as a natural experiment, we find no evidence that improved Internet access increases FinTech mortgage take-up. These results mitigate concerns about a digital divide in mortgage lending.

Taken together, our results suggest that recent technological innovations are improving the efficiency of the U.S. mortgage market. We find that FinTech lenders process mortgages more quickly without increasing loan risk, respond more elastically to demand shocks, and increase the propensity to refinance, especially among borrowers that are likely to benefit from it. We find, however, little evidence that FinTech lending is more effective at allocating credit to otherwise constrained borrowers.

Our results do not necessarily predict how FinTech lending will evolve in the future. FinTech lenders are nonbanks who securitize most of their mortgages—their growth could be affected by regulatory changes or reforms to the housing finance system. There is also uncertainty as to how the increased popularity of machine learning techniques, which FinTech lenders may be using more intensely, will influence the quantity and distribution of credit.[3] Related to this issue, although we find no evidence FinTech lenders select the highest-quality borrowers ("cream skim"), which could reduce credit for other borrowers, these results could change as technology-based lending becomes more widespread. Lastly, FinTech lenders use a less personalized loan process that relies on hard information, which could reduce credit

[3]See Bartlett et al. (2017) and Fuster et al. (2017a) for recent studies of these issues in the context of the U.S. mortgage market.

to atypical applications.

Our research contributes to several strands of the literature. Although a large body of research has studied residential mortgage lending (see Campbell, 2013 and Badarinza et al., 2016 for surveys), much of the recent work focuses on securitization and the lending boom prior to the U.S. financial crisis.[4] Our paper instead focuses on how technology affects the structure of residential mortgage lending after the crisis. Most closely related to this paper, Buchak et al. (2017) study the recent growth in the share of nonbank mortgage lenders, including FinTech lenders. While there is some overlap between the descriptive parts of our analyses, and we use similar approaches to classify FinTech lenders, the two papers are otherwise strongly complementary. Buchak et al. focus on explaining the growth of nonbank lending, using reduced-form analysis and a calibrated structural model. Our paper focuses on how technology impacts frictions in the mortgage origination process, such as slow processing times, capacity constraints and slow or suboptimal refinancing.[5]

Our findings also inform research on the role of mortgage markets in the transmission of monetary policy (e.g., Beraja et al., 2017; Di Maggio et al., 2017). If lenders constrain the pass-through of interest rates (Agarwal et al., 2017; Drechsler et al., 2017; Fuster et al., 2017b; Scharfstein and Sunderam, 2016), or borrowers are slow to refinance (Andersen et al., 2015; Agarwal et al., 2015), changes in interest rates will not be fully reflected in mortgage rates and originations. Our findings suggest that technology may be easing these frictions, potentially improving monetary policy pass-through in mortgage markets.

Finally, our paper contributes to a growing literature on the role of technology in finance (see Philippon, 2016, for an overview), and a broader literature on how new technology can lead to productivity growth (see e.g. Syverson, 2011 and Collard-Wexler and De Loecker, 2015). In our case, the "productivity" or "efficiency" measures we consider are processing times, supply elasticity, default and refinancing propensities, and we are the first to document that FinTech lending appears to lead to improvements along these dimensions.

[4]See, for example, Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys et al. (2010), Purnanandam (2010), Acharya et al. (2013), or Jiang et al. (2014). Aside from this paper, research focusing on mortgage lending in the post-crisis environment includes D'Acunto and Rossi (2017), DeFusco et al. (2017), and Gete and Reher (2017).

[5]We also study loan defaults and mortgage pricing in a similar way to Buchak et al., but focus on the riskier FHA segment of the market; they primarily study loans insured by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

# II Who is a FinTech Lender?

## A. *Defining FinTech lenders*

A central feature of our study is the distinction between FinTech mortgage originators and other lenders. While many mortgage lenders are adopting new technologies to varying degrees, it is clear that some lenders are at the forefront of using technology to fundamentally streamline and automate the mortgage origination process. The defining features of this business model are an end-to-end online mortgage application platform and centralized mortgage underwriting and processing augmented by automation.[6]

How does the FinTech business model affect the mortgage origination process in practice?[7] Online applications mean that a borrower can be approved for a loan without talking to a loan officer or visiting a physical location. The online platform is able to directly access the borrower's financial account statements and tax returns to electronically collect information about assets and income. Other supporting documents can be uploaded electronically, rather than by being sent piecemeal by mail, fax or email.[8] This automates a labor-intensive process, speeds up information transfer, and can improve accuracy, for example by eliminating transcription errors (Goodman 2016, Housing Wire 2015). The online platform also allows borrowers to customize their mortgage based on current lender underwriting standards and real-time pricing.

Supporting and complementing this online application process, FinTech mortgage lenders

[6] The discussion of institutional details in this section draws upon extensive conversations with mortgage industry professionals, market economists within the Federal Reserve, and other industry experts. For more detail on how technology is reshaping the mortgage market, see Oliver Wyman (2016), The Economist (2016), Goodman (2016), Goldman Sachs Research (2015) and Housing Wire (2015, 2017).

[7] Obtaining a purchase mortgage involves three main steps (see e.g., Freddie Mac, 2016). (1) An initial application and pre-approval—a pre-approval letter is nonbinding, but is indicative of a borrower's credit capacity and is often required to make an offer on a home. (2) Processing and underwriting, which is usually undertaken after a property has been identified and sale price agreed upon. This step involves verification of all supporting documentation, often involving many interactions between the processor, loan officer and borrower, and can take from 1-2 days to several weeks or more (known as the "turn time"). (3) Closing, when the funds and property deed are transferred. FinTech lenders partially automate the first two steps and allow them to be completed online. Recently, some lenders have also digitized the third and final step by creating an electronic mortgage note (e.g., see Quicken Loans, 2017a).

[8] FinTech lenders also offer email and phone support. The key distinction to traditional lenders is that borrowers can process the entire application without using paper forms, email, or phone support. In practice, the degree of automation is much larger among FinTech lenders relative to other lenders, even if some FinTech borrowers communicate via email or over the phone with their lender.

have developed "back-end" processes to automatically analyze the information collected during the application. For example, borrower information is compared against employment databases, property records, as well as marriage and divorce records; additionally, algorithms can examine whether recent bank account deposits are consistent with the borrower's paystubs. Optical character recognition and pattern recognition software can be used to process documents uploaded by the borrower and flag missing or inconsistent data. These systems make the mortgage underwriting process more standardized and repeatable, and may help identify fraud (Goodman, 2016).

This approach does not eliminate the role of human underwriters, but does make mortgage processing less labor-intensive. In contrast with more hub-and-spoke loan origination operations that put loan officers and underwriters in branches, FinTech lenders centralize their processing operations, which allows for labor specialization in the underwriting process. Lenders have told us anecdotally that this makes it easier to train new workers and to adjust labor supply in response to demand shocks.

Against these advantages, there may also be important disadvantages of a more automated approach to mortgage underwriting. For example, poorly designed online platforms may confuse borrowers or lead to errors, and a lack of personal interaction may impede the transmission of soft information, resulting in less effective borrower screening or credit rationing.[9] Our empirical analysis examines both the benefits and costs of the FinTech mortgage lending model.

We emphasize that automation and online applications are not entirely new.[10] For example many lenders in recent years have allowed borrowers to initiate a mortgage application online. However, the online application is often just a first step before directing applicants to speak to a loan officer who then initiates a more traditional loan application process. Similarly, although online mortgage rate comparison services such as LendingTree and BankRate have been a feature of the mortgage market for many years, these services simply provide information and connect borrowers and lenders; they do not automate the mortgage origi-

[9] A substantial academic literature has emphasized the role of soft versus hard information in lending (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Stein, 2002).

[10] More generally, the use of information technology in mortgage lending and servicing is not a recent phenomenon—see e.g. LaCour-Little (2000) for a discussion of developments in the 1990s.

nation process or put it online.

The emergence of several stand-alone FinTech firms as major lenders over the last few years is a strong indicator that fundamental change is underway. These firms are at the technological frontier and focus exclusively on the new business model. In contrast, established lenders with branch-based mortgage origination processes face significant obstacles in recalibrating their operations away from branches and loan officers. For this reason, the vanguard of FinTech lenders is composed of nonbanks, which do not have access to deposit finance and therefore do not retain originated loans on balance sheet. Like other nonbanks, the vast majority of FinTech lenders sell their loans through established channels supported by government guarantee programs (FHA, VA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac).

That said, a significant and growing number of mortgage lenders are at present incorporating aspects of the "FinTech model," and the current distinction between FinTech originators and other firms, including banks, may be temporary. The current market structure presents a window of opportunity to study the impact of FinTech on mortgage origination, and to draw inferences about what is likely to happen to the mortgage industry as a whole as these technologies diffuse more broadly.

## *B. Classifying FinTech lenders*

For our empirical analysis, we classify an originator as a FinTech lender if they enable a mortgage applicant to obtain a pre-approval online. We believe this classification distinguishes FinTech lenders from more traditional mortgage originators that may use "online applications" for marketing purposes but still require interaction with a loan officer.

Our classification should be viewed as a proxy, since an online application platform is only one dimension of the FinTech "model". Even so, it is an important component, and is also easily measurable in a consistent way across a large number of mortgage lenders. In practice, the set of lenders classified as FinTech by our approach matches up well with firms considered by industry observers and media to be at the frontier of technology-based mortgage lending. It also matches quite closely with the independent classification by Buchak et al. (2017).[11]

[11] Our classification and empirical analysis closely follows the methodology in our proposal to the RFS FinTech initiative submitted on March 15, 2017. Our proposal was submitted before we and Buchak et al.

We implement our classification by first compiling lists of the top 100 non-bank lenders for purchase loans and for refinancings over the analysis period.[12] The resulting list includes 135 lenders. We then manually initiate a mortgage application with each lender and analyze whether it is possible to obtain a pre-approval online. Most lenders halt the online application prior to the pre-approval and ask the borrower to directly contact a loan officer or broker. We classify the lender as a FinTech lender if we are able to continue with the online process until we get to the pre-approval decision that is based on a hard credit check of the applicant's credit score.

Our final classification is based on an analysis completed in June 2017. To construct a panel, we go back in time using a database that archives websites ("Wayback Machine"). Using the database from 2010 to 2017, we evaluate at which point in time a lender appears to have adopted their qualifying online lending process. We cannot always conduct a full evaluation because online application processes often rely on a technological process that evaluates information in real time. However, we can use the archived website to evaluate when a lender adopted an application which resembles the qualifying application in 2017. We use this information to determine the year in which a lender adopted a FinTech lending model. We corroborate our results using industry reports.[13]

FinTech lenders exhibit several other distinguishing characteristics relative to their competitors. For example, FinTech firms typically require a Social Security Number and conduct a hard credit check online, unlike most traditional mortgage originators we classified. FinTech lenders also tend to orient their marketing efforts around their website or mobile phone app. In particular, FinTech lender advertisements emphasize the functionality and ease of use of their website or app, and direct borrowers to those platforms. Other lenders may include their website in their marketing material but do not emphasize it to the same degree, and may primarily use it for "lead generation."

Figure 1 plots the number of FinTech lenders by year based on our classification. The

became aware of each others' work and pre-dates the first public version of their working paper.

[12] We also examined several top depository bank lenders, but did not classify any of them as FinTech through 2016 (although some began offering online pre-approvals in 2017). As discussed above, entrenched bank business models may slow their ability to integrate new technology into their existing branch-based mortgage origination process.

[13] We find no instance of a lender that stopped offering online processing during the analysis period.

number increases from two firms in 2010 to 18 lenders by 2017. In Table 1 we list the top 20 lenders in 2016, along with other FinTech lenders in the data in that year. The three largest originators identified as FinTech lenders are Quicken, LoanDepot.com, and Guaranteed Rate. All of the primary analyses in this paper use this classification, although we have verified that our main results are robust to the alternative classification of Buchak et al. (2017).[14]

Table 2 provides summary statistics of mortgage originations and applications, in total and by lender type, based on data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). HMDA data report characteristics of individual residential mortgage applications and originations from the vast majority of U.S. banks and non-banks. Data include the identity of the lender, loan amount, property location, borrower income, race and gender, though not credit score or loan-to-value ratio (LTV). Based on known local conforming loan limits, we impute whether each loan has "jumbo" status and thus cannot be securitized by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae. The processing time of loan applications, one of our main outcome variables of interest, can only be computed from a restricted version of the dataset available to users within the Federal Reserve System.[15] We include loans with application dates between January 2010 and June 2016.[16] First, we see that in terms of basic risk characteristics, non-bank lenders originate loans to borrowers with relatively low-income and high loan to income (LTI) ratio relative to banks. Similarly, FinTech lenders and other non-bank lenders have a much higher share of FHA and VA loans, but a lower share of jumbo mortgages, than banks. FinTech lenders originate many more refinance loans (as opposed to loans used for a home purchase) than banks and other non-bank lenders.[17]

We also see that FinTech lenders have shorter average processing times than both banks and other non-bank lenders. In the next section, we study whether this result persists once

[14]Our classification is similar tho one proposed by Buchak et al. (2017). There are only minor differences with respect to the classification of a few smaller lenders.

[15]This restricted version of the data records the exact date the lender receives an application, as well as the date on which the application was resolved (e.g. origination of the loan or denial or withdrawl of the application). The publicly available HMDA data only contains the year. All other variables are the same.

[16]We end the sample in June because for applications submitted later in the year, processing times may be biased downward. This is due to the fact that only applications for which an action (origination, denial, etc.) was taken by the end of 2016 are included in the HMDA data available at the time of writing.

[17]As Buchak et al. (2017) also note, FinTech lenders have a higher fraction of applications where applicant race or gender information is missing. We understand this is because borrowers can complete online applications without being required to provide this information.

we control for loan characteristics and location-time fixed effects. In Section VII we will study differences in borrower and location characteristics between FinTech and non-FinTech mortgages more systematically, building on Table 2.

# III Is FinTech Lending Faster?

Our first research question is whether FinTech lenders are able to process mortgage applications more quickly than other lenders. We measure processing time by the number of days between application and origination date, as in Fuster et al. (2017b). We estimate the following OLS regression using loan-level HMDA data:

$$\text{Processing Time}_{ijct} = \delta_{ct} + \beta \text{FinTech}_j + \gamma \text{Controls}_{ijct} + \epsilon_{ijct} \tag{1}$$

where Processing $\text{Time}_{ijct}$ is for loan $i$ issued by lender $j$ in census tract $c$ for an application received in month $t$, $\text{FinTech}_j$ is an indicator variable equal to one for FinTech lenders and zero otherwise, $\delta_{ct}$ is a vector of census-tract-month fixed effects, and $\text{Controls}_{ijct}$ includes loan and borrower controls.[18] We winsorize the top and bottom 1% of processing times and cluster standard errors at the lender-month level.

Our regression includes a large number of observable loan and borrower characteristics to control for factors other than lender efficiency that may affect processing time (e.g., local laws, housing market conditions, the complexity of the loan, borrower, and property, and the speed of obtaining a property appraisal). We expect that our rich set of controls should account well for these factors. In particular, census-tract-month fixed effects control in a highly disaggregated way for common geographic and time variation in processing times. We conduct the analysis separately for home purchase mortgages and refinances because the latter do not require the homeowner to move and the application process is simpler.

[18] The control variables are the natural logarithm of borrower income, the natural logarithm of total loan amount, indicator variables for race and gender, an indicator variable for whether there is a coapplicant, an indicator variable for whether a pre-approval was requested, indicator variables for the occupancy and lien status of the loan, indicator variables for property type, indicator variables for whether the loan is insured by the FHA or the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and an indicator variable for loans above the conforming loan limit (i.e. jumbo loans), and an indicator variable in case applicant income is missing.

## A. *Processing time results*

Panel A of Table 3 presents the results for purchase mortgages. In column (1), we find that FinTech lenders process loans 7.9 days faster than non-FinTech lenders. This effect is large, corresponding to 15% of average home purchase processing time of 52 days. The result is slightly larger in magnitude and remains statistically significant when we include loan and borrower controls (col. 2), census tract-month fixed effects (col. 3), and both (col. 4, where the estimated effect corresponds to 18% of the average processing time). The results are also robust to dropping deposit-taking banks from the sample (col. 5), which suggests that the results are not driven by regulatory factors or the different funding model of banks.

Panel B of Table 3 finds even larger effects for refinances. Across specifications, FinTech lenders process mortgages 9.3 to 14.6 days faster than other lenders. The effect corresponds to 17%-29% of the average refinance loan processing time of 51 days. Again, the result is robust to comparing FinTech lenders only to other nonbanks, which suggests that it is not driven by regulation or funding. The FinTech advantage for refinance loans might be larger because refinances offer more scope for automation than home purchase loans. For example, home mortgage loans always require an appraisal, which is administered locally and is not (yet) automated. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that FinTech lending growth has been larger for refinances relative to home purchase loans.[19]

While these regressions capture average effects, it is instructive to study the entire distribution of processing times across lender types. We do so in Figure A.1 in the Internet Appendix, where we plot the cumulative distributions of processing times for both purchase and refinance mortgages, after accounting for census-tract-month fixed effects and loan characteristics. For purchase mortgages the advantage of FinTech lenders comes primarily from the right tail (i.e., there are few loans with very long processing times), while for refinances the entire distribution is shifted to the left. This again suggests that for refinances, it is more easily possible for FinTech lenders to realize efficiency gains, while for purchase loans

[19] In unreported results we also condition on whether the loans are FHA or VA insured loans, since anecdotally, underwriting rules are less flexible for these loans, possibly constraining the advantages of FinTech lenders. Indeed, we find for refinances that the FinTech lender advantage is lower by 3 days (relative to a sample of non-government or "conventional" loans). However, we detect no corresponding difference in FinTech lenders' processing time advantage among new purchase loans.

the scope may be more limited.

## B. *Additional analysis*

One potential concern is that our processing time results are affected by endogenous matching between borrowers and lenders. For instance, if younger borrowers are more likely to use FinTech lenders and also tend to submit their paperwork faster, FinTech lenders would appear to process mortgages more quickly, even if they do not have an inherent technological advantage. Alternatively, FinTech lenders may attract the most complex mortgage applications, which would attenuate the estimated FinTech processing time advantage.

We emphasize that the coefficient on FinTech lenders is robust across specifications and samples. If FinTech lenders matched with borrowers or loan types that are easier to process, then adding the control variables should attenuate the estimated coefficient; instead, the coefficient tends to get larger with additional controls. To the extent that unobservable factors that make some borrowers faster than others are also correlated with observables, this is a first piece of evidence that our results are unlikely to be driven by endogenous matching or other unobserved variables, but instead represent the direct effect of FinTech lending on processing times.

To investigate further, we examine whether the FinTech processing time advantage is driven by "fast borrowers" migrating to FinTech lenders. We implement this test in two stages. In the first stage, we predict the probability that each loan is originated by a FinTech lender as a function of loan and borrower characteristics. We then take this predicted probability and use it as an explanatory variable in a second stage analysis of processing times among non-FinTech mortgages. If non-FinTech lenders lose their faster customers to FinTech lenders, non-FinTech processing times should have increased disproportionately for borrower and loan types with high FinTech penetration (as measured by a high first-stage probability).

The second stage results are shown in Table A.1 in the Internet Appendix. In our baseline specification, we find a positive effect of the predicted FinTech probability on non-Fintech processing times. This is consistent with selection, although the coefficient is not nearly

large enough to explain our earlier processing time results.[20] In addition, the coefficient of interest flips sign once we control for lender-by-census tract fixed effects to allow for the possibility that FinTech lenders have a high market share in areas where traditional lenders are slow (col. 2 and 4 of the table). In sum, it does not appear that selection effects could easily explain the large processing time differences we document.

Furthermore, as a direct test of whether FinTech lenders match with "fast" borrowers, we study whether FinTech originators have gained the highest market share in geographic locations where processing times were shortest ex ante, measured in 2010 prior to the growth in FinTech. These results are presented in Section VII. To preview the key result, we in fact find the opposite; FinTech lenders have become popular in locations where processing times were originally *slow* conditional on observables. This is inconsistent with an "endogenous selection" interpretation of our processing time estimates, and in fact suggests that slow processing by traditional lenders may be a driver of the growth in FinTech lending.

Summing up, our results suggest that FinTech mortgage lenders are roughly 20% faster at processing mortgage originations than other lenders; the estimated effects range from 7.5-9.4 days for purchase mortgages and 9.3-14.6 days for refinances. Several pieces of evidence suggest that this finding is not due to endogenous borrower-lender matching or other omitted variable biases.[21]

# IV Is FinTech More Efficient or Just Less Careful?

The faster processing speeds of FinTech lenders could simply be a product of less careful screening of borrowers, rather than greater efficiency.[22] We test this "lax screening" hypoth-

[20] For instance, the coefficient of 2.5 in column (1) of Table A.1 means that moving from the 1st to the 99th percentile in predicted FinTech propensity, corresponding to a difference of 0.335, increases expected processing time by 0.85 days. This is only about one-tenth of the processing time advantage of FinTech lenders as estimated in Table 3. Magnitudes are similar in column (3), which limits the sample to refinances.

[21] As a "reality check", our estimates also appear roughly comparable to industry-based estimates of the processing-time advantage of technology-based lending. In particular, Quicken Loans (2017b) claims that importing income and asset information through their online platform reduces client mortgage processing by 12 days on average. Although it is not clear exactly how this statistic is calculated, it is interesting that it is in the same ballpark as our estimate of a 8-14 day difference in processing times between FinTech originators and other lenders.

[22] For instance, using proprietary lender data, LaCour-Little (2007) documents that prior to the financial crisis, processing times were shortest for non-agency non-prime mortgages. This category of loans subse-

esis by studying the ex-post performance of FinTech loans compared to similar mortgages from other lenders. We focus on FHA lending, which has been the riskiest segment of the mortgage market in recent years and where we are therefore most likely to detect differences in loan risk.[23] We use two separate sources of publicly available data on FHA mortgage defaults: segment level data extracted from the FHA Neighborhood Watch Early Warning System ("FHA NW data") and FHA loan-level data from Ginnie Mae ("FHA Ginnie Mae data"). To our knowledge, this is the first academic study to make systematic use of either of these data sources.[24]

## *A. Analysis of default rates in FHA NW data*

We start by analyzing default rates on FHA loans using FHA NW data. The data contains origination volume and default rates for each lender at the national level and by state and metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The data are available for all FHA loans as well as certain subcategories including home purchase mortgages, refinances, and mortgages originated in underserved census tracts.[25] The data generally covers the period 2015:Q3 to 2017:Q3, although state and national data for all loans (not broken down by loan type) are available over a longer sample period from 2012:Q3 to 2017:Q3.

Default rates are calculated as the share of loans that become at least 90 days delinquent or are the subject of an FHA insurance claim within a specific time horizon after origination. The data include rates at one-year ("1 Year Default") and two-year ("2 Year Default")

quently experienced extremely high default rates during the crisis.

[23]FHA mortgages require a down payment of as little as 3.5% and are generally made to borrowers with low credit scores who do not qualify for a prime conforming loan. FHA loans are government-guaranteed, which limits the credit risk for the lender. However the lender is not fully indemnified against risk since the FHA can refuse to compensate the lender for credit losses in cases of fraud or other defects in mortgage underwriting. FHA lenders have also paid out large legal settlements on FHA loans due to breaches of the False Claims Act and other laws. As a result of these risks, many large bank lenders have withdrawn from FHA lending or wound back their participation in the market (see e.g., Wall Street Journal, 2015).

[24]The FHA Ginnie Mae data are similar to the loan-level data made available by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These are analyzed by Buchak et al. (2017), who find little difference in default probabilities between FinTech and other lenders (for origination vintages 2010-2013). The main drawback of the GSE data is that these prime agency mortgages have experienced very low default rates for recent vintages (as they are significantly less risky than FHA loans) so that it may be difficult to detect differences across lenders.

[25]A census tract is considered underserved by the FHA based on an administrative classification derived from median income and the share of minority households.

horizons. In order to control for geographic variation in default rates we scale a lender's default rate in each location by the overall default rate in that area. As an alternative to raw default rates, the data also contain the "Supplementary Performance Metric" (SPM), which scales a lender's default rate by a benchmark default rate defined based on the credit score distribution of the underlying mortgages. Again, we then take the ratio of the lender's SPM to the overall SPM in the area. The SPM is only available at the state and national level and at a two-year horizon after origination ("Mix-Adjusted 2 Year Default").

Our analysis focuses on the difference in default rates between FinTech lenders and other lenders. We compute the difference by taking by taking the weighted average of FinTech relative default rates using origination volume by region and lender as weights and subtracting one. This measure yields zero if there no differences in default rates between FinTech lenders and other lenders. We use a difference-in-means test to examine the null hypothesis that FinTech lender default rates are the same as other lenders.

Table 4 reports the results. Column (1) presents the relative difference in default rates for FinTech lenders using 1-year default as the default measure. In Panel A, we find that loans originated by FinTech lenders are 35% less likely to default than comparable loans originated by non-FinTech lenders. The coefficient is almost unchanged when using MSA-level data instead of state-level data and when using the 2-year default rate instead of the 1-year default rate (col. 2). The coefficient remains statistically significant, albeit the effect is smaller (-25.5%) when using the mix-adjusted default rate, based on the SPM, as the outcome variable (col. 3). We find quantitatively similar results when restricting the sample to high-market share regions (Panel B), when considering home purchase loans or refinances separately (Panel C), for loans to underserved neighborhoods (Panel D), and when considering a longer sample period (Panel E). Overall, we find no evidence that FinTech loans are risker than non-FinTech loans; in fact, they appear to default less often.

## *B. Loan-level analysis of FHA default rates*

We complement this evidence with a loan-level analysis of data on FHA mortgages securitized into Ginnie Mae MBS. The main advantage of the Ginnie Mae data relative to the FHA NW

data is that they include a rich set of loan and borrower characteristics (e.g., the borrower's credit score and the loan-to-value ratio). This allow us to investigate whether FinTech lenders target specific borrower types based on their riskiness and whether differences in default rates can be explained by differences in observable characteristics. A disadvantage of the Ginnie Mae data is that they only include the identity of the *MBS issuer*, not the mortgage originator. Hence, the data do not perfectly identify which loans come from FinTech lenders. However, the issuer and originator are typically the same and a comparison to HMDA suggests mismeasurement is concentrated among small lenders.[26]

Our sample consists of data from September 2013 (when the Ginnie Mae data first become available) until May 2017. We restrict the sample to 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, which are by far the most common FHA loan type. We estimate the following OLS regression:

$$\text{Default}_{ijst} = \alpha + \beta \text{FinTech}_j + \gamma \text{Controls}_{ijst} + \epsilon_{ijst} \tag{2}$$

where $\text{Default}_{ijst}$ on loan $i$ by lender $j$ in state $s$ originated in month $t$ is an indicator variable equal to one if a loan ever becomes delinquent for 90 days or longer over our observation period, $\text{FinTech}_j$ is an indicator variable equal to one for FinTech issuers, and $\text{Controls}_{ijst}$ is a broad set of control variables such as origination month or state-by-origination month fixed effects, loan purpose fixed effects, and other loan controls including borrower FICO score, loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and debt-to-income ratio (DTI).[27] We cluster standard errors at the issuer-origination month level.

Table 5 presents the results. Column (1) controls for origination-month fixed effects only and finds that FinTech borrowers are 1.29 percentage points less likely to default than non-FinTech borrowers, equivalent to 35% of the overall default rate of 3.65%. This result is very similar to the estimates based on FHA NW data. Column (2) adds loan purpose fixed effects. The effect declines to 0.91 percentage points, or 27%, but remains statistically

[26]For some small FinTech lenders, the number of MBS-issued loans is substantially smaller than their number of originated loans in HMDA, implying that they sell a significant portion of their loans to other firms before issuance. The effect on identifying FinTech loans should be limited given that this issue primarily affects smaller lenders.

[27]Other loan controls include the log of the loan amount and indicators for the number of borrowers, the property type, whether the borrower received down payment assistance, and for whether a loan's FICO, LTV, or DTI are missing.

significant. This result reflects the fact that FinTech lenders issue more refinance mortgages than home purchase mortgages, and that refinances tend to be less risky (especially those not involving cash-out). In column (3), we add further loan level controls such as FICO and LTV. We see that this has only a small incremental effect on the coefficient of interest, implying that FinTech lenders do not originate loans that are less risky based on these observable characteristics. Columns (4) and (5) split the sample by loan purpose; the effect is slightly larger for home purchase mortgages, but is also sizable for refinances.[28]

## C. *Are FinTech lenders cream skimming?*

Our analysis of default rates finds no evidence that FinTech lenders originate riskier mortgages—in fact, in the FHA market we find the opposite result. The difference in default rates varies across specifications but is statistically significant in almost all of them and the magnitude is economically large—default rates for FinTech-originated loans are about 25% lower in column (3) of Table 5, which includes the largest set of controls, and ranges between 10-40 percent in the other specifications. The results are robust to using two different datasets (FHA Neighborhood data and Ginnie Mae loan-level data) and to different sets of controls for loan, borrower and location characteristics.

Our findings speak directly against the "lax screening" hypothesis. If anything, they suggest that the automated technologies used by FinTech lenders may screen borrowers more effectively than the more labor-intensive methods used by other lenders (e.g., because the automated systems directly check databases of original source documents, reducing the possibility of fraud). This reasoning has been emphasized by industry experts (e.g., Goodman, 2016), and to our knowledge we provide the first systematic evidence to support it.

Although superior screening of credit risk can be viewed as an advantage of FinTech lending, it may also have negative consequences for some borrowers, or for the government, due to "cream skimming" of the highest value customers. For example, cream skimming could lead to ex ante credit rationing by weakening the credit quality of the remaining

[28] In further (unreported) regressions, we have found that the relative effect size is fairly stable if we repeat the regressions for each loan origination year 2013-2017. Furthermore, the Ginnie Mae data also contain mortgages guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA); for those loans, which default at lower rates than FHA ones, the relative decrease in default hazard for FinTech-originated loans is again similar.

borrower pool—this mechanism is explored by Mayer et al. (2013) in the context of private subprime mortgage lending. Alternatively, it could shift costs to the government if private and public lenders compete for borrowers, an argument that has been made in the context of FinTech lenders like SoFi in the student loan market[29].

In the context of mortgage lending in the current environment, it is unlikely that cream skimming by FinTech lenders has economically significant effects. The reason is that during our analysis period the vast majority of all risky mortgages in the U.S. are government insured at a pre-set price, either by the FHA or other government agencies such as the Department of Veterans Affairs. Consequently, cream skimming by FinTech lenders is unlikely to materially affect credit access for remaining borrowers, who will still qualify for government insurance.

Even so, we estimate two specifications to investigate possible cream-skimming effects. First, we examine whether a higher FinTech market share in a location helps to reduce overall mortgage default risk in that location, as opposed to FinTech lenders just selecting the lowest-default borrowers from a fixed pool. We also test whether the default advantage of FinTech lenders diminishes as their market share increases. If the distribution of risky borrowers is unchanged by the presence of FinTech lenders, then as their market share increases in an area their performance advantage will diminish, as they expand their lending to the more risky borrowers.

We present the results, based on the Ginnie Mae data from the previous subsection, in columns (6) and (7) of Table 5. Column (6) estimates the direct effect of FinTech state-level market share on default. Although the point estimate is negative, the effect is economically small and statistically insignificant. This result suggests that there is no discernable effect of an increased FinTech footprint on the overall default risk of borrowers receiving mortgage credit. We note that the estimate has large standard errors; it would be interesting to revisit this analysis in the future when the market share of FinTech lending is larger.

Column (7) adds the interaction of the FinTech lender indicator variable and local FinTech market share and finds that the coefficient on the interaction is negative and marginally significant. This result suggests that the better default performance of FinTech mortgages

[29]See e.g. `https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-10/student-loan-refinancing-boom-could-cost-u-s-taxpayers-billions`.

in fact tends to be *more* pronounced in regions where FinTech has a larger market share. On the other hand, however, in Panel B of Table 4, we find a lower FinTech default advantage in markets where the lender has a high market share (although the difference is not statistically significant, and even in these locations, FinTech default rates remain lower than the market as a whole).

While somewhat mixed, none of the results suggest a robust positive relation between market share and risk. In addition, we find no evidence that the lower default rate of FinTech lenders disappears in locations where their market share is high. In sum, the findings suggest that the lower default rates associated with FinTech lending is not simply due to positive selection of low-risk borrowers.

## *D. Are FinTech lenders charging higher interest rates?*

Related, we can also use FHA loan-level data from Ginnie Mae to test whether FinTech lenders charge higher or lower mortgage interest rates conditional on observables. Results are shown in Table A.2 in the Internet Appendix. We find that FinTech lenders offer interest rates which are 2.3bp lower overall—splitting the sample by loan purpose, the effect is 7.5bp for purchase mortgages and effectively zero for refinances.[30] Although these differences are small in magnitude, the direction of the effect is consistent with the Buchak et al. (2017) estimates for FHA loans (although they are cautious in drawing inferences from their results because their FHA dataset includes fewer loan-level controls than the data used here). However, it contrasts with Buchak et al.'s finding that FinTech lenders charge higher rates for GSE mortgages. One possible explanation that could account for both sets of results, and is in line with some of Buchak et al.'s other evidence, is that lower-income borrowers, who are more likely to obtain FHA loans, are more price sensitive and less willing to pay a premium for convenience.

[30] We note that these coefficients are not particularly stable if we allow them to vary over time — in some time periods the FinTech coefficient is positive and significant, but over others it is negative and significant. A potential explanation is that movements in market interest rates may be reflected at different times on rates on originated loans between FinTech and other lenders, due to differences in processing times. The Ginnie Mae data, or the GSE data used by Buchak et al. (2017), does not easily allow one to cleanly control for this.

# V Is FinTech Lending More Elastic?

We next study whether FinTech lenders are better able to accommodate shocks to mortgage demand. Mortgage application volumes in the U.S. fluctuate enormously over time, primarily due to movements in interest rates that can lead to "refinancing waves." There is also substantial cross-sectional variation in demand for new mortgages, for example due to differential housing market trends.

Managing volatility in mortgage applications is a key challenge for lenders. If a lender receives more applications than their underwriting process can accommodate, their processing cycle times increase and they risk losing money (and future business) due to loans not closing in a timely manner. Figure 2, which is similar to evidence in Fuster et al. (2017b), illustrates two main points. First, as shown in panel (a), there is large variation in the level of monthly applications, with the peak level being almost three times as high as the trough. Application volume co-moves closely with borrowers' average incentive to refinance, here proxied by the difference between the average coupon rate on outstanding mortgages and the 10-year Treasury yield. Second, panel (b) shows that fluctuations in median processing times are sizable (from a low of 37 days to a high of 51 days), and that processing times are strongly positively correlated with total mortgage applications.[31]

By automating, centralizing and standardizing much of the underwriting process, FinTech lenders may conceivably increase the short-run elasticity of lending supply in response to demand shocks. However, testing whether capacity constraints are less binding for FinTech lenders presents a clear empirical challenge: the volume of applications a lender receives is endogenous. For example, lenders may solicit applications when processing constraints are slack and discourage applications when processing times are expected to be long. Both behaviors would attenuate the relationship between applications and processing time and obfuscate differences across lenders.

[31] One exception: between October and December 2015, processing times increase even though applications decrease. This is most likely due to the implementation of new loan disclosure rules ("TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure," or TRID) on October 3, 2015. These new rules required many lenders to adjust their underwriting processes, resulting in delays. For more details, see e.g. `https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-mortgage-rules-may-spark-delays-frustration-1443519000`.

## A. *Demand shocks and processing time*

We identify differences in supply elasticity by exploiting demand shocks that vary application volumes independent of firm-specific conditions. We use time-series variation in *total* applications, which is primarily determined by macroeconomic factors, in particular long-term interest rates, and is plausibly exogenous to the capacity contraints facing any individual lender. We test whether FinTech mortgage processing times are less sensitive to variation in total application volume by estimating the following regression using loan-level HMDA data from 2010 through June of 2016:

$$\text{Processing Time}_{ijct} = \gamma \text{Applications}_t + \beta \text{Applications}_t \times \text{FinTech}_j + \alpha_j + \delta_c + \theta \text{Controls}_{it} + \epsilon_{ijct} \quad (3)$$

where Processing $\text{Time}_{ijct}$ is the number of days between application and closing for mortgage $i$ from lender $j$ in census tract $c$ and application month $t$, $\text{Applications}_t$ is the log of aggregate mortgage applications in month $t$, $\text{FinTech}_j$ is an indicator variable equal to one for FinTech lenders, $\alpha_j$ and $\delta_c$ are vectors of lender and census-tract fixed effects, and $\text{Controls}_{it}$ includes borrower and loan controls similar to Table 3 as well as calendar month dummies to account for seasonality and dummies for loan purpose (purchase versus refinancing). Standard errors are clustered by lender-month.

Table 6 presents the results. The first two columns consider all originated loans; column (1) controls only for lender dummies, while column (2) includes additional controls for loan and borrower characteristics, location, and month. We find that FinTech lenders are about half as sensitive to aggregate mortgage application volumes as other lenders. Quantitatively, a 10% rise in overall application volume increases processing time by 1.3 days for non-FinTech lenders but only 0.7 days for FinTech firms (based on column 2). Column (3) restricts the sample to refinances, the market where FinTech lenders specialize and where interest rates matter most for demand. We find that processing times for refinances are more sensitive to aggregate volumes, but again FinTech lenders are only half as sensitive. Column (4) considers all applications, including denied and withdrawn applications; again, the results are similar. All results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Columns (5)-(7) repeat the prior three specifications but restrict the sample to nonbanks. The degree to which FinTech

lenders are less sensitive to aggregate applications is not as large in this sample but the magnitudes are still economically meaningful. FinTech lenders are 20-40% less sensitive to aggregate volumes relative to nonbanks, again statistically significant at the 1% level except for column (5), where $p = 0.14$.[32]

The differential sensitivity of FinTech lender processing times to application volume is also illustrated visually in Figure 3. This binned scatter plot confirms that FinTech lenders have shorter processing times on average, as already shown in Section III. More importantly, processing time for Fintech lenders is also less sensitive to demand for new mortgages compared to banks and (to a lesser extent) other non-bank lenders. This lower sensitivity is particularly apparent at the highest levels of application volume (when aggregate application volume exceeds 1.2 million mortgages per month).

## B. *Alternative demand shocks and processing time*

We repeat the analysis using the weighted average coupon on the universe of fixed-rate MBS less the 10-year Treasury yield ("Refi Incentive") as our measure of mortgage demand, instead of log application volume.[33] Our findings, presented in columns (1)-(3) of Table A.3 in the Internet Appendix, are similar to those discussed above. A higher refinancing incentive is significantly correlated with longer processing times across specifications, but processing times for FinTech lenders are significantly less sensitive, if anything by a larger proportion than in our main results. The consistency with our earlier findings is sensible given that we show in Figure 2 that refinancing incentives are the key determinant of mortgage application volume. The result does, however, address any concerns that our earlier results are affected by idiosyncratic shocks to individual large lenders that are large enough to influence aggregate applications.

As alternative approach, we also construct a "Bartik-style" index of exposure to local fluctuations in mortgage application volume based on the geography of lender activity. The

[32] In unreported results, we consider specifications with time fixed effects and draw similar conclusions. While it absorbs all time-series variation, this alternative specification does not allow us to observe the uninteracted coefficient on aggregate application volume.

[33] As in Fuster et al. (2017b), we use the 10-year Treasury rate rather than a market rate on new mortgages in order to prevent endogeneity to concurrent supply conditions in the mortgage market.

index is calculated as the log of the weighted sum of county-level mortgage applications in month $t$, where the weights are the lender's average market shares in each county measured over the entire sample period. The identification assumption is that application volumes in a geographic area are exogenous to any given market participant's share. We present the results in in columns (4)-(6) of Table A.3 in the Internet Appendix. Processing times are positively correlated with the proxy, although once again, less so for FinTech lenders when we consider refinancing loans and all applications. There is no statistically significant effect for the sample of all originated loans (col. 4).

Taking together, results based on two alternative measures of loan demand indicate that FinTech lenders are less sensitive to exogenous demand shocks than other lenders, supporting our main findings in Table 6.

## *C. Demand shocks and application denial rates*

A possible concern is that our results may reflect credit rationing. If FinTech lenders avoid capacity constraints by becoming more selective and rationing credit when total mortgage demand rises, their processing times may seem less sensitive to demand even if they are not actually more elastic. We test this hypothesis by examining whether denial rates for FinTech lenders are differentially sensitive to aggregate application volume. The regression specification is identical to Eq. (3) above, except that the left-hand side variable is an indicator variable equal to one if a loan application was denied and zero otherwise. The sample includes all applications that were either approved or denied.

Table 7 presents the results. We find that FinTech lenders reduce denial rates by 1.1% percentage points for each 10% increase in application volume (col. 1). The effect is similar when focusing on refinance mortgages (col. 2), restricting the sample to nonbanks (col. 3), and focusing on refinance mortgages among nonbanks (col. 4). These results are inconsistent with credit rationing and instead provide further evidence that FinTech lenders' credit supply is more elastic than those of other lenders.[34]

[34] In unreported results, we find that FinTech lenders on average have a roughly 2.5 percentage point higher denial rate than banks (though the difference is statistically insignificant), and a 3.5 percentage higher denial rate than other nonbank lenders (significant at $p < 0.1$), conditional on our typical set of controls. This could reflect more stringent screening, or alternatively that with online applications, there is no "filtering"

We point out that the direct effect of application volume on denial rates is negative across all specifications. This may seem counter-intuitive, although it likely reflects the fact that when applications rise due to changes in interest rates, the average credit quality of applicants improves.[35]

## D. *Demand shocks and origination volumes*

We also analyze whether mortgage origination volumes for FinTech lenders respond differentially to changes in total applications. Analysis of quantities over our short sample period is difficult because there are differential trends in application volumes across lender types and across individual firms within a type. We estimate a model in first differences to partial out these trends:

$$\Delta\text{Originations}_{jt} = \gamma\Delta\text{Applications}_t + \beta\Delta\text{Applications}_t \times \text{FinTech}_j + \alpha_j + \epsilon_{jt}$$

where $\text{Originations}_{jt}$ is the log of originated applications (by lender $j$ for applications in month $t$) and $\text{Applications}_t$ is the log of aggregate application volume. Lender origination changes are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers. We include lender fixed effects, $\alpha_i$, to allow for lender-specific differences in the average growth rate over the analysis period. We restrict the sample to lenders who rank in the top 500 in volume at some point during the sample period.

We find no meaningful difference in origination sensitivity for FinTech lenders. As shown in Table 8, FinTech origination volume appears equally sensitive to changes in aggregate application volumes as those of all other lenders (col. 1 and 2) and nonbanks (cols. 3 and 4). Hence, similar to our results on denials, we find no evidence that the lower sensitivity of FinTech lender processing times comes at the expense of lower originations due to credit rationing; conversely, though, we do not see an obvious increase in origination growth for

by a loan officer that may discourage borrowers from applying when their chances of approval are low.

[35] In line with this interpretation, Fuster and Willen (2010) show that denial probabilities fell for all income levels in the wake of the first MBS purchase announcement by the Federal Reserve in late 2008 (when application volumes surged), and that average FICO scores (which are not in HMDA) increased sharply.

FinTech lenders when application volume rises. Overall, we are cautious about drawing strong conclusions from this analysis as it is quite difficult to establish lender-type specific effects given the strong and nonlinear upward trend in the FinTech lender market share during this period.

# VI FinTech and Mortgage Refinancing

This section examines whether the presence of FinTech lenders affects mortgage refinancing behavior by borrowers. Prior work has shown that many borrowers do not refinance their fixed-rate mortgages optimally; they commit errors either by failing to refinance when it is in their financial interest to do so, or by refinancing even though the costs of doing so exceed the benefits (e.g., Campbell, 2006; Agarwal et al., 2015; Andersen et al., 2015; Keys et al., 2016). In addition to behavioral factors, intermediation frictions in the mortgage market also contribute to inefficient refinancing patterns (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2017; Bond et al., 2017; Scharfstein and Sunderam, 2016). These frictions weaken the "refinancing channel" of monetary policy (e.g., Beraja et al., 2017; Di Maggio et al., 2016; Wong, 2016). Examining the effect of FinTech on refinancing is thus important, since this is one channel through which technological progress in the mortgage industry may have real effects on the economy.

Industry reports and academic research indicate that mortgage-backed securities backed by FinTech loans do exhibit faster prepayment speeds than pools from other lenders, consistent with an effect of FinTech on the speed of refinancing (e.g., Goldman Sachs Research, 2016; Buchak et al., 2017). However, it is unclear whether this fact reflects faster-prepaying borrowers selecting into mortgages from FinTech lenders, or whether FinTech lending directly affects the likelihood of refinancing, thereby potentially affecting aggregate refinancing behavior. If FinTech mortgage lending does affect the market-wide propensity to refinance, an important follow-up question is whether this is due to a reduction in errors of omission (meaning that more borrowers who should refinance do so), or instead reflects an increase in errors of commission (more borrowers refinance even when they should not). Below, we assess this based on the optimal refinancing decision rule of Agarwal et al. (2013).

To measure refinancing behavior, we use data from Equifax's Credit Risk Insight Servicing

McDash (CRISM) dataset, which merges McDash mortgage servicing records from Black Knight with credit bureau data from Equifax. The sample period is January 2010 through June 2016. The CRISM dataset provides information on loan and borrower characteristics such as FICO score, CLTV, interest rate, and loan term, and features borrower identifiers that allow us to track a borrower across loans and thereby identify mortgage refinancing.[36] We focus on the 500 largest counties by loan volume. Details on the sample construction and how we measure refinancing are provided in Section D of the Internet Appendix, where we also confirm that the average refinance propensity we measure in our data is closely aligned with variation over time in the volume of of refinancing loans in HMDA.

## A. *Refinancing propensity*

We measure the effect of FinTech lending on monthly refinancing propensities using the following OLS regression:

$$\text{Refi Propensity}_{c,t} = \alpha_c + \alpha_t + \beta \cdot \text{FinTechShare}_{c,t-s} + \Gamma \cdot \mathbf{X}_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,t} \tag{4}$$

where Refi Propensity$_{c,t}$ is the share of mortgages in county $c$ in month $t$ that are refinanced and FinTechShare$_{c,t-s}$ is the one-quarter-lagged four-quarter moving average market share of FinTech mortgage lenders among refinance loans in a county. We include county fixed effects, $\alpha_c$, to control for fixed unobservable differences in refinancing speeds across counties and month fixed effects, $\alpha_t$, to control for aggregate conditions.[37] The time-varying county-level controls $\mathbf{X}_{c,t}$ include average FICO score, average CLTV, the average interest rate on outstanding loans, and the share of outstanding loans that are FHA or VA loans. We run the regressions separately for the sample of all outstanding loans, and restricting to 30-year

[36] CRISM has previously been used to study refinancing by Beraja et al. (2017) and Di Maggio et al. (2016).

[37] Market shares are calculated based on HMDA. Results are similar if we use all loans, rather than just refinances, to calculate the market share (although we view this alternative approach as less conceptually appealing, because composition effects imply that the overall FinTech market share will be affected by the relative volume of purchase loans versus refinances, which in turn is related to our outcome variable). Market shares are calculated on a volume-weighted basis, although results are similar if we use loan-count weighted shares instead. Similarly, our results are robust to using alternative timing conventions, such as the share over the previous calendar year.

FRMs only. We cluster standard errors by county.

Table 9 shows that there is a positive and strongly statistically significant association between refinancing propensities and FinTech market share. The estimate of 0.689 in column (2) implies that an 8 percentage point increase in FinTech market share (corresonding to moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of county averages in 2015) is associated with a 0.055 percentage point increase in the refinancing propensity, about a 10% increase relative to the average monthly refinancing propensity over this time period of 0.54%. Thus, the magnitude of the effect is economically meaningful.[38]

Figure 4 further illustrates the effect. Here we sort the counties into fixed terciles based on their FinTech market share in the middle of our sample period (between mid-2012 to mid-2013). We then plot the average refinance propensity in each tercile over time. We see that in 2010, before the growth in FinTech lending, the tercile of counties where FinTech lenders subsequently gained the most market share has the slowest refinancing speeds. The refinancing propensity across the three terciles converge over time, however, coincident with the growth in FinTech lending. This suggests that FinTech mortgage lenders have helped "slow" refinancing counties to "catch up."

In summary, our results show that the faster prepayment speeds on FinTech mortgages are also reflected in overall market-wide local refinancing propensities, rather than just being due to a selection of "fast" borrowers into FinTech loans. As a caveat on our results, we note that, although our regressions condition on county and time fixed effects, the differential growth in FinTech market share across counties may not be exogenous with respect to refinancing propensities. For instance, it is possible that FinTech lenders predicted correctly which geographic regions still had the most potential for higher refinancing volumes, and advertised and expanded most intensively there. At the least, however, our results suggest that a higher presence of FinTech lending leads to faster mortgage refinancing, perhaps by reducing the transaction or time costs of refinancing.[39]

[38] We have also replicated these regressions using HMDA data, where we use the log of the number of refinance loans originated in a county-month as the dependent variable. The lagged FinTech market share (controlling for county and month fixed effects) is again positively and significantly associated with refinance originations, and the magnitude of the effect is comparable to the estimates in Table 9.

[39] Our findings here have an interesting parallel to earlier work by Bennett et al. (2001), who find evidence that technological innovation in the 1990s reduced refinancing frictions and increased mortgage refinancing speeds.

## B. *Refinancing optimality*

We next examine whether the increase in refinancing speeds documented above is associated with more *optimal* refinancing decisions. In other words, is it driven by higher refinancing by borrowers with a high mortgage coupon rate relative to the available rate on new loans, and who thus realize large savings in interest costs by refinancing (fewer errors of omission)? Or is it due in large part to borrowers who refinanced more frequently but should not have done so because the interest savings were small and outweighed by the costs of refinancing (more errors of commission)?

To determine the breakeven interest rate differential beyond which a borrower should refinance, we use the "square-root rule" of Agarwal, Driscoll, and Laibson (2013), henceforth ADL.[40] For this analysis, we restrict the sample to 30-year FRMs, since the ADL optimality calculation was derived for FRMs; it does not apply to adjustable-rate loans. We note that the ADL calculation embeds a number of assumptions about the costs and benefits of refinancing; among these, it does not account for other common refinancing motives, such as cashing out home equity, shortening the term of the loan, or refinancing from a mortgage type that requires mortgage insurance (such as FHA loans) to one that does not. While the ADL benchmark is very useful, it is ultimately a simplification.

Based on the ADL rule, we find, similar to Keys et al. (2016), that at certain points over our sample period, a lot of borrowers should refinance. For instance, in late 2012, about 60% of all 30-year FRM borrowers in our sample should have refinanced according to the ADL benchmark, yet only a significantly smaller percentage did so. However, similar to Agarwal et al. (2015), we find that among refinances that do occur, more than half are executed at a rate differential that is *too small* when assessed against the ADL rule. Thus, at least when compared to this benchmark, there is substantial scope for enhanced refinancing efficiency.

In Table 10, we estimate loan-level regressions similar to the county-level specifications from above, but now separating outstanding mortgages into different bins depending on how "in the money" the refinancing option is. Specifically, the "refi incentive" shown in

[40] The square-root rule is a second-order approximation that comes close to the (more complicated) optimal decision rule derived by ADL. As inputs to the calculation, we require assumptions on discount rates, tax rates, moving probabilities, interest rate volatility, and (most importantly) the upfront costs associated with refinancing; we use the same parameter values as ADL's baseline calibration (following also Keys et al. 2016).

the table is equal to the difference between the outstanding mortgage rate and current market rate, minus the optimal refinancing differential according to ADL.[41] For instance, if a borrower is currently paying 6.5%, the market interest rate is at 4.5%, and the optimal refinancing differential is 1.5% based on the ADL formula, the borrower would have a 0.5% positive refinancing incentive. If the market rate increases to 5.5%, the refinancing incentive would become negative. Even though a refinancing in this situation would still reduce the borrower's monthly payments, the savings would not be sufficient to outweigh the fixed costs of refinancing and the loss of option value.

Column (1) shows that for borrowers where the refinancing option is more than 1 percentage point out of the money, a higher local FinTech share has a marginally *negative* effect on the likelihood of refinancing. The effect of a higher FinTech share then becomes positive, and is highest for borrowers that are within 50 basis points of their optimal refinancing differential (columns 3 and 4). The effect size then decreases again somewhat for borrowers that have a large refinancing incentive according to ADL; these borrowers in many cases have suboptimally failed to refinance for a long period of time (given that the refinancing incentive is driven by market interest rates, which drift only slowly through time). In industry jargon, these borrowers are sometimes called "woodheads" (Deng and Quigley, 2012).

The results imply that an increased presence of FinTech lenders is most strongly associated with higher refinancing when the borrower's incentive to refinance is either "at the money" or just "in the money." It does not appear that FinTech lenders induce an increase in grossly inefficient refinancings (if anything, the reverse is true), although they also do not spur a large increase in refinancing for the borrowers who would gain the most from doing so.

We present additional evidence in Table A.4 of the Internet Appendix. Specifically we examine refinances from 30-year FRMs to new 30-year FRMs, and find that a higher local FinTech share is associated with a higher fraction of refinances that would be classified as optimal; larger decreases in the interest rate a borrower is paying; and a higher fraction of cash-out refinancings.

[41] The FRM market rate is measured using the 30-year FRM rate from Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage Market Survey, which is a standard source for academic research and policy analysis.

In sum, the results suggest that a higher share of FinTech lending is associated not just with faster refinancing, but also more optimal refinancing decisions. However, this effect appears somewhat weaker for the borrowers that would most benefit from additional refinancing. Such borrowers may be less financially literate; we show in the next section that proxies for financial literacy are negatively correlated with takeup of mortgages from FinTech lenders. In some cases seemingly "woodhead" borrowers may face other obstacles that prevent refinancing (e.g., a significant decline in income since the original mortgage was received). To the extent that an increased FinTech share in the market overall continues to lead to faster refinancing, it is in fact possible that borrowers who themselves are limited in their sophistication or are otherwise unable to refinance may be worse off: in equilibrium faster prepayment speeds will be priced in MBS valuations, which could feed through to higher market mortgage rates.

# VII Who Borrows From FinTech Lenders?

The market share of FinTech lenders varies significantly by geography and across segments of the mortgage market.[42] In this section we estimate a simple model of the likelihood of borrowing from a FinTech mortgage lender as a function of loan, borrower and location characteristics. We then compare the cross-sectional patterns in the data to a number of hypotheses about the drivers of the growth in FinTech mortgage borrowing.

We estimate a loan-level linear probability model using pooled HMDA data on mortgage originations from 2010 to 2016:

$$\text{FinTech}_{i,c,t} = \alpha_t + \beta \cdot \text{Controls}_{i,c,t} + \Gamma \cdot \text{location}_c + \epsilon_{l,c,t} \tag{5}$$

where $\text{FinTech}_{i,c,t}$ is equal to 100 if mortgage $i$ in census tract $c$ originated at time $t$ was orig-

[42] Table 2 provides univariate summary statistics about the characteristics of mortgages from FinTech lenders. Figure E in the Internet Appendix maps the FinTech market share of mortgage originations in 2010 and 2016. This map highlights the substantial geographic variation in the market share of FinTech lenders, as well as the widespread growth in technology-based lending over our sample period. One limitation of HMDA is that market coverage outside of MSAs may be more limited, because very small lenders and lenders that do not operate in MSAs do not need to report. However, our regression results in this section are robust to restricting the sample to MSAs.

inated by a FinTech lender and zero otherwise, $\alpha_t$ is a vector of time dummies, $\text{Controls}_{i,c,t}$ is a set of loan and borrower characteristics drawn from HMDA, and $\text{location}_c$ is a set of local geographic and socioeconomic variables measured at the census tract or county level, drawn from a variety of sources including the U.S. Census, American Community Survey and the FRBNY consumer credit panel. These location variables are measured in 2010, or otherwise as early in time as possible, to minimize any concerns about reverse causality. Data definitions and sources are provided in the Data Appendix.

We estimate this model separately for purchase mortgages and refinances, because the determinants of demand may be quite different between the two, and because the market share of FinTech lenders is significantly higher for refinances (Table 2). Since differences in borrower characteristics between FinTech lenders and banks may be driven by regulatory factors, we present each specification both including and excluding mortgages from banks. In the specifications excluding banks, FinTech lenders are compared to other nonbanks, who are regulated similarly and have the same funding model.

## *A. Results*

Estimates are presented in Table 11. Each continuous right-hand side variable is normalized to have a standard deviation of one, so that magnitudes can be compared across variables.[43] Below, we discuss the cross-sectional patterns relative to the predictions of four sets of potential drivers of the growth in FinTech mortgage lending: (i) access to finance, (ii) technology adoption and financial literacy, (iii) Internet access, and (iv) local mortgage and housing market conditions.

**Access to finance**. We find no strong evidence that FinTech lenders disproportionately cater to financially constrained borrowers (e.g., borrowers with low incomes or poor credit

[43]Beyond the main variables of interest reported in the table, regressions also control for loan size (in logs), dummies for loan type (jumbo, FHA, VA), dummies for coapplicant and investor loan, additional individual-level race dummies, state dummies, and dummies for missing values for each variable with incomplete data coverage. See Internet Appendix F for a full table of results including these variables. The table in the Internet Appendix also presents results of univariate regressions in which the FinTech dummy is regressed individually on each right-hand-side variable. The only additional control included in these univariate regressions is the vector of time dummies. Comparing the univariate and multivariate results helps to show which results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of other variables.

histories), particularly compared to other nonbanks. Although the FinTech market share is higher in census tracts where mortgage borrowers have lower average credit scores, the results for income and the share of FHA/VA-insured mortgages are mixed depending on the type of loan and comparison group.[44] As shown in Section IV, FinTech mortgages also have comparatively lower default rates on FHA loans, suggesting they are not targeting the riskiest borrowers. Nonbank lenders overall, including FinTech lenders, originate a significantly higher share of FHA and VA loans than banks, however (see Table 2 or the Internet Appendix). Buchak et al. (2017) attribute the low levels of bank FHA lending to regulatory and legal factors. FinTech lenders attract a higher share of female borrowers, although the share of black or hispanic borrowers is lower in most specifications.[45]

Also related to access to finance, we test whether FinTech borrowing is higher in census tracts with few physical bank branches. We measure branch access as the number of bank branches within a 25 mile radius of the geographic midpoint of the census tract, based on FDIC Summary of Deposits data. Even though the FinTech business model is focused on online applications, we find that the share of FinTech borrowing is *increasing* in bank branch density.

**Technology adoption and financial literacy.** Early technology adoption is often concentrated in urban areas as well as among younger and more educated consumers. Indeed, we find that the FinTech market share is higher in more urban neighborhoods, measured by population density, although only for purchase mortgages (for refinances, the coefficient flips sign across specifications).

Examining education and age directly, we find that the FinTech market share is increasing in the fraction of adults with at least a bachelor's degree. Interestingly, however, the share of FinTech borrowing is *increasing* with average mortgage borrower age. Although this may

[44] Among purchase mortgages, FinTech borrowers have higher incomes either compared to all lenders or just nonbanks, and are also less likely to be FHA/VA guaranteed than loans from other nonbanks. For refinances, FinTech borrowers have lower incomes and the fraction of FHA/VA insured loans is generally higher. –see Internet Appendix F for the FHA and VA coefficients

[45] Our estimates with regard to borrower gender and race should be treated with caution, because as discussed earlier, a significant fraction of race and gender fields in HMDA are coded as missing or "NA" for FinTech lenders. As a result, the measured shares of female and minority borrowers are likely to be a lower bound. Using census tract variation in minority population from the 2010 Census, we find that the FinTech share is lower in tracts with a high share of minority borrowers, although this is not always true in the univariate specifications in the Internet Appendix.

seem counterintuitive, we have been told by industry practitioners that first-time mortgage borrowers often prefer to interact face-to-face with a mortgage broker or loan officer, rather than applying online, because they are less familiar with the steps involved; in other words they are less financially experienced and literate (consistent with Agarwal et al., 2009, who find that financial literacy increases with age up to individuals' mid-50's).

**Internet access.** As online services become more ubiquitous, there is growing concern about the "digital divide", meaning that inequality in access to Internet services may be exacerbating income and wealth inequality. We examine whether the availability of high-speed Internet is a constraint on FinTech mortgage borrowing (where applications are generally completed online), using two data sources: first, the fraction of households with high-speed Internet access from the Census Bureau American Community Survey (available from 2013 by county); second, census-block data from the FCC and NTIA for the ten largest states by population on the fraction of households with the option to connect to fiber or cable Internet, which we aggregate by census tract.

Empirically, these two variables have opposite signs, and the coefficients are generally small in magnitude. We conclude that lack of access to adequate Internet does not appear to be a significant constraint on the diffusion of technology-based mortgage lending. This interpretation is also consistent with more detailed analysis described below about the staggered rollout of Google Fiber in one local market.

**Local mortgage and housing market conditions.** As FinTech lending becomes more widely available, it may be particularly beneficial in areas with long processing times. Indeed, we find that a higher share of FinTech mortgage borrowing in census tracts where mortgage processing times were slow ex ante, measured in 2010 prior to the growth in FinTech lending.[46] This result suggests that borrowers have turned to FinTech lenders in part to alleviate bottlenecks in mortgage origination associated with "traditional" mortgage lenders.[47]

[46] We measure average processing time in 2010 conditional on borrower characteristics. Using 2010 HMDA data, we regress processing time on loan and borrower characteristics. We then take the residuals from this regression and aggregate them to the census tract level.

[47] As discussed in Section III, the sign of this correlation also speaks against concerns that our earlier processing time results are due to selection effects. If "fast processor" borrowers (conditional on observables) are attracted to FinTech lenders, we would have expected a higher ex post FinTech share in neighborhoods where 2010 processing times were faster than would be expected based on observables. In fact, however, we

We also examine whether FinTech mortgage borrowing is more prevalent in "hot" real estate markets where prices are rising rapidly and quick closing may be more important. Anecdotal evidence suggests that borrowers may be particuarly attracted to the convenience and fast processing speeds of FinTech lenders in such markets.[48] We find no empirical support for this hypothesis; in fact, home price growth is negatively correlated with the market share of FinTech lending for purchase mortgages (which are the relevant group to consider for this hypothesis).

We examine whether the FinTech share is lower in neighborhoods with high average home prices (measured in 2010). This hypothesis is motivated by the fact that FinTech lenders rely on securitization for funding mortgages; as a result these lenders originate few jumbo loans, which are difficult to securitize. This in turn means that FinTech lenders may advertise less in high-home-price markets where jumbo mortgages predominate. There also may be less social learning about the FinTech mortgage lending model in such markets. We do indeed find that the likelihood of borrowing from a FinTech lender is lower in high home price areas, conditional on loan size and other observables.

## B. *Interpretation*

We interpret our evidence as supporting the view that FinTech mortgage borrowers are attracted to the faster processing times and greater convenience involved with online applications and partial automation of mortgage underwriting. This is consistent with the faster growth of FinTech in census tracts with previously long mortgage processing cycle times and the higher incomes and education of FinTech borrowers. It is also consistent with the high share of refinances for FinTech lenders.[49] We find no empirical support for the hypothesis that FinTech lenders have grown by disproportionately targeting risky, marginal borrowers.

find that the opposite correlation is true in the data.

[48]For example, a September 2015 *The Street* article titled "Online Mortgage Lenders Are Beating Traditional Bank Loans" highlights the shorter closing times of online lenders, and includes the following quote from the CEO of the lender Bank of the Internet "We have very short underwriting term times and that's a plus for our purchase oriented borrowers – we give quick answers," Garrabrants said. "In a really hot market, that's important." (see `https://www.thestreet.com/story/13282079/1/online-mortgage-lenders-are-beating-traditional-bank-loans.html`).

[49]The more standardized set of tasks involved in refinancing a mortgage may be the best fit for FinTech lending at the current state of technology.

Despite the emphasis of the FinTech lending model on online applications and interactions, we also find no evidence that younger borrowers or borrowers located in census tracts with better Internet access are more likely to borrow from FinTech lenders.

We emphasize that we do not attach a strong causal interpretation to our results, given the reduced-form nature of our analysis. Yet, we believe that the empirical relationships documented here are a useful benchmark for further analysis.[50]

## *C. Evidence from Google Fiber rollout*

In addition to our reduced-form analysis, we also conduct an in-depth empirical analysis of the potential causal effect of improved Internet access on FinTech lending. We exploit the staggered entry of a new high-speed Internet provider in a single market, namely the entry of Google Fiber in Kansas City starting in late 2012. Google Fiber is a large-scale initiative by Google to establish a new Internet service provider. The first metro area that Google Fiber entered was the Kansas City area, consisting of Johnson, Leavenworth, and Wyandotte counties in Kansas and Cass, Clay, Jackson, and Platte counties in Missouri.

A major factor behind the selection of Kansas City was that households had poor access to high-speed Internet prior to the entry of Google Fiber. High-speed Internet was only available to a relatively small fraction of households over this period (cable and fiber Internet from providers other than Google was limited), and there was a rapid expansion in high-speed Internet access over this time period as Google Fiber became available broadly across the Kansas City area.

Using HMDA data, we analyze how the market share of FinTech lenders across different neighborhoods in the Kansas City MSA evolved over this period, exploiting the staggered rollout of Google Fiber across census tracts and controlling for time and census-tract fixed effects. Results are presented in Internet Appendix G. Our main finding is that the discrete improvements in Internet access generated by the entry of Google Fiber did not induce a

[50] We note that, where comparable, our results are generally consistent with Buchak et al. (2017), who estimate similar reduced-form regressions of the determinants of borrowing from FinTech lenders and other nonbanks. For example, Buchak et al. (2017) also find that FinTech lenders originate a significantly higher share of refinances compared to purchase mortgages, and have a high incidence of missing race and gender. Besides differences in modelling choices, we also examine a number of determinants of FinTech demand which Buchak et al. (2017) do not (e.g., bank branch density, borrower age, or Internet access).

higher share of FinTech borrowing. The results are often not statistically significant; in the cases where they are significant they have the opposite sign to that predicted, due to a migration in mortgage lending from nonbanks to banks.

Consistent with our earlier evidence, these results indicate that adequate Internet access is unlikely to be a significant constraint on the diffusion of online mortgage lending, mitigating concerns about the "digital divide" in this setting.

# VIII Conclusion

This paper presents new evidence on how technology is reshaping the U.S. mortgage market by studying the vanguard of technology-based lenders. Our results show that FinTech lenders offer a faster origination process that is less sensitive to fluctuations in demand than traditional lenders. These improvements are associated with an increase in the propensity to refinance, especially among borrowers that are likely to benefit from it. We find no evidence that FinTech lending is more risky.

Going forward, we expect that other lenders will seek to replicate the "FinTech model" characterized by electronic application processes with centralized, semi-automated underwriting operations. However, it is unclear whether traditional lenders or small institutions will all be able to adopt these practices as these innovations require significant reorganization and sizable investments. The end result could be a more concentrated mortgage market dominated by those firms that can afford to innovate. From a consumer perspective, we believe our results shed light on how mortgage credit supply is likely to evolve in the future. Specifically, technology will allow the origination process to be faster and to more easily accommodate changes in interest rates, leading to greater transmission of monetary policy to households via the mortgage market. Our findings also imply that technological diffusion may reduce inefficiencies in refinancing decisions, with significant benefits to U.S. households.

Our results have to be considered in the prevailing institutional context of the U.S. mortgage market. Specifically, at the time of our study FinTech lenders are non-banks that securitize their mortgages and do not take deposits. It remains to be seen whether we find

the same benefits of FinTech lending as the model spreads to deposit-taking banks and their borrowers. Changes in banking regulation or the housing finance system may affect FinTech lenders going forward. Also, the benefits we document stem from innovations that rely on hard information; as these innovations spread, they may affect access to credit for those borrowers with applications that require soft information or borrowers that require direct communication with a loan officer. We leave these issues for future research.

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# Appendix: Data Sources and Variable Definitions

| Variable | Definition | Level of Aggregation |
|---|---|---|
| **HMDA** | | |
| Log(income) | Log of borrower income | Individual |
| Log(loan size) | Log of loan amount | Individual |
| Loan-to-income (LTI) | Loan amount divided by borrower income | Individual |
| Jumbo Loan [0,1] | Indicator variable equal to one if loan amount exceeds FHFA conforming loan limit for the month of origination | Individual |
| Loan Type [0,1] | Indicator variables for conventional, FHA, and VA loans. Conventional is omitted category in regressions. | Individual |
| Loan purpose [0,1] | Indicator variables for whether whether loan is a home purchase loan or a refinancing | Individual |
| No Coapplicant [0,1] | Indicator variable equal to one if no coapplicant on the mortgage application | Individual |
| Owner Occupied [0,1] | Indicator for the property being the borrower's principal dwelling | Individual |
| Gender [0,1] | Indicators for borrower gender being Female, Male, or Unknown (unreported). Male is omitted category in regressions. | Individual |
| Race & Ethnicity [0,1] | Indicators for race & ethnicity. Non-hispanic white is omitted category in regressions. | Individual |
| Processing Time | Number of calendar days between the application date and action date of a loan (based on restricted-use version of HMDA data). | Individual |
| Log(application volume) | Log of aggregate application volume | National |
| **U.S. Census** | | |
| % Black or Hispanic | Percent of population identifying as Black, Hispanic, or both in 2010 | Tract |
| Population density | Thousands of residents in thousands per square mile in 2010 | Tract |
| **American Community Survey** | | |
| % bachelor degree | Percent of population 25 years or older with a bachelor's or higher degree in 2010 | Tract |
| % with broadband subscription | Percent of population with an Internet subscription other than dial-up (including DSL, cable, fiber optic, mobile broadband, satellite, or fixed wireless) in 2010 | County |
| **Equifax** | | |
| Credit score | Mean credit score of all individuals with a positive mortgage balance (measured as of 2014Q3) | Tract |
| Age | Median age of individuals with a positive mortgage balance (measured as of 2014Q3) | Tract |
| **Zillow** | | |
| Home price appreciation | Home price appreciation over the 12 months up to the month of loan origination | County |
| Log(2010 home price) | Log of average home price as of January 2010 | County |
| **NTIA/FCC** | | |
| High speed internet coverage | Percent of households with access to either cable or fiber services, or Google Fiber, measured at a half-yearly frequency. Data is collected from the NTIA from 2011 to mid-2014 and from the FCC from end-2014 to end-2016. Data only available for the ten largest US states. | Tract |

| Variable | Definition | Level of Aggregation |
|---|---|---|
| **FDIC Summary of Deposits** | | |
| Bank branch density | Number of bank branches (in 000s) within a 25 mile radius of the center of census tract in 2010 | Tract |
| **FHA Neighborhood Watch Early Warning System** | | |
| One- and two-year comparative default rate | Default rate (90+ days delinquent or teriminated in a claim as % of loans) for FinTech lender $i$ measured as the percent deviation from the default rate for all FHA loans in the same geography and time period. 1 year default rate considers only defaults occurring in the first year of the mortgage life. For most analysis, performance is measured over the sample period 2015:Q3 to 2017:Q3. | MSA, state or national |
| Mix-adjusted 2-year default rate | Based on the FHA supplementary performance measure (SPM, equal to the ratio of the lender's two-year default rate to a benchmark default rate for a portfolio of loans with the same mix of credit scores.) Mix-adjusted default rate is the ratio of the lender's SPM to the SPM for all FHA loans in the same geography and time period. | MSA, state or national |
| **Ginnie Mae loan-level data** | | |
| Default | Indicator variable for whether FHA mortgage enters 90+ days delinquency | Individual |
| FICO | Borrower credit score at origination | Individual |
| LTV | Ratio of loan amount to appraised property value | Individual |
| DTI | Ratio of total debt payment to borrower income | Individual |
| **Equifax CRISM borrower level data** | | |
| Coupon minus 10-year Treasury yield | Difference between average coupon rate on outstanding mortgages and 10-year Treasury bond yield (used in Figure 2) | National |
| Refinancing propensity | Share of outstanding mortgages in month $t$ that are refinanced in month $t+1$ | County |
| FICO | Borrower credit score (updated monthly), county average | County |
| CLTV | Combined loan-to-value ratio (sum of all mortgage liens divided by updated home value) | County |
| Average current rate | Current mortgage coupon rate, county average | County |
| FHA/VA share | Share of FHA/VA mortgages in county | County |
| **Author derived variables** | | |
| 2010 conditional processing time | Average processing time in 2010 (census tract average, residual after regressing processing time in days on HMDA borrower & loan characteristics) | Tract |
| Refinancing incentive | Difference between coupon rate and rate at which borrower would be indifferent between refinancing and not refinancing based on the 'square root rule' of Agarwal et al. (2013) | Individual |

# Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Number of FinTech mortgage lenders (according to our classification) over time



Figure 2: Application volume, interest rate, and processing time

(a) Mortgage application volume and interest rates




(b) Mortgage application volume and processing time




Figure shows the evolution of the number of applications for new loans in HMDA that result in loan originations (divided by the number of business days in a given month), plotted against (a) a proxy for borrowers' refinancing incentive (the difference between the average coupon on outstanding mortgages and the 10-year Treasury bond yield), and (b) the median processing time for new loan applications that result in loan originations and were submitted in the same month.

Figure 3: Illustrating differences in processing times and elasticity to demand across lender types.




Figure shows binned scatter plot (with linear fit) of processing times of originated loans against the volume of aggregate loan applications by lender type, all measured in HMDA 2010-2016:Q2. Processing times and application volume are first residualized with respect to the following variables: census tract indicators, calendar month indicators, the log of applicant income, the log of the loan amount, indicators for FHA loans, VA loans and jumbo loans, applicant race, gender, whether the loan is a refinance, whether the loan has a coapplicant, whether a pre-approval was requested, the occupancy and lien status of the loan, the property type, and a dummy indicating whether income is missing. Application volumes are then grouped into 10 bins, and for each bin the mean of the residualized processing time is calculated and the mean processing time is added, separately for the three lender types in our analysis.

Figure 4: Refinancing propensities across counties with different levels of FinTech market share




Figure shows average monthly refinance propensities across three groups of counties, sorted based on county-level FinTech market shares (among refinance loans) over mid-2012 to mid-2013. Data source: CRISM.

Table 1: FinTech and Top 20 Mortgage Originators in 2016, based on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)

| Rank | Type of Lender | Lender Name | Volume (Bn) | Market Share (%) | FinTech Since |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Bank | Wells Fargo | 132.58 | 6.62 | |
| 2 | FinTech | Quicken Loans | 90.55 | 4.52 | 2010 |
| 3 | Bank | JPMorgan Chase | 75.52 | 3.77 | |
| 4 | Bank | Bank Of America | 60.24 | 3.01 | |
| 5 | FinTech | Loandepot.com | 35.94 | 1.80 | 2016 |
| 6 | Mtg | Freedom Mortgage | 32.17 | 1.61 | |
| 7 | Bank | US Bank | 30.69 | 1.53 | |
| 8 | Mtg | Caliber Home Loans | 27.94 | 1.40 | |
| 9 | Bank | Flagstar | 27.31 | 1.36 | |
| 10 | Mtg | United Shore | 22.93 | 1.15 | |
| 11 | Bank | Citibank | 21.73 | 1.09 | |
| 12 | FinTech | Guaranteed Rate | 18.44 | 0.92 | 2010 |
| 13 | Mtg | Finance of America | 17.63 | 0.88 | |
| 14 | Mtg | Fairway Independent | 16.10 | 0.80 | |
| 15 | Bank | USAA Federal Savings | 15.52 | 0.78 | |
| 16 | Mtg | Guild Mortgage | 15.07 | 0.75 | |
| 17 | Mtg | Stearns Lending | 14.93 | 0.75 | |
| 18 | Bank | Suntrust Mortgage | 14.77 | 0.74 | |
| 19 | Bank | Primelending | 13.87 | 0.69 | |
| 20 | Mtg | Nationstar Mortgage | 13.50 | 0.67 | |
| ... | | | | | |
| 23 | FinTech | Movement Mortgage | 11.61 | 0.58 | 2014 |
| 39 | FinTech | Everett Financial (Supreme) | 7.62 | 0.38 | 2016 |
| 534 | FinTech | Avex Funding (Better.com) | 0.49 | 0.02 | 2016 |

Bank = Depository Institution, Mtg = Non-bank Mortgage Lender, FinTech = FinTech Lender
Market share is based on dollar volume of originations in HMDA.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics by lender type, HMDA data 2010 - mid-2016

| | Banks | | Non-bank lenders | | | | All Lenders | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Non-FinTech | | FinTech | | | |
| | Mean | p50 | Mean | p50 | Mean | p50 | Mean | p50 |
| Originated Mortgages | | | | | | | | |
| Applicant Income | 121 | 86.00 | 102 | 82.00 | 102 | 84.00 | 115 | 84.00 |
| Loan amount / income | 1.96 | 1.80 | 2.46 | 2.40 | 2.34 | 2.19 | 2.13 | 2.00 |
| Home Purchase | 0.34 | 0 | 0.52 | 1 | 0.22 | 0 | 0.38 | 0 |
| Refinancing | 0.66 | 1 | 0.48 | 0 | 0.78 | 1 | 0.62 | 1 |
| Jumbo | 0.05 | 0 | 0.02 | 0 | 0.02 | 0 | 0.04 | 0 |
| Loan Type: | | | | | | | | |
| Conventional | 0.86 | 1 | 0.61 | 1 | 0.71 | 1 | 0.78 | 1 |
| FHA | 0.09 | 0 | 0.28 | 0 | 0.20 | 0 | 0.15 | 0 |
| VA | 0.05 | 0 | 0.11 | 0 | 0.09 | 0 | 0.07 | 0 |
| Owner Occupied | 0.88 | 1 | 0.92 | 1 | 0.92 | 1 | 0.89 | 1 |
| Male | 0.67 | 1 | 0.69 | 1 | 0.59 | 1 | 0.68 | 1 |
| Female | 0.25 | 0 | 0.27 | 0 | 0.26 | 0 | 0.26 | 0 |
| No Coapplicant | 0.45 | 0 | 0.52 | 1 | 0.50 | 0 | 0.48 | 0 |
| Race: | | | | | | | | |
| White | 0.79 | 1 | 0.78 | 1 | 0.68 | 1 | 0.78 | 1 |
| Black/African American | 0.04 | 0 | 0.06 | 0 | 0.05 | 0 | 0.05 | 0 |
| Asian | 0.05 | 0 | 0.07 | 0 | 0.04 | 0 | 0.06 | 0 |
| Other | 0.01 | 0 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.01 | 0 |
| Unknown | 0.11 | 0 | 0.09 | 0 | 0.22 | 0 | 0.11 | 0 |
| Processing Time | 53.04 | 45.00 | 50.20 | 40.00 | 42.58 | 37.00 | 51.71 | 43.00 |
| Observations | 32,751,662 | | 14,742,227 | | 2,306,237 | | 49,800,126 | |
| All Applications | | | | | | | | |
| Loan Outcome | | | | | | | | |
| Originated | 0.64 | 1 | 0.58 | 1 | 0.66 | 1 | 0.62 | 1 |
| Approved, Not Accepted | 0.04 | 0 | 0.05 | 0 | 0.03 | 0 | 0.04 | 0 |
| Denied | 0.20 | 0 | 0.16 | 0 | 0.27 | 0 | 0.19 | 0 |
| Withdrawn | 0.09 | 0 | 0.15 | 0 | 0.03 | 0 | 0.11 | 0 |
| Closed for Incompleteness | 0.03 | 0 | 0.06 | 0 | 0.01 | 0 | 0.04 | 0 |
| Processing Time | 47.16 | 40.00 | 46.98 | 35.00 | 40.11 | 35.00 | 46.80 | 38.00 |
| Observations | 51,448,444 | | 25,604,501 | | 3,473,506 | | 80,526,451 | |

Table contains summary statistics of HMDA data by lender type, for loan applications from January 2010 through June 2016. "Banks" are depository institutions, "Non-bank lenders" are non-bank mortgage lenders, and "FinTech" lenders are classified according to Section II. In the first part of the table, summary statistics are calculated for originated mortgages only. In the second part of the table, statistics are calculated for all applications, which include applications that ended up being originated, approved by the lender but not accepted by the borrower, denied, withdrawn by the applicant before a decision was made, or closed for incompleteness. "Applicant Income" is in thousands of USD and does not include missing values. "Loan amount / income" (LTI) is loan amount divided by applicant income; LTI is winsorized at the 0.5% level and does not include missing values. "Jumbo" is an indicator for the loan amount being greater than the applicable FHFA Conforming Loan Limit. "Owner Occupied" is an indicator for the property being the borrower's principal dwelling. "No Coapplicant" is an indicator for no coapplicant provided for the loan. Race: "Other" is an indicator for applicant race being American Indian, Alaskan, Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander. "Unknown" is an indicator for race being unreported or "Not Applicable". "Processing Time" is the number of days between application date and action date of a loan. Loan outcomes: "Originated" are applications that were successfully originated. "Approved, Not Accepted" are applications where the application was approved, but not accepted by applicant. "Denied" are applications that were denied by originator. "Withdrawn" are applications that were withdrawn by the applicant before a credit decision was made. "Closed for Incompleteness" are applications where the application file was closed for incompleteness.

Table 3: FinTech lenders and processing times: Loan-level results

| Panel A: Purchase Loans | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FinTech Lender | -7.93*** | -9.43*** | -8.33*** | -9.24*** | -7.46*** |
| | (0.52) | (0.61) | (0.43) | (0.48) | (0.45) |
| Log(Applicant Income) | | -0.55*** | | -1.00*** | -0.44*** |
| | | (0.04) | | (0.03) | (0.06) |
| Log(Loan Amount) | | 4.47*** | | 4.90*** | 6.09*** |
| | | (0.08) | | (0.05) | (0.13) |
| FHA | | 0.65*** | | 0.27*** | -0.34*** |
| | | (0.15) | | (0.10) | (0.09) |
| VA | | 1.68*** | | 1.51*** | 1.91*** |
| | | (0.22) | | (0.20) | (0.30) |
| Jumbo | | 3.17*** | | 5.29*** | 5.90*** |
| | | (0.22) | | (0.15) | (0.28) |
| Observations | 19,159,345 | 19,159,345 | 18,551,855 | 18,551,855 | 7,185,042 |
| $R^2$ | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.34 |
| Census Tract-Month | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Sample | All Lenders | All Lenders | All Lenders | All Lenders | Nonbanks |

| Panel B: Refinance Loans | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FinTech Lender | -9.99*** | -13.64*** | -10.82*** | -14.61*** | -9.32*** |
| | (0.59) | (0.57) | (0.79) | (0.71) | (0.53) |
| Log(Applicant Income) | | 0.04 | | -0.17*** | -0.25** |
| | | (0.09) | | (0.06) | (0.12) |
| Log(Loan Amount) | | 4.74*** | | 4.60*** | 1.24*** |
| | | (0.10) | | (0.09) | (0.14) |
| FHA | | 5.83*** | | 5.67*** | 5.48*** |
| | | (0.46) | | (0.40) | (0.29) |
| VA | | 1.70*** | | 2.04*** | 1.42*** |
| | | (0.53) | | (0.44) | (0.41) |
| Jumbo | | 7.06*** | | 7.23*** | 9.71*** |
| | | (0.23) | | (0.21) | (0.17) |
| Observations | 30,616,247 | 30,616,247 | 30,169,300 | 30,169,300 | 8,041,746 |
| $R^2$ | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.29 |
| Census Tract-Month | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan Controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Sample | All Lenders | All Lenders | All Lenders | All Lenders | Nonbanks |

Table reports regressions of loan processing time (in days) on an indicator variable identifying FinTech lenders, census tract-month fixed effects, loan controls and borrower controls. Data source: HMDA. The sample consists of originated purchase loans in Panel A and refinancing loans in Panel B with application dates from 2010 to 2016Q2. Displayed loan controls include the log of applicant income, the log of the loan amount, indicators for FHA loans, VA loans and jumbo loans. Suppressed loan controls include applicant race, gender, whether the loan has a coapplicant, whether a preapproval was obtained, the occupancy and lien status of the loan, the property type, and a dummy indicating whether income is missing. Column (5) excludes bank lenders. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by lender-month. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 4: Default rate for FinTech lenders, FHA loans (% deviation from region)

| | Default definition | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 Year Default | 2 Year Default | Mix-Adjusted 2 Year Default |
| *A. All FHA loans* | | | |
| State level | -35.0*** | -35.8*** | -25.5*** |
| | (3.8) | (3.9) | (4.5) |
| MSA level | -35.3*** | -36.2*** | |
| | (2.4) | (2.6) | |
| *B. High market share regions only (loans in top quartile markets by lender):* | | | |
| State level | -24.7*** | -23.4*** | -11.7 |
| | (8.4) | (8.6) | (9.9) |
| MSA level | -19.8*** | -20.5*** | |
| | (6.0) | (6.1) | |
| *C. Disaggregated by purchase versus refinancing (all loans, state level)* | | | |
| Purchase | -14.8*** | -17.1*** | -10.1* |
| | (3.6) | (4.3) | (5.9) |
| Refinancing | -30.6*** | -27.5*** | -40.3*** |
| | (2.6) | (3.5) | (2.4) |
| *D. Disaggregated by neighborhood socioeconomic status (all loans, state level)* | | | |
| Underserved (low income/minority) | -33.5*** | -32.4*** | -25.3*** |
| | (4.5) | (4.4) | (4.4) |
| Not Underserved | -36.8*** | -36.5*** | -25.4*** |
| | (3.6) | (3.9) | (4.3) |
| *E. All FHA loans: longer time series* | | | |
| National level | -44.7*** | -45.6*** | -32.7*** |
| | (4.8) | (4.5) | (5.7) |
| State level | -45.4*** | -46.1*** | -33.4*** |
| | (3.2) | (3.1) | (3.9) |

Table reports weighted average percent difference in default rate between mortgages from FinTech lenders and all FHA mortgages originated in same time period and market (either MSA, state or national market). Values less than zero indicate lower default rates for FinTech lenders. These statistics are calculated as the weighted average of $compare_{ir} = (default\ rate_{ir}/default\ rate_r) - 1$ across FinTech lenders $i$ and regions $r$, weighting by lender origination volume. In practice we calculate this weighted average by regressing $compare_{ir}$ on a constant term using weighted least squares. Default definition is either default within first year, default within first two years, or the 'mix-adjusted' default rate which is based on the supplementary performance metric, an adjusted default rate which takes into account the credit score distribution of originations (see text for details). Sample period 2015:Q3 to 2017:Q3 except for panel E, where sample period is 2012:Q3 to 2017:Q3. Data extracted from the FHA Early Warning System portal in December 2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered by state in state-level regression using longer time series (section E). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 5: FHA mortgage default regressions based on Ginnie Mae data.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FinTech | -1.29*** | -0.97*** | -0.93*** | -1.51*** | -0.79*** | | -0.91*** |
| | (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.11) | | (0.14) |
| FinTech Share | | | | | | -0.10 | |
| | | | | | | (1.00) | |
| FT X FT share | | | | | | | -1.70* |
| | | | | | | | (0.98) |
| FICO | | | -0.04*** | -0.05*** | -0.03*** | -0.04*** | -0.04*** |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| LTV | | | 0.04*** | 0.07*** | 0.03*** | 0.04*** | 0.04*** |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| DTI | | | 0.06*** | 0.07*** | 0.04*** | 0.06*** | 0.06*** |
| | | | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.00) |
| Purpose FE | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month FE | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| State FE | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| MonthXState FE | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Loan Controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mean Y | 3.65 | 3.65 | 3.65 | 4.00 | 2.73 | 3.65 | 3.65 |
| R2 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Observations | 4097569 | 4097568 | 4097544 | 2966644 | 1130881 | 4097548 | 4097544 |
| Loan Sample | All | All | All | Purch. | Refi | All | All |

Table reports regressions of indicator for a loan ever entering 90+ day delinquency on an indicator variable identifying FinTech issuers (or the state-level FinTech market share, demeaned by month; or the interaction of the FinTech indicator with FinTech market share), state-by-origination month fixed effects, loan controls and borrower controls. The sample consists of FHA-insured 30-year fixed-rate mortgages originated over June 2013 to May 2017, obtained from Ginnie Mae MBS monthly loan-level disclosures. Displayed loan controls include the borrower FICO score, the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and the debt-to-income ratio (DTI). Suppressed loans controls include loan purpose type, the log of the loan amount, and indicators for the number of borrowers, the property type, whether the borrower received down payment assistance, and for whether FICO, LTV, or DTI are missing. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by issuer-origination month. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 6: Elasticity of processing time with respect to aggregate application volume: FinTech vs. other lenders

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ln(App. Vol.) | 11.76*** | 13.48*** | 18.88*** | 13.43*** | 8.85*** | 13.60*** | 10.55*** |
| | (0.52) | (0.47) | (0.67) | (0.47) | (0.45) | (0.81) | (0.79) |
| ln(App. Vol.) × FinTech | -7.55*** | -6.15*** | -9.57*** | -7.46*** | -2.06 | -4.45*** | -4.47*** |
| | (1.46) | (1.51) | (1.80) | (1.50) | (1.40) | (1.67) | (1.56) |
| Observations | 49,775,550 | 49,775,312 | 30,615,852 | 80,495,817 | 17,024,138 | 8,927,175 | 29,048,184 |
| $R^2$ | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.16 |
| Loan Controls | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Lender FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Census Tract FE | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month FE | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Application Sample | Originated | Originated | Refi | All | Originated | Refi | All |
| Lender Sample | All | All | All | All | Nonbanks | Nonbanks | Nonbanks |

Table reports regressions of loan processing time (in days) on the log of aggregate monthly application volume, an interaction with the FinTech indicator, loan controls, lender fixed effects, census-tract fixed effects and calendar month fixed effects. Data source: HMDA. The sample is restricted to application dates from 2010 to 2016:Q2. Columns (1), (2), and (5) include all originated loans; Columns (3) and (6) include originated refinancing loans; and Columns (4) and (7) include all applications (including denied and withdrawn applications). The sample of lenders includes all lender types in Columns (1)-(4) and nonbanks only in Columns (5)-(7). Loan controls include the log of applicant income, the log of the loan amount, indicators for FHA loans, VA loans and jumbo loans, applicant race, gender, whether the loan has a coapplicant, whether a preapproval was obtained, the occupancy and lien status of the loan, the property type, and a dummy indicating whether income is missing. Columns (4) and (7) also include indicators for whether a loan was denied or withdrawn. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by lender-month. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 7: Elasticity of mortgage application denial probabilities with respect to variation in aggregate demand for loans — FinTech vs. other lenders.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ln(App. Vol.) | -0.068*** | -0.107*** | -0.067*** | -0.124*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.009) |
| ln(App. Vol.) × FinTech | -0.108*** | -0.087*** | -0.108*** | -0.072*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Loan controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Lender FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Census Tract FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R2 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.27 | 0.30 |
| Observations | 68,793,269 | 44,728,223 | 23,538,398 | 13,328,381 |
| Application Sample | All | Refi | All | Refi |
| Lender Sample | All | All | Nonbanks | Nonbanks |

Table reports regressions of indicator for loan application denial on the log of aggregate application volume, an interaction with the FinTech indicator, loan controls, lender fixed effects, census-tract fixed effects and calendar month fixed effects. Data source: HMDA. The sample is restricted to application dates from 2010 to 2016:Q2. Applications are included if they result in either a loan origination, in the application being approved by the lender but not accepted by the borrower, or an application denial. The sample of lenders includes all lender types in Columns (1)-(2) and nonbanks only in Columns (3)-(4). Loan controls include the log of applicant income, the log of the loan amount, indicators for FHA loans, VA loans and jumbo loans, applicant race, gender, whether the loan has a coapplicant, whether a preapproval was obtained, the occupancy and lien status of the loan, the property type, and a dummy indicating whether income is missing. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by lender-month. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 8: Elasticity of originations with respect to changes in aggregate volume: FinTech vs. other lenders

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $\Delta$ ln(App. Vol.) | 1.17*** | 1.57*** | 1.17*** | 1.71*** |
| | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) |
| $\Delta$ ln(App. Vol.) $\times$ FinTech | -0.06 | 0.06 | -0.06 | -0.08 |
| | (0.07) | (0.12) | (0.07) | (0.12) |
| Observations | 52,030 | 51,311 | 24,450 | 23,831 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.32 | 0.33 |
| Month FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Application Sample | Originated | Refi | Originated | Refi |
| Lender Sample | All | All | Nonbanks | Nonbanks |

Table reports regressions of the log change in lender-level originated loans on the log change in aggregate application volumes, an interaction with the FinTech indicator, loan controls, lender fixed effects, census-tract fixed effects and calendar month fixed effects. The unit of observation is lender-month. Data source: HMDA. The sample is restricted to 2010 through 2016:Q2. Columns (1) and (3) include all originated loans; columns (2) and (4) included originated refinancing loans. The sample of lenders includes all lender types in columns (1) and (2) and nonbanks only in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors reported in parentheses are White-Huber standard errors. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 9: FinTech market share and refinancing propensities: county-level results.

| | (1) All | (2) All | (3) 30yr FRM | (4) 30yr FRM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FinTech Share$_{Q-1}$ (MA) | 1.121*** | 0.689*** | 1.195*** | 0.706*** |
| | (0.204) | (0.142) | (0.223) | (0.157) |
| Average FICO/10 | | 0.067*** | | 0.071*** |
| | | (0.012) | | (0.013) |
| Average CLTV/10 | | -0.094*** | | -0.104*** |
| | | (0.007) | | (0.008) |
| Average current rate | | 1.135*** | | 1.202*** |
| | | (0.059) | | (0.062) |
| FHA/VA share | | 0.190 | | 0.185 |
| | | (0.315) | | (0.332) |
| County fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mean of dep var | 0.54 | 0.54 | 0.59 | 0.59 |
| R2 | 0.78 | 0.81 | 0.76 | 0.79 |
| Obs. | 39000 | 39000 | 39000 | 39000 |

Table regresses county-level monthly refinancing propensities (defined as the share of outstanding mortgages in month $t-1$ that are refinanced in month $t$, in percentage points) on the FinTech share in a county (4-quarter rolling average, lagged one quarter; range [0,1]), county fixed effects, month fixed effects, and average characteristics of outstanding loans in the county: FICO, updated combined loan-to-value ratios (CLTV), average coupon rate, and the share of FHA/VA mortgages. Data sources: CRISM for refinancing propensities and loan characteristics, HMDA for FinTech market shares. In columns (1) and (2), refinancing propensities are calculated based on all loans; in columns (3) and (4), based on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages only. Sample covers January 2010 through June 2016 for the largest 500 counties by count of outstanding mortgages in December 2013 (see Appendix D for details). Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by county. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 10: FinTech market share and refinancing propensities, by refinancing incentive bins.

| *Refi incentive (ADL)* | (1) $< -1$ | (2) $[-1, -0.5)$ | (3) $[-0.5, 0)$ | (4) $[0, 0.5)$ | (5) $[0.5, 1)$ | (6) $\geq 1$ | (7) All |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FT Share$_{Q-1}$ (MA) | -0.140* | 1.028*** | 2.008*** | 1.985*** | 1.444*** | 0.507* | 1.436*** |
| | (0.073) | (0.200) | (0.304) | (0.353) | (0.347) | (0.267) | (0.229) |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mean Y | 0.12 | 0.46 | 0.85 | 1.04 | 1.05 | 0.78 | 0.59 |
| R2 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Obs. | 64,866,392 | 42,085,823 | 38,988,748 | 29,249,088 | 19,039,098 | 20,745,039 | 214,996,787 |

Table regresses indicator for whether a borrower refinanced their loan in a given month on the FinTech share in a county (4-quarter rolling average, lagged one quarter), county fixed effects, month fixed effects, and the following loan controls: 5-point bins of CLTV, 20-point bins of FICO, a cubic function in the age of the refinanced loan, the log of the balance of the refinanced loan, and an indicator for whether the refinanced loan was an FHA/VA loan. Data sources: CRISM for refinancing propensities and loan characteristics, HMDA for FinTech market shares. For columns (1)-(6), borrowers are separated into 6 bins depending on their refinancing incentive based on the Agarwal et al. (2013) (ADL) calculation. Negative incentives (expressed in percentage points of interest rates) mean that according to ADL a borrower should not refinance; positive incentives mean they should refinance. The final column (7) pools all bins. Sample includes 30-year fixed-rate mortgages only. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by county. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Table 11: Who Borrows from FinTech Mortgage Lenders?

Dependent variable: = 100 if originator is FinTech lender, = 0 otherwise

| | Purchases | | Refinances | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All | Nonbanks | All | Nonbanks |
| ***Borrower income and demography*** | | | | |
| Log(income) | 0.104*** | 0.701*** | -0.833*** | -0.159*** |
| | (0.00650) | (0.0173) | (0.00725) | (0.0275) |
| Gender: | | | | |
| Female | 0.0592*** | 0.184*** | 0.756*** | 3.056*** |
| | (0.00947) | (0.0208) | (0.0126) | (0.0379) |
| Unknown | 2.887*** | 10.13*** | 6.728*** | 24.99*** |
| | (0.0421) | (0.117) | (0.0437) | (0.100) |
| Race and ethnicity: | | | | |
| Black | -0.306*** | -0.387*** | -0.415*** | 1.166*** |
| | (0.0254) | (0.0495) | (0.0291) | (0.0814) |
| Hispanic | -0.880*** | -1.577*** | -1.432*** | -1.982*** |
| | (0.0200) | (0.0391) | (0.0250) | (0.0629) |
| Unknown | 1.551*** | 3.220*** | 3.632*** | 6.540*** |
| | (0.0294) | (0.0658) | (0.0310) | (0.0710) |
| % black or hispanic$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | -0.228*** | -1.064*** | -0.256*** | -2.273*** |
| | (0.0166) | (0.0394) | (0.0165) | (0.0501) |
| ***Access to finance*** | | | | |
| Credit score$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | -0.279*** | -0.731*** | -1.068*** | -3.002*** |
| | (0.0192) | (0.0468) | (0.0193) | (0.0618) |
| Bank branch density$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.467*** | 0.954*** | 0.275*** | 0.479*** |
| | (0.0262) | (0.0574) | (0.0201) | (0.0530) |
| ***Technology diffusion and adoption*** | | | | |
| Population density$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.141*** | 0.920*** | -0.0691*** | 0.421*** |
| | (0.0275) | (0.0697) | (0.0236) | (0.0607) |
| Borrower age$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.119*** | 0.340*** | 0.263*** | 0.869*** |
| | (0.0168) | (0.0400) | (0.0169) | (0.0502) |
| % bachelor degree$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.307*** | 0.920*** | 0.262*** | 0.690*** |
| | (0.0213) | (0.0529) | (0.0180) | (0.0553) |
| ***Internet access*** | | | | |
| % high speed coverage$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.101*** | 0.255*** | 0.0689*** | 0.371*** |
| | (0.0127) | (0.0316) | (0.0127) | (0.0461) |
| % with broadband subscription$^{\text{CTY}}$ | -0.132*** | -0.487*** | -0.0344** | -0.0551 |
| | (0.0179) | (0.0460) | (0.0167) | (0.0555) |
| ***Local housing market conditions*** | | | | |
| % home price appreciation$^{\text{CTY}}$ | -0.0362*** | -0.836*** | 0.277*** | -1.258*** |
| | (0.0114) | (0.0258) | (0.0132) | (0.0382) |
| Processing time coefficients$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.0182 | 0.205*** | 0.588*** | 1.599*** |
| | (0.0111) | (0.0269) | (0.0119) | (0.0397) |
| Log(2010 home price)$^{\text{CTY}}$ | -0.127*** | -0.688*** | -0.812*** | -2.993*** |
| | (0.0188) | (0.0471) | (0.0213) | (0.0675) |
| Additional controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 20790255 | 8901875 | 32936746 | 9888845 |
| Mean of Dependent Variable | 2.888 | 6.745 | 6.129 | 20.41 |

Linear probability model based on HMDA data from 2010-16. All continuous right-hand size variables normalized to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Superscripts $^{\text{TRACT}}$ and $^{\text{CTY}}$ indicate variable is measured at the census tract or county level of aggregation, respectively, rather than at the loan level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by census tract. Regressions include controls for loan size, loan type, dummies for jumbo loan, coapplicant, owner occupied, other race categories, and missing values for any variable with positive incidence of missing values. See Internet Appendix for full results including coefficients on these variables as well as univariate regressions. See Data Appendix for variable definitions and sources.* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

# Internet Appendix for "The Role of Technology in Mortgage Lending"

Andreas Fuster, Matthew Plosser, Philipp Schnabl, and James Vickery

# A Processing time: additional analysis

Figure A.1: Distribution of processing times by lender type. (These are residuals after controlling for loan characteristics and census tract × month fixed effects as in Table 3.)




(a) Purchase mortgages




(b) Refinance mortgages

Table A.1: Testing whether high FinTech probability is associated with slower processing time for non-FinTech lenders.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $\widehat{\text{FinTech}}$ | 2.547*** | -0.808*** | 3.109*** | -0.559*** |
| | (0.163) | (0.144) | (0.216) | (0.183) |
| Loan controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Lender-Month FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Lender-Census Tract FE | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| R2 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.33 |
| Observations | 47180463 | 44210993 | 28616765 | 26127401 |
| Loan type | All | All | Refi | Refi |
| Sample | Non-Fintech | Non-Fintech | Non-Fintech | Non-Fintech |

Table regresses loan processing time (in days) for non-FinTech lenders on the predicted probability that an application would go to a FinTech lender ($\widehat{\text{FinTech}}$), lender-month fixed effects, lender-census tract fixed effects, and loan controls. $\widehat{\text{FinTech}}$ comes from an unreported first-stage OLS regression where, in the full sample including all lender types, an indicator for a loan being originated by a FinTech lender is regressed on census tract-month fixed effects and loan controls. In both stages, loan controls include the log of applicant income, the log of the loan amount, indicators for FHA loans, VA loans and jumbo loans, applicant race, gender, loan purpose (purchase or refinancing), whether the loan has a coapplicant, whether a preapproval was obtained, the occupancy and lien status of the loan, the property type, and a dummy indicating whether income is missing. Both purchase and refinance loans are included in columns (1)-(2), while only refinance loans are included in columns (3)-(4). Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by lender-month. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

# B Is FinTech lending cheaper?

Table A.2: FHA mortgage interest rate regressions based on Ginnie Mae data. Includes 30-year fixed-rate mortgages originated 2013-2017.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FinTech | 0.000 | -0.023** | -0.075*** | 0.002 |
| | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.008) |
| FICO | | -0.002*** | -0.002*** | -0.001*** |
| | | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| LTV | | 0.000*** | 0.003*** | -0.001*** |
| | | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| DTI | | 0.000*** | 0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Sample | All | All | Purch. | Refi |
| Purpose FE? | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month FE? | Yes | No | No | No |
| MonthXState FE? | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan cont.? | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mean Y | 4.00 | 4.00 | 4.01 | 3.96 |
| R2 | 0.31 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.46 |
| Observations | 4097569 | 4097544 | 2966644 | 1130881 |

Table regresses mortgage interest rate on an indicator variable identifying FinTech issuers, state-by-origination month fixed effects, loan controls and borrower controls. The sample consists of FHA-insured 30-year fixed-rate mortgages originated over June 2013 to June 2017, obtained from Ginnie Mae MBS monthly loan-level disclosures. Displayed loan controls include the borrower FICO score, the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and the debt-to-income ratio (DTI). Suppressed loans controls include loan purpose type, the log of the loan amount, and indicators for the number of borrowers, the property type, whether the borrower received down payment assistance, and for whether FICO, LTV, or DTI are missing. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by issuer-origination month. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

# C Is FinTech lending more elastic? Additional results

Table A.3: Elasticity of processing time with respect to demand proxies: FinTech vs. other lenders

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Refi Incentive | 4.79*** | 6.72*** | 5.14*** | | | |
| | (0.20) | (0.28) | (0.19) | | | |
| Refi Inc. × FinTech | -3.95*** | -5.45*** | -4.56*** | | | |
| | (0.64) | (0.74) | (0.65) | | | |
| Bartik App. × FinTech | | | | 9.73*** | 13.78*** | 8.97*** |
| | | | | (0.34) | (0.50) | (0.35) |
| Bartik App. × FinTech | | | | 0.05 | -3.27*** | -2.51*** |
| | | | | (0.82) | (0.82) | (0.67) |
| Observations | 49,775,312 | 30,615,852 | 80,495,817 | 49,775,312 | 30,615,852 | 80,495,817 |
| $R^2$ | 0.20 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.17 |
| Loan Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Lender FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Census Tract FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Application Sample | Originated | Refi | All | Originated | Refi | All |
| Lender Sample | All | All | All | All | All | All |

Table A.3 regresses loan processing time on two proxies for aggregate mortgage demand: the average outstanding coupon less the 10-yr Treasury yield (Refi Incentive) and the log of the weighted sum of county-level applications where weights are the unconditional market share of applications received in the county (Bartik Applications). Regressions include an interaction between the proxy and the FinTech indicator, loan controls, lender fixed effects, census-tract fixed effects and calendar month fixed effects. The sample is restricted to application dates from 2010 to 2016Q2. Columns 1 and 4 include all originated loans; Columns 2 and 5 included originated refinancing loans; and Columns 3 and 6 include all applications (including denied applications). The sample of lenders includes all lender types. Loan controls include the log of applicant income, the log of the loan amount, indicators for FHA loans, VA loans and jumbo loans, applicant race, gender, whether the loan has a coapplicant, whether the application was a preapproval, the occupancy and lien status of the loan, the property type, and a dummy indicating whether income is missing. Columns 3 and 6 also include indicators for whether a loan was denied or withdrawn. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by lender-month. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

# D FinTech & refinancing: additional analysis

## *A.1 Sample construction*

We pull all active loans in CRISM in December 2013 and select the 500 counties with the highest number of loans. To limit the sample size while still having sufficient data coverage across the counties, we take 12,000 loans from each county (roughly the number of loans in the smallest county in the top 500). We then take the individual CRISM identifiers that were associated with these loans, and pull all records associated with those individuals from 2010 through 2016. By restricting to the largest counties, we are able to get accurate refinance propensities for a cross-section of the country at the county level while limiting our sample size for computational reasons. This sample selection procedure gives us a sample of over 325 million loan-month observations, made up of 7.2 million distinct loans from 5.1 million distinct borrowers.

We identify refinances and calculate refinance propensities and cashouts at the county level following the same procedure in Beraja et al. (2017). Refinance propensities at the county level are defined as the percentage of loans from month $t-1$ that are refinanced in month $t$. We create panels both at the county and individual level with these identified refinances.

Figure A.2 shows the average refinance propensity over time as well as the number of originated refinance loans in the same counties, as recorded in HMDA (where we sum loans by application month). We track the evolution of originations fairly closely.[1]

## *A.2 Additional results*

In Table A.4 we complement the findings in Section VI by studying the properties of 30-year FRMs that were refinanced into new 30-year FRMs over our sample period. The first two columns of the table study whether a refinance was optimal (i.e. whether the interest rate saving was large enough) according to the ADL rule. In column (1), we do this based on comparing the rate on the old mortgage to the market rate at the time the refinance happened (similar to how we define refinancing incentives in the main text). In column (2), we instead directly use the rate on the new (refinance) mortgage. We see that in both cases, a higher local FinTech market share increases the probability that a refinance is classified as optimal. Interestingly, the association is stronger when we use the actual mortgage rate rather than the market rate, even though based on that metric, actually fewer refinances

[1] Note that our CRISM sample design (explained above) over-samples the relatively smaller counties among the top 500; if we weight counties similarly in HMDA, the two lines become even closer.




Figure A.2: Refinance propensity over time: comparing CRISM-derived measure to number of refinance mortgages in top 500 counties recorded in HMDA.

(only 41%) are classified as optimal.[2]

In column (3), instead of relying on the ADL calculation, we directly look at the gap between the old mortgage rate and the new mortgage rate, which averages 1.35%. There, again, a higher local FinTech share is associated with a larger gap. Finally, the last columns shows that in places with higher FinTech shares, borrowers were more likely to also withdraw some home equity when refinancing.[3]

[2]This reflects the fact that, on average, rates on actually originated mortgages tend to be somewhat higher than the rate reported in the Freddie Mac Primarly Mortgage Market Survey, which applies to the highest credit quality borrowers.

[3]The cash out indicator that is used as the left-hand side variable here is equal to 1 if, after subtracting 2 percent from the new loan to cover closing costs, the new mortgage is at least $5,000 above the old mortgage (including junior liens) that is being paid off.

Table A.4: Testing for link between local FinTech share and properties of realized refinances of 30-year fixed-rate mortgages.

| | (1) Opt. refi? (mkt rate) | (2) Opt. refi? (actual rate) | (3) Rate gap (old−new) | (4) Cash out? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FT Share$_{Q-1}$ (MA) | 0.266*** | 0.610*** | 0.939*** | 0.175** |
| | (0.083) | (0.092) | (0.122) | (0.081) |
| County FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Loan controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mean Y | 0.55 | 0.41 | 1.34 | 0.17 |
| R2 | 0.35 | 0.25 | 0.42 | 0.13 |
| Obs. | 666,070 | 666,070 | 666,070 | 666,072 |

Table shows results of four different regressions of characteristics of refinance loans in CRISM where both the old and new mortgage are 30-year FRMs. The left-hand side variables are, by column, 1) an indicator for whether a refinancing occurred at a time where the market interest rate was below the rate at which the Agarwal et al. (2013) (ADL) rule would prescribe that the borrower refinance (so "1" would mean the refinancing was "optimal" in that sense); (2) an indicator of whether the mortgage rate on the new (refinance) loan is below the ADL rate; (3) the difference between the old mortgage rate and the new mortgage rate (winsorized at 1%); (4) an indicator variable for the refinance involving "cashing out" home equity (set equal to 1 if the balance of the new loan exceeds the balance of the old loan by more than $5000 plus closing costs (assumed to correspond to 2 percent of the loan amount). Independent variables in each case include the one-quarter-lagged four-quarter county-level FinTech market share, county fixed effects, month fixed effects, and the following loan controls: 5-point bins of CLTV, 20-point bins of FICO, a cubic function in the age of the refinanced loan, the log of the balance of the refinanced loan, and an indicator for whether the refinanced loan was an FHA/VA loan. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered by county. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

# E Spatial Variation in FinTech Mortgage Lending

Figure A.3: Market share of FinTech lenders by county

Calendar year 2010




Calendar year 2016




FinTech market share by county in 2010 and 2016. Figure reflects all lender types and both purchase mortgages and refinancings. FinTech lenders classified using the procedure described in Section II. Data source: HMDA.

# F Cross-sectional regressions: Additional results

Dependent variable: = 100 if fintech lender, = 0 otherwise

| | Purchases | | | | Refinances | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All | | Nonbanks | | All | | Nonbanks | |
| | Univariate | Multivariate | Univariate | Multivariate | Univariate | Multivariate | Univariate | Multivariate |
| ***Borrower income and demography*** | | | | | | | | |
| Log(income) | -0.0932*** | 0.104*** | 0.761*** | 0.701*** | -0.549*** | -0.833*** | -2.677*** | -0.159*** |
| | (0.00777) | (0.00650) | (0.0242) | (0.0173) | (0.00877) | (0.00725) | (0.0321) | (0.0275) |
| Gender: | | | | | | | | |
| Female | 0.00683 | 0.0592*** | -0.502*** | 0.184*** | -0.130*** | 0.756*** | 0.199*** | 3.056*** |
| | (0.00973) | (0.00947) | (0.0218) | (0.0208) | (0.0119) | (0.0126) | (0.0380) | (0.0379) |
| Unknown | 3.027*** | 2.887*** | 13.09*** | 10.13*** | 8.712*** | 6.728*** | 30.88*** | 24.99*** |
| | (0.0334) | (0.0421) | (0.120) | (0.117) | (0.0384) | (0.0437) | (0.0990) | (0.100) |
| Race and ethnicity: | | | | | | | | |
| Black | 0.0808*** | -0.306*** | -1.181*** | -0.387*** | -0.218*** | -0.415*** | -2.862*** | 1.166*** |
| | (0.0276) | (0.0254) | (0.0568) | (0.0495) | (0.0298) | (0.0291) | (0.0877) | (0.0814) |
| Hispanic | -0.729*** | -0.880*** | -3.314*** | -1.577*** | -1.542*** | -1.432*** | -7.162*** | -1.982*** |
| | (0.0180) | (0.0200) | (0.0370) | (0.0391) | (0.0253) | (0.0250) | (0.0759) | (0.0629) |
| Unknown | 2.594*** | 1.551*** | 8.604*** | 3.220*** | 7.206*** | 3.632*** | 19.53*** | 6.540*** |
| | (0.0262) | (0.0294) | (0.0796) | (0.0658) | (0.0303) | (0.0310) | (0.0814) | (0.0710) |
| % black or hispanic$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.0449*** | -0.228*** | -0.816*** | -1.064*** | 0.288*** | -0.256*** | -1.452*** | -2.273*** |
| | (0.0102) | (0.0166) | (0.0224) | (0.0394) | (0.0117) | (0.0165) | (0.0393) | (0.0501) |
| ***Access to finance*** | | | | | | | | |
| Credit score$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | -0.0777*** | -0.279*** | 0.408*** | -0.731*** | -0.532*** | -1.068*** | -2.523*** | -3.002*** |
| | (0.0123) | (0.0192) | (0.0315) | (0.0468) | (0.0120) | (0.0193) | (0.0423) | (0.0618) |
| Bank branch density$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.523*** | 0.467*** | 1.040*** | 0.954*** | 0.266*** | 0.275*** | -1.382*** | 0.479*** |
| | (0.0239) | (0.0262) | (0.0604) | (0.0574) | (0.0186) | (0.0201) | (0.0623) | (0.0530) |
| ***Technology diffusion and adoption*** | | | | | | | | |
| Population density$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.269*** | 0.141*** | 0.672*** | 0.920*** | -0.000996 | -0.0691*** | -1.538*** | 0.421*** |
| | (0.0237) | (0.0275) | (0.0669) | (0.0697) | (0.0194) | (0.0236) | (0.0714) | (0.0607) |
| Borrower age$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.0400*** | 0.119*** | 0.673*** | 0.340*** | -0.0186 | 0.263*** | 1.680*** | 0.869*** |
| | (0.0154) | (0.0168) | (0.0390) | (0.0400) | (0.0161) | (0.0169) | (0.0538) | (0.0502) |
| % bachelor degree$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.116*** | 0.307*** | 0.940*** | 0.920*** | -0.199*** | 0.262*** | -1.388*** | 0.690*** |
| | (0.0175) | (0.0213) | (0.0476) | (0.0529) | (0.0143) | (0.0180) | (0.0489) | (0.0553) |
| ***Internet access*** | | | | | | | | |
| % high speed | 0.192*** | 0.101*** | 0.294*** | 0.255*** | 0.120*** | 0.0689*** | -0.611*** | 0.371*** |
| coverage$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | (0.0118) | (0.0127) | (0.0316) | (0.0316) | (0.0130) | (0.0127) | (0.0575) | (0.0461) |
| % with broadband | -0.0924*** | -0.132*** | -0.466*** | -0.487*** | -0.279*** | -0.0344** | -2.864*** | -0.0551 |
| subscription$^{\text{CTY}}$ | (0.0131) | (0.0179) | (0.0341) | (0.0460) | (0.0138) | (0.0167) | (0.0462) | (0.0555) |
| ***Local housing market conditions*** | | | | | | | | |
| % home price | -0.0522*** | -0.0362*** | -0.971*** | -0.836*** | 0.315*** | 0.277*** | -1.999*** | -1.258*** |
| appreciation$^{\text{CTY}}$ | (0.0112) | (0.0114) | (0.0271) | (0.0258) | (0.0137) | (0.0132) | (0.0443) | (0.0382) |
| Processing time | 0.0961*** | 0.0182 | 0.204*** | 0.205*** | 0.760*** | 0.588*** | 1.561*** | 1.599*** |
| coefficients$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | (0.0108) | (0.0111) | (0.0290) | (0.0269) | (0.0133) | (0.0119) | (0.0502) | (0.0397) |
| Log(2010 home price)$^{\text{CTY}}$ | -0.150*** | -0.127*** | -0.628*** | -0.688*** | -0.440*** | -0.812*** | -4.321*** | -2.993*** |
| | (0.0111) | (0.0188) | (0.0284) | (0.0471) | (0.0139) | (0.0213) | (0.0411) | (0.0675) |
| Observations | 20790255 | 20790255 | 8901875 | 8901875 | 32936746 | 32936746 | 9888845 | 9888845 |
| Mean Dependent Var | 2.888 | 2.888 | 6.745 | 6.745 | 6.129 | 6.129 | 20.41 | 20.41 |

Dependent variable: = 100 if fintech lender, = 0 otherwise

| | Purchases | | | | Refinances | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All | | Nonbanks | | All | | Nonbanks | |
| | Univariate | Multivariate | Univariate | Multivariate | Univariate | Multivariate | Univariate | Multivariate |
| ***Additional race variables*** | | | | | | | | |
| American Indian/Alaska Native | -0.605*** | -0.351*** | -1.837*** | -1.165*** | 0.185*** | 0.873*** | 0.431** | 1.100*** |
| | (0.0471) | (0.0469) | (0.100) | (0.103) | (0.0697) | (0.0681) | (0.200) | (0.199) |
| Asian | -0.401*** | -0.223*** | -0.820*** | -0.573*** | -1.673*** | -0.582*** | -8.575*** | -2.263*** |
| | (0.0289) | (0.0309) | (0.0679) | (0.0698) | (0.0403) | (0.0445) | (0.105) | (0.123) |
| Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | -0.198*** | -0.0433 | -1.731*** | -0.307*** | -0.815*** | -0.316*** | -5.427*** | 0.309 |
| | (0.0611) | (0.0614) | (0.114) | (0.113) | (0.0809) | (0.0916) | (0.212) | (0.220) |
| ***Missing variable indicators*** | | | | | | | | |
| Missing Log(income) | -3.037*** | -5.187*** | -7.263*** | -11.55*** | -2.545*** | -9.490*** | -14.23*** | -18.42*** |
| | (0.0144) | (0.0297) | (0.0526) | (0.151) | (0.0207) | (0.0290) | (0.0609) | (0.0693) |
| Missing % black or hispanic$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 4.111*** | 5.285*** | 2.929*** | 7.582*** | -0.0931 | 3.341 | -5.258 | 4.777 |
| | (1.214) | (1.383) | (0.556) | (1.971) | (2.551) | (2.698) | (6.680) | (5.378) |
| Missing Credit score$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | -0.916*** | -0.589*** | -2.476*** | -0.948 | -1.354*** | -0.312 | -4.354*** | -1.116 |
| | (0.191) | (0.198) | (0.462) | (0.636) | (0.401) | (0.397) | (1.191) | (1.318) |
| Missing Bank branch density$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.156*** | 0.129*** | -0.213*** | 0.0722 | 0.615*** | 0.234*** | 0.468*** | 0.469*** |
| | (0.0272) | (0.0318) | (0.0670) | (0.0771) | (0.0294) | (0.0305) | (0.108) | (0.101) |
| Missing Population density$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 1.412 | -1.939*** | 1.100 | -3.873*** | -1.702 | -2.794 | -6.470* | -1.920 |
| | (1.632) | (0.432) | (1.476) | (0.996) | (1.100) | (1.920) | (3.674) | (5.038) |
| Missing Borrower age$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | -0.724** | 0.176 | -2.392*** | -0.343 | -1.070 | -0.336 | -4.657** | -1.447 |
| | (0.363) | (0.429) | (0.706) | (0.998) | (0.767) | (0.707) | (2.145) | (2.225) |
| Missing % bachelor degree$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 2.803* | 0.992 | 1.941* | 0.544 | -1.160 | -0.289 | -6.413 | -3.266 |
| | (1.535) | (0.726) | (1.098) | (1.945) | (1.560) | (1.629) | (4.561) | (5.304) |
| Missing % high speed coverage$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | -0.947*** | -0.886*** | -1.532*** | -1.917*** | -0.718*** | -0.652*** | -0.575*** | -2.222*** |
| | (0.0251) | (0.0250) | (0.0628) | (0.0604) | (0.0268) | (0.0243) | (0.0979) | (0.0766) |
| Missing % with broadband subscription$^{\text{CTY}}$ | -0.222*** | 0.613*** | 2.194*** | 3.157*** | -0.482*** | 0.0861** | 6.369*** | 2.676*** |
| | (0.0280) | (0.0362) | (0.0968) | (0.116) | (0.0326) | (0.0355) | (0.142) | (0.134) |
| Missing % home price appreciation$^{\text{CTY}}$ | -0.675*** | 0.109** | -0.190** | 0.150 | -0.395*** | 0.0437 | 6.062*** | 0.391 |
| | (0.0241) | (0.0518) | (0.0835) | (0.172) | (0.0315) | (0.0747) | (0.123) | (0.270) |
| Missing Processing time coefficients$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | 0.179*** | 0.0334 | -0.594*** | -0.314*** | 0.733*** | 0.135*** | -0.398*** | -0.387*** |
| | (0.0426) | (0.0475) | (0.0962) | (0.106) | (0.0455) | (0.0475) | (0.140) | (0.136) |
| Missing Log(2010 home price)$^{\text{CTY}}$ | -0.704*** | -0.728*** | 0.0130 | -0.906*** | -0.415*** | 0.384*** | 5.403*** | 2.375*** |
| | (0.0237) | (0.0536) | (0.0790) | (0.171) | (0.0306) | (0.0762) | (0.118) | (0.273) |
| ***Other loan controls*** | | | | | | | | |
| Log(loan size) | 0.0252*** | 0.0909*** | -0.138*** | -0.494*** | 1.295*** | 2.435*** | -5.397*** | -1.665*** |
| | (0.00930) | (0.00931) | (0.0264) | (0.0240) | (0.0108) | (0.00762) | (0.0487) | (0.0626) |
| Jumbo Loans | -1.951*** | -2.599*** | 0.605*** | -0.524*** | -4.578*** | -6.870*** | -6.122*** | -0.401*** |
| | (0.0226) | (0.0314) | (0.116) | (0.100) | (0.0272) | (0.0358) | (0.132) | (0.129) |
| Loan Type: FHA | 1.078*** | 1.223*** | -1.124*** | -0.379*** | 5.864*** | 9.225*** | -2.041*** | 2.884*** |
| | (0.0165) | (0.0149) | (0.0358) | (0.0286) | (0.0341) | (0.0362) | (0.0585) | (0.0593) |
| Loan Type: VA | 0.0610*** | 0.497*** | -1.282*** | -0.889*** | 2.990*** | 7.633*** | -3.873*** | 3.893*** |
| | (0.0229) | (0.0222) | (0.0458) | (0.0444) | (0.0494) | (0.0486) | (0.0846) | (0.0806) |
| No Coapplicant | 0.533*** | 0.469*** | 0.498*** | 0.860*** | 0.451*** | 0.138*** | -0.755*** | -1.694*** |
| | (0.00977) | (0.00945) | (0.0230) | (0.0215) | (0.0121) | (0.0121) | (0.0368) | (0.0343) |
| Owner Occupied | 0.543*** | 0.0652*** | -1.652*** | -0.589*** | 1.881*** | 0.908*** | 3.194*** | 3.855*** |
| | (0.0176) | (0.0193) | (0.0619) | (0.0593) | (0.0203) | (0.0189) | (0.0694) | (0.0658) |
| Observations | 20790255 | 20790255 | 8901875 | 8901875 | 32936746 | 32936746 | 9888845 | 9888845 |
| Mean Dependent Var | 2.888 | 2.888 | 6.745 | 6.745 | 6.129 | 6.129 | 20.41 | 20.41 |

Linear probability model based on HMDA data from 2010-16. All continuous right-hand size variables normalized to have mean of zero and standard deviation of one. $^{\text{TRACT}}$ and $^{\text{CTY}}$ indicate variable is measured at the census tract or county level of aggregation, respectively, rather than at the loan level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by census tract. Regressions include controls for loan size, loan type, dummies for jumbo loan, coapplicant, owner occupied, other race categories, and missing values for any variable with positive incidence of missing values. See Internet Appendix for full results including coefficients on these variables as well as univariate regressions. See Data Appendix for variable definitions and sources.* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

# G Diffusion of Google Fiber in Kansas City

Table A.5: Summary Statistics for Kansas City Regression Variables

| | mean | sd | min | p50 | max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| % with Google Fiber$^{CTY}$ | 0.07 | 0.24 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Log(income) | 4.41 | 0.61 | 0.00 | 4.41 | 9.21 |
| Log(loan size) | 4.96 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 5.02 | 10.77 |
| Female | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Unknown | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Black | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Hispanic | 0.03 | 0.17 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Unknown | 0.10 | 0.30 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| American Indian/Alaska Native | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Asian | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Hawaiian/Pacific Islander | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Jumbo Loans | 0.02 | 0.15 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Loan Type: FHA | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Loan Type: VA | 0.07 | 0.26 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| No Coapplicant | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Owner Occupied | 0.92 | 0.28 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |

Table A.6: Fintech Mortgage Share & Google Fiber Access

Dependent variable: = 100 if fintech lender, = 0 otherwise

| | Purchases | | | | Refinances | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All | | Nonbank | | All | | Nonbank | |
| % with Google Fiber$^{\text{TRACT}}$ | -0.800*** | -0.738*** | -1.260 | -0.903 | -0.487 | -0.417 | 0.0186 | 0.595 |
| | (0.244) | (0.243) | (0.935) | (0.926) | (0.357) | (0.341) | (1.023) | (0.996) |
| Year-Month FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Census Tract FEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Borrower & Loan Controls | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y |
| Observations | 138306 | 138306 | 34796 | 34796 | 180777 | 180777 | 51890 | 51890 |
| Mean Dependent Var | 2.147 | 2.147 | 8.535 | 8.535 | 5.189 | 5.189 | 18.08 | 18.08 |

Linear probability model of borrowing from a FinTech lender on Google Fiber access, based on HMDA data from 2011-16. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by census tract. Borrower and loan characteristics include applicant income, indicator for missing applicant income, loan size, borrower gender, race, & ethnicity indicators, loan type, coapplicant indicator, and owner occupied indicator. $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$

Figure A.6: Staggered Entry of Google Fiber

Google Fiber Availability in December 2011




Google Fiber Availability in December 2015




Figure shows the share of the population for each census tract that lives in a census block with Google Fiber in Kansas City. Source: NTIA and FCC data on Internet coverage by census block, provider, and technology in December 2011 and 2015.