

**It's Not Only What You Do, But Why You Do It: How Managerial Motives Influence
Employees' Fairness Judgments**

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Abstract

Although past research demonstrates that perceived fairness leads to many benefits, it also tends to assume that fairness flows almost exclusively from justice adherence. We instead reason that when employees form fairness judgments, they consider not only the extent to which supervisors adhere to justice but also *why* supervisors do so. In particular, our work outlines three distinct theoretical pathways to fairness. Supervisory justice motives affect fairness judgments via supervisors' justice rule adherence (*behavioral*) and via employees' attributed motives (*attributional*), such that prosocial (self-interest) motives are positively (negatively) related to fairness judgments and controlling for justice. We also reason that people jointly consider supervisory motives and justice when forming fairness judgments (*interactive*), such that the relationship between prosocial (self-interest) motives and fairness judgments is more positive (negative) when justice is lower versus higher. We test our predictions across six studies, both survey and experimental. Our results support the three pathways for prosocial justice motives and the behavioral and attributional (but not interactive) pathways for self-interest justice motives. Our work suggests organizations trying to promote fairness should avoid inadvertently instilling a self-interest justice motive in their supervisors.

Keywords: fairness judgments, justice rule adherence, justice motives, attributed motives; prosocial and self-interest

The importance of fairness judgments in the workplace—the subjective, global assessment of the appropriateness of authority figures' behavior (Colquitt & Rodell, 2015)—has long been established. When employees judge the outcomes, procedures, and treatment they receive in the workplace as fair, many benefits accrue (e.g., job satisfaction, organizational commitment; Colquitt et al., 2013). To form fairness judgments, employees rely on information about justice; that is, employees judge supervisors as fair or unfair based on the extent to which those supervisors adhere to distributive (e.g., equity), procedural (e.g., consistency, accuracy), interpersonal (e.g., respect), and informational (e.g., truthfulness) justice rules (Adams, 1965; Bies & Moag, 1986; Leventhal, 1980).

Despite the conceptual distinctions between fairness and justice rule adherence, as Cropanzano et al. (2015, p. 290) suggest, the implicit association between "traditional justice rules" and fairness judgments is so strong that "studies have not included both measures together." At the same time, scholars agree that "fairness perceptions capture more than just descriptive evaluations of the rules" (Scott et al., 2009, p. 758), such that justice is a central, but not the only, predictor of fairness (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015). Emerging work has begun to highlight how other factors, such as supervisors' characteristics, impact fairness judgments (e.g., Rodell et al., 2017; Zapata et al., 2016). Although this work has made significant strides in enhancing our understanding of fairness judgments, it is still limited in crucial ways.

First, conceptually and empirically, past work has not always clarified whether other factors affect fairness judgments because they *also* affect justice. In other words, because certain traits predispose managers to adhere more (or less) to justice (Graso et al., 2020), it is important to determine whether, conceptually and empirically, other factors have an independent effect on fairness judgments. Second, recent work has tended to assume that the impact of other factors on

fairness judgments generally does not vary based on the level of justice rule adherence. Yet, information processing arguments (Fiske & Taylor, 2013) suggest that the extent to which employees rely on factors other than justice may vary based on whether justice is low versus high. If true, then failing to account for how justice interacts with other factors may inadvertently misrepresent the extent these factors shape fairness judgments. Consequently, we suggest that when theorizing about fairness judgments, scholars should consider three pathways: behavioral (via justice), attributional (over and above justice), and interactive (as a function of justice).

To illustrate the usefulness of these pathways, we extend recent discussions on justice motives (Matta et al., 2020; Scott et al., 2014) by highlighting how supervisory motives impact employee fairness judgments. Examining motives through the three-pathways is especially appropriate for justice motives given that broader work on motivation has established that one's motives influence one's behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and how one is assessed by others (Heider, 1958), both independent of and in conjunction with said behavior.

We make three core arguments. First, because motives impact how people allocate personal resources (i.e., attention, time, effort; Ajzen, 1991; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kanfer, 1990), justice motives should impact the formation of fairness judgments by influencing supervisors' justice rule adherence. Put simply, we reason that a supervisor's prosocial justice motive (desire to benefit other people) increases justice rule adherence; by comparison, a supervisor's self-interest justice motive (desire to benefit oneself) should demonstrate weaker effects. Second, because motives are evaluative (i.e., have positive or negative connotations; Ariely et al., 2009), we also posit that employees care about and can assess their supervisors' justice motives (attributed motives), which affect fairness judgments over and above justice. Third, we reason that justice rule adherence moderates the effects of attributed justice motives on fairness

judgments. Given that sensemaking processes differ depending on the extent to which an event is negative or surprising (Baumeister et al., 2001), and fairness judgments are formed with a more methodical thought process when outcomes are negative (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), we argue that attributed motives help employees interpret low justice. In particular, the positive effect of attributed prosocial motives on fairness should strengthen because employees rely on the motive to interpret seemingly motive inconsistent behavior. By contrast, when supervisors are seen as motivated by self-interest, low justice appears motive consistent (i.e., intentional), strengthening the negative effect of attributed self-interest motives on fairness judgments (see Figure 1).

In line with recent conceptual developments (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015; Cropanzano et al., 2015), our work further illuminates the complex relationships between fairness judgments, justice, and other factors (e.g., motives). More broadly, our work provides a comprehensive theoretical template for future research that focuses on how a given factor impacts fairness judgments via three conceptual pathways: behavioral, attributional, and interactive. Our work also uniquely illustrates the conceptual necessity to account for justice and for the possibility that such effects vary based on whether justice is low versus high. In particular, we demonstrate that understanding fairness judgments requires considering not only justice rule adherence but also the attributed motives for these behaviors. Hence, employees consider the extent to which supervisors adhere to justice rules and why supervisors do so.

We also contribute to current discussions on supervisory motives to act fairly (Kleshinski et al., 2020; Matta et al., 2020; Scott et al., 2014). Whereas the predominant theory on justice motives (Scott et al., 2009) has focused on three cognitive motives (effecting compliance, identity maintenance, establishing fairness), our work draws directly from the broader work motivation literature (De Dreu, 2006; De Dreu & Nauta, 2009; Folger & Salvador, 2008) to

conceptualize prosocial and self-interest justice motives; this is important because as recently highlighted by Kleshinski et al. (2020), the motives in the predominant justice motive framework may be categorized as both self and other-focused. Thus, we view our work as providing a complementary justice motives framework. As the distinction between prosocial and self-interest motives has proven to be consequential for work-related phenomenon (e.g., De Dreu & Nauta, 2009; Grant et al., 2009), utilizing this lens may help uncover a deeper understanding of the role that motives play in fairness judgment and may align with different theoretical predictions.

Also, work on justice motives has focused on examining the effects of either supervisory motives on justice rule adherence (Scott et al., 2009, 2014) or attributed justice motives on employees' trust judgments following specific justice events (Matta et al., 2020). In contrast, we explore how motives, actual and attributed, work in conjunction with justice rule adherence to affect fairness judgments, thus expanding our understanding of the role of justice motives in shaping more global fairness processes and judgments. This extension has important theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, our prosocial and self-interest motive framework offers a potential pathway to align solely positive predictions for supervisors' justice motives (Scott et al., 2014) with some negative predictions for employees attributed justice motives (Matta et al., 2020). From a practical perspective, our work highlights why supervisors interested in being evaluated fairly by their employees need to manage not only their justice behaviors but also the attributions employees make about said behaviors, both of which are influenced by supervisory prosocial and self-interest justice motives. Moreover, because of the downsides associated with a motive of self-interest, our theorizing suggests that promoting fairness via self-interest (e.g., rewards) may inadvertently hinder those efforts.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

Justice Motives

Motives drive the direction and intensity of effort (Ajzen, 1991; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kanfer, 1990), and thus motivation is often equated with “an inner desire to make an effort” (Dowling & Sayles, 1978, p. 16). Because effort can be directed toward any behavior, motives are often thought of as referent specific, such that effort is directed toward specific actions. In particular, supervisors’ justice motives should play a fundamental role in distributing resources equitably (distributive), using consistent, accurate, and free of bias procedures (procedural), providing truthful and timely explanations or justifications (informational), and communicating in a respectful, proper manner (interpersonal) (Scott et al., 2009).

The literature on justice motives has thus far focused on three cognitive motives outlined by Scott et al. (2009): effecting compliance (i.e., to maintain control), identity maintenance (i.e., to manage an image of a good leader), and establishing fairness (i.e., to do the right thing). Empirically, these motives impact justice rule adherence in specific events (Scott et al., 2014), and when these motives are attributed to the supervisor by employees following specific events, they shape the extent to which employees trust the supervisor (Matta et al., 2020). We expand this work by distinguishing between prosocial and self-interest justice motives.

A prosocial motive is typically defined as “the desire to expend effort to benefit other people” (Grant, 2008, p. 48). When people are prosocially motivated, they “see the work as a means to the end goal of benefiting others” (Grant, 2008, p. 49). Thus, we define a prosocial justice motive as the desire to adhere to justice rules to benefit others, particularly employees, given they are the primary recipients of justice. A self-interest motive is defined as “the motive to benefit the self” (Folger & Salvador, 2008, p. 1135) and is said to be driven by a focus on

financial (following an economic viewpoint) and reputational (as indicated by societal norms) benefits. Some scholars go as far as suggesting that self-interest may also be driven by self-impression management concerns (e.g., Murnighan et al., 2001). However, we agree with the assessment that this conceptualization may be so broad that it encompasses nearly all behavior (for a review, see Folger & Salvador, 2008). Thus, we define a self-interest justice motive as the desire to adhere to justice rules to benefit oneself.

Crucially, our focus on prosocial and self-interest justice motives is complementary to the three-justice motives based on Scott et al.'s (2009) work. Indeed, in their recent review, Kleshinski et al. (2020) suggest that motives such as effecting compliance or identity maintenance may be ascribed to both self and other concerns. Thus, one can be concerned with effecting compliance due to self-interested reasons, similar to managers focusing on appearing fair to gain benefits rather than being fair (Greenberg, 1988) or due to prosocial reasons, such as ensuring the group's cooperation and success. Similarly, identity maintenance motives may arise due to a desire to maintain a positive reputation (self-interest) or because being perceived as a good leader means one is positively impacting the lives of others. Such distinctions have been similarly discussed concerning power, which can engender either a self-focus or a focus on responsibility for others (Tost, 2015; Tost & Johnson, 2019).

Although Scott et al. (2009, p. 757) acknowledge that motives "may underlie managers' adherence to and violation of justice rules," when and how motives lead to adherence versus violation remains unclear. Additional work in this area has further exacerbated this lack of clarity by theorizing either all positive effects (Scott et al., 2014) or some negative effects (Matta et al., 2020), depending on whether the focus is on actual versus attributed motives. However, thus far, the empirical evidence only supports positive effects. Our work aims to provide consensus to the

literature by building on an extensive body of work, suggesting that one's focus (self or other) impacts one's actions and others' attributions. In particular, we explain how prosocial and self-interest justice motives differentially affect justice rule adherence, attributed motives, and thus fairness judgments via multiple theoretical pathways. Because our focus is on predicting fairness judgments, "a global perception of appropriateness" (Colquitt & Rodell, 2015, p. 188; see also Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a), and our theorizing is drawn from the general motivation literature, the broader distinctions between prosocial and self-interest are theoretically aligned with our model. Our aim, however, is not to replace the current motives framework. Both frameworks represent valid conceptualizations of justice motives, and the theory and research question(s) should drive the choice of a motive framework.

Below, we combine the distinction between prosocial and self-interest motives with the three proposed pathways, generating theory about how supervisor justice motives differentially affect employees' fairness judgments via each pathway. For simplicity, we will refer to justice motives as motives and justice rule adherence/enactment as justice.

Behavioral Path: Justice Motives' Effect on Fairness Judgments Via Justice

Because people direct their attention and invest their resources (i.e., persistence and intensity) in line with their motives (Ajzen, 1991; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kanfer, 1990), prosocial and self-interest motives tend to differentially impact behavior. In the case of justice, supervisors must invest time, effort, and other regulatory resources (Johnson et al., 2014) if they are to adhere to justice effectively; however, because justice competes with other task responsibilities for such resources (Sherf et al., 2019), and supervisors may be distracted by other responsibilities that seem more important (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a) or lack information about the need to enact justice (Sherf et al., 2020), they may be driven to other pursuits that appear more fruitful

(Brockner, 2006, 2010; Brockner et al., 2009).

When supervisors are motivated to enact justice due to a desire to help their employees (i.e., prosocial), they likely notice, attend to, and invest personal resources toward justice issues frequently and intently; this is because the motive to help others focuses one's attention and effort on activities that may bring benefits to others (Grant, 2008), and fairness is considered both salient and important to employees (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). Perhaps, as a result, Bolino (1999) reasoned that people driven primarily by prosocial motives tend to provide others with more effective help. Given that internalized motives are generally associated with a higher quality of functioning (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kanfer, 1990), and people with "prosocial motives tend to focus their attention outwardly rather than inwardly" (Grant & Mayer, 2009, p. 901), we reason that prosocially motivated supervisors are more likely to notice and decode situations as relevant for justice, and thus should be skilled at demonstrating justice. Within the justice literature, indirect support for our arguments can be found in work suggesting that empathic concern (a form of other-directed motivation) positively influences interpersonal and informational justice (e.g., Patient & Skarlicki, 2010; Whiteside & Barclay, 2016). Thus, over time, a prosocially motivated supervisor should tend to adhere to justice rules.

By comparison, when supervisors are motivated to enact justice to benefit from doing so directly (e.g., self-interest), they should be less likely to notice, attend to, and invest personal resources toward justice; when they do, it should be less frequently and intently. This is because, for justice behavior, a self-interest motive likely elicits cost/benefit concerns. Given the multiple, sometimes competing demands on supervisors' time and attention, coupled with how organizations reward and evaluate supervisors' performance, issues relating to justice and fairness can be seen as less important and less directly rewarded; this misalignment will make

other pursuits, such as focusing on technical tasks, seem more attractive (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009a; Brockner et al., 2009; Sherf et al., 2019). Thus, a self-interest motive may weaken supervisors' justice because it drives supervisors away from the societal norm to be just (Lerner, 1980) and to seek alternative, more beneficial opportunities to advance their financial and reputational interests. Relatedly, because justice requires intentionality, if supervisors are focused on their interests, they may fail to notice and decode situations as relevant for justice. We are not suggesting that supervisors with a self-interest motive will never adhere to the rules of justice, but rather that they will do so more narrowly, and only to the extent it serves their interests. Indirectly supporting this logic, Hui et al. (2000) found that strategic employees increase citizenship behaviors before impending promotions, but once the value is attained (i.e., the promotion), these behaviors decline significantly.

Much of the work demonstrating the downsides of self-interest has done so via comparisons with prosocial motives (e.g., Bolino, 1999). For example, Finkelstein and Penner (2004) found that, compared to prosocial, self-interest was a significantly weaker predictor of how frequently employees engage in citizenship behavior. Grant et al. (2009, p. 35) summarize this work succinctly by stating that people “with self-serving values... are distracted by image concerns,” rendering them comparatively less effective. Although, like Grant and Berg (2011, p. 30), we acknowledge “there are moments and circumstances in which prosocial motivation and self-interested motivation guide employees toward conflicting courses of action,” our theorizing has focused not on the situational level, which is where “the negative, bipolar relationship between the two motivations is most likely to occur” but instead aligns more closely with the contextual level, where “these conflicts appear to disappear—or at least become resolved” (Grant & Berg, 2011, p. 30). Thus, prosocially motivated supervisors should, on average, adhere to

justice rules even at personal cost; those motivated by self-interest should do so more narrowly:

Hypothesis 1a: A supervisor's prosocial justice motive is *positively* related to their justice rule adherence.

Hypothesis 1b: Compared to a supervisor's prosocial justice motives, their self-interest justice motives are *more weakly* related to their justice rule adherence.

As justice is the most proximal predictor of fairness judgments (for a review, see Colquitt & Rodell, 2015), we also hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2a: A supervisor's prosocial justice motive *positively* relates to employees' fairness judgments via the supervisor's justice rule adherence.

Hypothesis 2b: A supervisor's self-interest justice motive is *more weakly* related than their prosocial justice motive to employees' fairness judgments via the supervisor's justice rule adherence.

Attributional Path: Justice Motives' Effect on Fairness Judgments via Attributed Motives

We also posit that motives not only impact fairness judgments via justice but also via employees' attributed (i.e., perceived) motives, over and above the effect of motives on justice. Past theorizing in the justice literature has indicated the importance of signals that seem to go beyond adherence to justice rules. For instance, Folger (1993, p. 175) theorized that "an agent's conduct involves more than the process determining how much another person receives in the exchange... some conduct may have little to do directly with the things being exchanged or how the amounts to be exchanged will be determined." "Conduct" is so vital that Folger (1993, p. 177) claims it "can keep the decision-maker from being a target of resentment." We reason employees evaluate supervisory conduct by making motive attributions, which independently impact fairness judgments.

Attributed prosocial motives indicate positive intentionality that implies a person is a desirable social exchange partner (Soetevent, 2005). They are seen as conforming with more

permanent moral, social, and ethical norms (Rioux & Penner, 2001). Economists similarly argue that a prosocial motive has a signaling capacity (Glazer & Konrad, 1996) that imbues people with prestige and status (Harbaugh, 1998). More specific to the justice literature, in discussions on fairness theory, Folger and Cropanzano (1998, p. 191) imply the importance of a prosocial motive by arguing that “a foundational element of fairness is a conscious effort to consider another person’s needs.” On the other hand, an attributed self-interest motive tends to elicit negative impressions from others (Dana et al., 2006), as selfishness is viewed as an immoral trait (Aquino & Reed, 2002); after all, pure self-interest violates internalized norms for cooperation (Rege & Telle, 2004). For instance, people engaging in altruistic behaviors derived from a desire to benefit others are granted more “credit” by observers for the same behavior (Barnett et al., 2000; Grant et al., 2009; Lin-Healy & Small, 2012). Put simply, “being altruistic is often seen as “good” and being greedy or selfish is not” (Ariely et al., 2009, p. 544). In sum, past research supports the importance of attributed intentionality (i.e., one’s motives) as an evaluative indicator, over and above the behavior in question. Thus, irrespective of justice, we reason employees rely on attributed prosocial and self-interest motives to inform fairness judgments:

Hypothesis 3a: A supervisor’s prosocial justice motive is *positively* related to employees’ fairness judgments after controlling for justice rule adherence.

Hypothesis 3b: A supervisor’s self-interest justice motive is *negatively* related to employees’ fairness judgments after controlling for justice rule adherence.

Implied in the arguments above is the idea that employees use insights gleaned from their supervisor’s motives to assess said motives accurately. This is supported by attribution theory, which suggests that people attempt to understand the underlying motives of others to make causal inferences (Heider, 1958). Indeed, supervisors are often aware of the importance of these attributions, as they emphasize “communicating fair intentions” to “look fair” (Greenberg, 1988,

p. 155). Although people cannot perfectly assess others' motives, they are generally good assessors of the values and motives of others (e.g., Maierhofer et al., 2000) because people tend to behave in ways that reveal their motives. For instance, those who hold prosocial motives "send signals about their underlying intentions" by expressing prosocial values (Grant et al., 2009, p. 31) whereas those who espouse self-interest motives, "through the nature and timing of their actions...", "leak observable cues about their values" (Grant et al., 2009, p. 35; Hui et al., 2000). With justice specifically, past research suggests that employees seem to look for conduct clues (Hollensbe et al., 2008). Thus, given that employees notice and care about why supervisors behave the way they do, we predict that controlling for justice, supervisory motives impact fairness judgments through their effect on attributed motives:

Hypothesis 4a: A supervisor's prosocial justice motive is *positively* related to employees' fairness judgments *via* attributed prosocial motives after controlling for justice rule adherence.

Hypothesis 4b: A supervisor's self-interest justice motive is *negatively* related to employees' fairness judgments *via* attributed self-interest motives after controlling for justice rule adherence.

Interactive Path: Joint Effect of Justice Motives and Justice Rule Adherence

Although we have focused on the independent effects of motives and justice on fairness judgments, as motives and justice provide employees with different information, we argue they also interactively impact how employees form fairness judgments. When justice is high, fairness judgments are likely formed using justice as the primary source of information; hence, other information, including motives, should play a lesser role. This is consistent with the prominent role of justice as the main predictor of fairness judgments (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015; Cropanzano et al., 2015). When justice is low, however, the aversive experience should lead people to engage in deeper cognitive processing (Zapata et al., 2016), resulting in a heightened search for

information. After all, people are cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), and as such, they engage in more sensemaking when events are negative or surprising (Baumeister et al., 2001; Wong & Weiner, 1981). Indeed, Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001) posits that negative events lead to a counterfactual thought process to determine whether or not a supervisor is responsible (and thus deserves blame) for said event. Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996, p. 201) also theorize that people “initiate sense-making or information-seeking activity when procedures are unfair, outcomes are unfavorable, or both” (i.e., low justice). Thus, as employees try to make sense of low justice, they likely search for additional information.

Similarly to Folger (1993, p. 178), who theorized that “a perception of the thing received in an exchange (outcome) and a perception of the person with whom one is in an exchange relationship (conduct)—guide people’s reactions in the aftermath of any exchange,” we reason that the motives one attributes to a supervisor provide important information that can serve to insulate *or* exaggerate responses to low justice. If we assume prosocially motivated supervisors, on average, demonstrate stronger justice, then negative behaviors such as a lack of justice (or violations) are likely evaluated as surprising. Because evaluations of behavior take into account the consistency and distinctiveness of said behavior, inconsistent, unexpected events tend to be attributed to external or situational factors; in the case of lower justice coupled with a prosocial motive, employees might assume the supervisor had little control or discretion (Jackson & LePine, 2003; Kelley, 1973). Because attributions of responsibility are fundamental to fairness judgments (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), perceived lack of supervisory discretion should reduce judgments of unfairness (Nicklin et al., 2011).

An attributed prosocial motive may also provide supervisors with idiosyncrasy credits, “the accumulation of positive impressions of an individual acquired through achievements or

past behavior, which are associated with greater ability to deviate from expectations without sanctions” (Phillips et al., 2009, p. 722), serving to insulate supervisors from low fairness judgments. Thus, a prosocially motivated supervisor that either fails to adhere to justice or violates justice may be given the “benefit of the doubt” via higher than expected fairness perceptions as they may still be seen as “trying to be fair” (Folger, 1998, p. 191).

Unlike a prosocial motive, behaviors driven by self-interest are frequently met with skepticism (Lin-Healy & Small, 2012). Not unlike how people react especially negatively when both distributive and procedural justice are low (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger, 1987), we reason that a self-interest motive coupled with negative behaviors may be seen as more intentional, and thus elicit a stronger, negative response on fairness judgments. Similarly, although self-interest coupled with positive behaviors may still be interpreted positively, self-interest accompanied by negative behaviors leaves little doubt the supervisor is only concerned with themselves. As a result, when supervisors are seen as motivated by self-interest and fail to act justly, employees have little reason to view the supervisor as fair and may feel especially injured. Because of the harm typically caused by low levels of justice (Gilliland, 2008), we posit that low justice exacerbates the negative effects commonly associated with a motive of self-interest. When combined with low levels of justice, we reason that a self-interest motive is viewed as especially unfair because it is accompanied by actual injury, leading to stronger negative fairness judgments.

In sum, we theorize motives should have a stronger impact on fairness judgments when justice is low. These conditions induce further information processing that necessitates the reliance on additional information provided by an attributed motive. Put differently, although low levels of justice are, by and large, associated with negative outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2015),

supervisors seen as prosocially motivated should be somewhat insulated from the downsides of low justice on fairness judgments, whereas those seen as motivated by self-interest should experience somewhat exacerbated effects of low justice on fairness judgments:

Hypothesis 5a: The relationship between attributed prosocial justice motives and employees' fairness judgments is moderated by justice rule adherence, such that it is more *positive* when justice is low (vs. high).

Hypothesis 5b: The relationship between attributed self-interest justice motives and employees' fairness judgments is moderated by justice rule adherence, such that it is more *negative* when justice is low (vs. high).

Overview of Studies¹

We conducted six studies to test our hypotheses. In Studies 1a-b, we asked supervisors to rate their motives and justice behaviors. In Study 1c, we asked employees to rate their supervisors' motives and justice, as well as judge the fairness of their supervisors. These studies served to test our hypotheses and compare multiple approaches to the measurement of prosocial and self-interest motives. In Study 2, supervisors reported their motives, and one of their direct reports assessed justice and fairness judgments. In Study 3, we tested our entire model by surveying supervisors and one of their direct reports across time, measuring motives from both perspectives. Finally, Study 4 manipulated justice and attributed motives and measured fairness judgments to provide casual evidence to support our conceptual model. For all analyses, we relied on listwise deletion and did not remove data due to outliers. The field data were part of broader data collection efforts.

Studies 1a and 1b: Method

Sample and Procedure

¹ A full list of any adapted items used in our field studies is available in the Appendix. Data and syntax used in our analysis of all studies is available on the open science framework website: bit.ly/2RvQZQ1

We recruited U.S. and U.K. supervisors with at least one direct report via Prolific Academic (Palan & Schitter, 2018), confirmed via preliminary survey, and paid them \$1.25 (Study 1a) and \$1.50 (Study 1b) (University of Notre Dame, Protocol 19-10-5594: An examination of supervisory motives). For Study 1a, we aimed to recruit 160 participants, with 146 participants responding (58% male, 90% Caucasian, 6% Hispanic, 5% Asian/Pacific Islander, 3% African American, 1% other, with 5% choosing multiple categories, $M_{\text{age}} = 41.40$ [SD = 11.35], $M_{\text{tenure in position}} = 6.37$ [SD = 5.30]). For Study 1b, we aimed to recruit 202 participants, with 197 participants responding (58% male, 83% Caucasian, 6% Hispanic, 13% Asian/Pacific Islander, 4% African American, and 1% other, with 7% choosing multiple categories, $M_{\text{age}} = 38.14$ [SD = 9.39], $M_{\text{tenure in position}} = 5.67$ [SD = 4.49]). In both samples, supervisors worked in a diverse set of industries, including professional, scientific, or technical services, educational services, health care, and social assistance, and manufacturing, and included various occupations, such as office manager, IT manager, and systems analyst.

Measures

Justice Rule Adherence

Supervisors indicated the extent (1: “*To a very small extent*” to 5: “*To a very large extent*”) to which they adhered to distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice using Colquitt’s (2001) 20-item scale.

Justice Motives

The organizational literature on motives has often relied on one of two approaches to operationalize prosocial and self-interest motives: a faceted approach (e.g., Rioux & Penner, 2001) and an overall approach (e.g., De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). Rioux and Penner’s (2001) motive scale provides specificity as it includes the type of outcomes most sought out when one is either

motivated by self-interest or prosocial desires. In particular, their “impression management motives” scale captures self-interest motives because it refers to both financial and reputational benefits, as summarized in Folger and Salvador’s (2008) review of self-interest. Their “prosocial motives” scale focuses on helping, as prosocial motives are most often discussed as directing one broadly toward “protecting and promoting the welfare of other people, which is typically prompted by contact with others who need help” (Grant, 2008, p. 49). DeDreu and Nauta’s (2009) motive orientation scale asks respondents to consider the extent to which they broadly focus on their own (self-interest) and/or others’ (prosocial) goals, aspirations, wishes, desires, needs, and/or interests.

In this paper, we mostly rely on the faceted approach, using items adapted to justice motives from Rioux and Penner (2001). However, to enhance the robustness of our findings and to ensure results are consistent across measurement approaches, in Studies 1b-c, we also rely on an overall approach using De Dreu and Nauta’s (2009) 6-item scale. In adapting all items to capture justice motives, we asked supervisors to respond to their internal states (Chan, 2010; Scott et al., 2014) (Study 1a: 1 “*never*” to 5 “*always*”; Study 1b: 1 “*never*” to 7 “*always*”):

“The next set of questions will refer to reasons why you might choose to engage in the types of justice behaviors described in the previous items. For instance, when deciding about employee pay, rewards, evaluations, promotions, or work assignments, supervisors often try to make sure employees feel fairly treated. You can do this, for example, by using consistent, accurate, and free of bias procedures, providing explanations or justifications that are truthful and timely, and communicating with employees in a respectful, proper manner. I am motivated to act fairly because...”

In Studies 1a and 1b, we used shortened versions of Rioux and Penner’s (2001) 10-item scales for construct validity purposes. Concerning self-interest motives, we omitted “to avoid looking lazy,” “to look like I am busy,” and “to impress my coworkers” from the original impression management scale as there is little indication supervisors adhere to justice rules for these benefits. Concerning prosocial motives, we excluded items that assessed ability or intrinsic

motivation, as well as those referencing benefits that, again, do not seem to directly result from justice: “To have fun with my co-workers,” “To be friendly with others,” “To get to know my co-workers better,” “Because I feel it is important to help those in need,” “Because it is easy for me to be helpful,” “Because I can put myself in other people's shoes.”²

Additional Motives Measures

We asked supervisors to rate Scott et al.'s (2009) three cognitive justice motives using Scott et al.'s (2014) items for effecting compliance³, identity maintenance, and establishing fairness, using the above instructions with the addition “to ensure that my employees...” To compare our focus on a self-interest motive to a power motive, in Study 1a, we included five items to reflect power and influence, worded similarly to items used to capture our focal motives. We also measured the supervisor's positive and negative affectivity in Study 1b (using Thompson's [2007] 10-item scale; 1 “never” to 5 “always”), as they may also influence justice. To minimize potential ordering effects, we randomized the order of the motive frameworks.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)

We conducted a CFA (Hu & Bentler, 1999) to establish the distinctiveness of our variables. We used random item parceling to reduce the number of indicators to 3 parcels for motives factor that included more than 5 items (Little et al., 2013). In addition, we used the scale means of the 4 justice facets as indicators of justice (e.g., Liao, 2007; Sherf et al., 2019). For Study 1a, the 7-factor model (justice, prosocial [faceted], self-interest [faceted], power, effecting compliance, identity maintenance, and establishing fairness) fit the data well χ^2 [N = 146, df =

² According to Hinkin (2005), long scales are problematic for a variety of reasons, including respondent fatigue, response biases, and space limitations, the latter being especially concerning for supervisor surveys. As Hinkin's work suggests that three items are often sufficient to capture the essence of a construct, we felt confident using 4 or more items for each motive. We conduct a generalizability theory analysis in Study 1c to test this assumption.

³ We note that due to an error, Study 1a omitted one item from Scott et al.'s (2014) 6-item effecting compliance measure. This error was corrected in Study 1b.

356] = 561.98, $p < .001$, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .06) and all indicators loaded significantly on their intended factors. For Study 1b, the 8-factor model (justice, prosocial [faceted], self-interest [faceted], effecting compliance, identity maintenance, establishing fairness, positive affectivity, negative affectivity) fit the data well χ^2 [N = 197, df = 436] = 640.99, $p < .001$, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .05) and all indicators loaded significantly on intended factors⁴. Chi-square difference tests showed that alternative nested models achieved significantly poorer fit. For example, in Study 1a, constraining self-interest and power motives to load on one factor produced significantly worse fit ($\Delta\chi^2$ [N = 146, Δ df = 1] = 281.58, $< .001$, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .10, SRMR = .08).

Studies 1a and 1b: Results and Discussion

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. Table 2 reports our regression analyses on the effect of justice motives on supervisory justice. We first entered the three Scott et al. (2014) motives and the power motive (Study 1a) and positive/negative affectivity (Study 1b) into the equation (Table 2, Models 1a & 1b). Establishing fairness and both affect measures were significantly related to justice. However, only negative affectivity remained significant when we added prosocial and self-interest motives into the regression (Table 2, Models 2a & 2b). Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, prosocial motives were positively related to justice (1a: $B = .30$, $p = .002$; 1b: $B = .18$, $p < .001$). Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, the effect of a self-interest motive was weaker than the effect of a prosocial motive and in fact was negative and significant (1a: $B = -.10$, $p = .016$; 1b: $B = -.06$, $p = .008$). We obtained similar results with only prosocial and self-interest motives in our regression (Table 2, Models 3a & 3b).⁵ We ran the same analysis using

⁴ We conducted the same CFA with the two overall motive measures instead of the faceted ones. This model also fit the data well: χ^2 [N = 197, df = 406] = 657.51, $p < .001$, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .06).

⁵ We also explored whether prosocial and self-interest motives interacted to predict justice, but the interaction was not significant ($B = -.09$, $p = .202$).

the overall justice motives measures and obtained similar support for our hypotheses. The self-interest motive effect was not significant, though it was weaker ($B = .01, p = .673$) than the prosocial motive effect ($B = .18, p < .001$).

Our results provide support for Hypotheses 1a-b by demonstrating that prosocial and self-interest motives were differentially related to justice, using either the faceted (Rioux & Penner, 2001) or overall (De Dreu & Nauta, 2009) measurement approach. Interestingly, whereas both prosocial motives measures were positively related to justice, and both self-interest measures had a comparative weaker relationship with justice, the faceted items revealed a significant negative effect of self-interest. In addition, our results support the predictive validity of the Scott et al. (2009) motive framework (see Table 2), though prosocial and self-interest motives explain additional variance in justice (Study 1a: $\Delta R^2 = .10$; Study 1b: $\Delta R^2 = .11$).

Because justice refers to behaviors (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015), it can be conceptualized from different sources with relatively strong agreement (e.g., Zapata et al., 2013). Although here we measured it from the supervisor perspective, in Study 1c (and our other field investigations), we revert to the more traditional operationalization by measuring it from the employees' perspective. We also use Study 1c to verify our attributed motive measurement approach further, as well as provide a test of Hypotheses 4a-b and 5a-b.

Study 1c: Method

Sample and Procedure

We recruited U.S. and U.K. full-time employees via Prolific Academic in 4 waves. At Time 0, we posted screening questions about demographics and employment, which all 366 recruited respondents completed (University of Notre Dame, Protocol 19-09-5555: Leader characteristics). Respondents represented 18 different industries, such as manufacturing,

education, finance, and transportation, and included various occupations, such as office manager, teacher, and registered nurse. The following day (Time 1), we invited the 298 respondents who reported having one direct supervisor to participate in three surveys, each separated by two weeks to provide enough time separation to reduce common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003) without disrupting the proposed causal process. At Time 1, 282 respondents completed a survey on the justice motives respondents attributed to their supervisors. At Time 2, 256 respondents completed a survey about their supervisors' justice. At Time 3, 218 respondents reported their fairness judgments. Because of the time-separated nature of the data, we eliminated respondents that reported job or supervisory changes during the study. We relied only on listwise deletion, resulting in a final sample of 193 (45% male, 54% female, 1% non-binary, 85% Caucasian, 0.5% Hispanic, 9% Asian, 5% African American, 0.5% other, with 2% choosing multiple categories, $M_{\text{age}} = 36.95$ [SD = 10.43]).

Measures

Attributed Justice Motives

At Time 1, we again relied on two measurement approaches. We used all 20 items from Rioux and Penner's (2001) prosocial and impression management scales for the faceted approach as well as De Dreu and Nauta's (2009) 6-item scale for the overall approach (1: "never" to 7: "always"). We again relied on our adapted instructions, referring to the supervisor's motive.

Justice Rule Adherence

At Time 2, we measured justice using Colquitt's (2001) 20-item scale (1: "To a very small extent" to 5: "To a very large extent").

Fairness Judgments

At time 3, we used Colquitt et al.'s (2015) 3-items (with 7-point Likert anchors), adding opposing versions of each item to capture the full range of fairness cognitions (6-items total).

CFA

We conducted a CFA to establish the distinctiveness of our variables. We used random item parceling to reduce the number of indicators to 3 parcels for the motives and fairness measures. In addition, we used the scale means of the 4 justice facets as indicators of justice. The 4-factor model (justice, attributed prosocial [faceted], attributed self-interest [faceted], and fairness judgments) fit the data well $\chi^2 [N = 193, df = 356] = 561.98, p < .001, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .06$ and all indicators loaded significantly on their intended factors⁶. Chi-square difference tests showed that alternative nested models achieved significantly poorer fit. For example, constraining justice and fairness to load on one factor produced significantly worse fit ($\Delta\chi^2 [N = 193, \Delta df = 1] = 171.54, p < .001, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .15, SRMR = .08$).

Study 1c: Results

Table 3 reports descriptive statistics. Table 4 reports our regression analyses on the effect of justice motives on fairness judgments. Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, attributed prosocial motives were positively related to fairness judgments, controlling for justice ($B = .37, p < .001, Model 2$). Consistent with Hypothesis 4b, attributed self-interest motives were negatively related to fairness judgments, controlling for justice ($B = -.13, p = .008, Model 2$). There was an interaction between attributed prosocial motives and justice ($B = -.25, p < .001, Model 3$), but not between attributed self-interest motives and justice ($B = -.04, p = .462, Model 3$). Simple slopes analysis suggested that attributed prosocial motives and fairness judgments were

⁶ We conducted the same CFA with the two overall motive measures instead of the faceted ones. This model also fit the data reasonably well: $\chi^2 [N = 193, df = 59] = 151.66, p < .001, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .10$.

positively related when justice was low (-1SD, $B = .59$, $p < .001$) but not related when it was high (+1SD, $B = .10$, $p = .254$) (Figure 2). These results support Hypothesis 5a but not 5b. We ran the same analysis using the overall justice motives measures and obtained similar results, with attributed self-interest negatively related to fairness judgments ($B = -.14$, $p = .008$) and attributed prosocial motive positively related to fairness judgments ($B = .35$, $p < .001$). Similarly, only the attributed prosocial motives interacted with justice ($B = -.17$, $p < .001$)⁷.

Although Studies 1a-c separately confirm the three pathways, Studies 2 and 3 were aimed at replicating our results by surveying both supervisors and employees concurrently.

Study 2: Method

Sample and Procedure

We asked undergraduates to identify potential participants interested in research, whom we then contacted directly (Georgia Institute of Technology Office of Research Compliance, Protocol H09249: Individual differences and job outcomes). This approach is recommended by Marcus et al. (2017) as an effective way to minimize data concerns, with a meta-analysis suggesting that such samples are comparable to organizational samples (Wheeler et al., 2014). Potential participants were told they, along with their immediate supervisor, would be asked to fill out brief online surveys. All respondents were entered into a drawing for one of several \$15 Starbucks Gift Cards in exchange for participation. We then recruited 256 potential dyads via email. We received responses from 135 dyads. The final sample of direct reports (44% male, 64% Caucasian, 4% Hispanic, 20% Asian/Pacific Islander, 7% African American, 1% Native

⁷ In Studies 1a and 1b, we used 4 and 7 items from the faceted prosocial and self-interest motive measure, respectively. To verify the validity of this choice, we conducted a generalizability theory analysis, which provides guidelines for exploring the number of items needed to sufficiently capture a construct (Furr & Bacharach, 2008; Shavelson et al., 1989). These analyses indicated that 4 items are sufficient to capture either construct adequately (prosocial, G-coefficient and $\phi > .88$; self-interest, G-coefficient and $\phi > .87$). We also re-ran our analyses using the shortened measures, and the results do not change direction or significance.

American, and 4% other/not specified, $M_{\text{age}} = 38.77$ [$SD = 12.91$], $M_{\text{job tenure}} = 6.30$ [$SD = 6.97$] and supervisors (66% male, 71% Caucasian, 1% Hispanic, 13% Asian/Pacific Islander, 9% African American, 1% Native American, and 5% other/not specified, $M_{\text{age}} = 46.38$ [$SD = 10.07$], $M_{\text{job tenure}} = 10.78$ [$SD = 9.46$]). Participants worked in multiple industries, such as real estate, law, manufacturing, education, IT, and transportation, and employees held job titles such as police sergeant, server, dental assistant, teacher, vet assistant, and lead risk analyst, among others.

Measures

Justice Motives

Supervisors rated motives using the faceted items from Studies 1a-b using the same description of fair treatment, but with the instructions: "Please rate how important each reason is in your decision to treat this employee fairly" (1= "*unimportant*" to 5 "*very important*").

Justice Rule Adherence

We measured employee reported justice with Colquitt's (2001) scale as in Study 1c.

Fairness Judgments

We measured employee fairness judgments using Rodell and Colquitt's (2009) 3-item measure of global supervisor fairness using their 5-point Likert anchors.

Control Variables

As dyadic tenure may be influential in impacting supervisor-employee relationships (e.g., Wayne et al., 1997), employees indicated how long they had been reporting to their supervisor.

CFA

To ensure the distinctiveness of our measured variables we conducted a CFA using the same random item parceling procedure used previously. Our four-factor model provided good fit

(χ^2 [N = 135, df = 71] = 133.87, $p < .001$, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .05) and all indicators loaded significantly on their intended factors. Chi-square difference tests showed that alternative nested models achieved significantly poorer fit. For example, constraining justice and fairness judgments to load on one factor produced significantly worse fit ($\Delta\chi^2$ [N = 135, $\Delta df = 1$] = 43.26, $p < .001$, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .10, SRMR = .06).

Study 2: Results and Discussion

Table 5 reports descriptive statistics. We tested our hypotheses using a single-level, regression-based path analysis with a maximum likelihood estimator in Mplus 8.4. We conducted a piecewise analysis of each stage (Table 6). We then used 10,000 bootstrap iterations in Mplus to test the model in its entirety and conduct tests of indirect effects (Edwards & Lambert, 2007).

As seen in Table 6 (Model 1), Hypothesis 1a was supported, as prosocial motives were positively related to justice ($B = .20$, $p = .042$). Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, the effect of self-interest motives was weaker than the effect of prosocial motives and, again, was negative and significant ($B = -.20$, $p = .001$)⁸. Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the indirect effect of prosocial motives on fairness judgments via justice was positive (estimate: .15, 95% CI: .003, .31) and supporting Hypothesis 2b, the indirect effect of self-interest motives on fairness judgments via justice (estimate: -.15, 95% CI: -.26, -.07) was weaker than the indirect effect of prosocial motives (estimate of the difference of indirect effects: .30, 95% CI: .13, .54). Consistent with Hypothesis 3a, prosocial motives were positively related to fairness judgments after controlling

⁸ We also explored whether prosocial and self-interest motives interacted to predict justice, but the interaction was not significant ($B = -.12$, $p = .160$).

for justice ($B = .20, p = .007$, Model 3). Hypothesis 3b was not supported, as self-interest motives were not related to fairness judgments after controlling for justice ($B = -.03, p = .457$).

Our results support the effects of prosocial and self-interest motives on fairness judgments via the behavioral pathway (through justice). We also find some support for the existence of an attributional path, as we find a direct effect of prosocial (but not self-interest) motives on fairness judgments after controlling for justice. Study 2 has some limitations, notably the lack of attributed motives and the lack of temporal separation between justice and fairness, which may help explain our nonsignificant finding for the effect of self-interest on fairness, controlling for justice. To counter these limitations, in Study 3, we measure actual and attributed motives, allowing a test of all three pathways, and separate the measurement of justice and fairness across different time points.

Study 3: Method

Procedure and Sample

We recruited supervisor-employee dyads at two universities in different regions of the United States as well as on ResearchMatch (Harris et al., 2012) (CSU Chico Research Foundation, Protocol 21532: An Examination of Supervisory Motives; Texas A&M, Protocol 2018-0993D: Supervisor Relationships; UNC Kenan Flagler, Protocol 18-3348, Supervisory behaviors and employee attitudes). All respondents were full-time working adults, though less than 10% were also students⁹. We instructed respondents to invite their direct supervisor and were either offered extra credit or a \$5 honorarium for each completed survey. Out of 82 recruits from ResearchMatch, and 74 from the universities, we received complete data from 105

⁹ We did not observe any significant differences based on sample source on rating of any variables included in the analysis reported below.

supervisors (Time 1) and three data waves from one of their direct reports (Times 0, 2, and 3). As in Study 1c, time points were separated by two weeks. The final sample of employees (33% male, 79% Caucasian, 3% Hispanic, 9% Asian/Pacific Islander, 10% African American, 1% Native American, 2% other, with 4% choosing multiple categories, $M_{\text{age}} = 35$ [SD = 10.38] and supervisors (36% male, 89% Caucasian, 5% Hispanic, 2% Asian/Pacific Islander, 6% African American, 1% Native American, 1% other, 4% multiple categories, $M_{\text{age}} = 41.68$ [SD = 10.33] worked in various industries, such as professional, scientific, or technical services, manufacturing, education, finance, and transportation, and included occupations such as retail manager, pharmacy technician, police captain, and registered nurse.

Measures

Justice Motives

Supervisors rated their prosocial and self-interest justice motives at Time 1 using the Rioux and Penner (2001) items used in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2. Employees rated attributed self-interest and prosocial justice motives using those same items referring to the supervisor, similar to Study 1c (Time 2) (1 = “never” to 7 = “every time”).

Justice Rule Adherence

At Time 2, employees rated their supervisor’s justice using Colquitt’s (2001) 20-item scale using his 5-point Likert anchors.

Fairness Judgments

At Time 3, we measured employees’ judgment of their supervisor’s fairness using three 3-item scales (9 items total) from Choi (2008), Colquitt et al. (2015), and Rodell and Colquitt (2009) using each of their respective anchors on a 7-point Likert scale.

Controls

Employees reported tenure with their supervisor as in Study 2. Additionally, given that supervisors may find it useful to *appear* fair rather than *act* fair (Greenberg, 1988), we included a 7-item 'ability to modify self-presentation' dimension of self-monitoring (Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) to differentiate motives from the ability to manage one's presentation (7-point Likert scale; 1: "*Strongly disagree*" to 7: "*Strongly agree*").

CFA

To ensure the distinctiveness of our eight measured variables we conducted a CFA. We again used random three item parcels for measures with more than five items and used the scale means of the 4 justice facets as indicators of justice. This 8-factor model factor fit the data well $\chi^2 [N = 105, df = 231] = 392.80, p < .001, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .06$) and all indicators loaded significantly on their intended factors. Chi-square difference tests showed that alternative nested models had significantly worse fit. For example, constraining justice and fairness to load on one factor again produced significantly worse fit ($\Delta\chi^2 [N = 105, \Delta df = 1] = 140.81, p < .001, CFI = .86, RMSEA = .11, SRMR = .08$).

Study 3: Results and Discussion

Table 7 reports descriptive statistics. We used the same analytical approach as in Study 2 (i.e., regression-based path analysis with a maximum likelihood estimator in Mplus 8.4). As seen in Table 8 (Model 3), consistent with Hypotheses 1a-b, prosocial motives were positively related to justice ($B = .52, p < .001$), and the effect of a self-interest motive was weaker than the effect of prosocial motives ($B = .05, p = .543$)¹⁰. Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the indirect effect of prosocial motives on fairness judgments via justice was positive (estimate: .11, 95% CI: .002,

¹⁰ We also explored whether prosocial and self-interest motives interacted to predict justice, but the interaction was not significant ($B = -.07, p = .522$).

.27), and supporting Hypothesis 2b, the indirect effect of self-interest motives on fairness judgments via justice was weaker (and not significant, estimate: .01, 95% CI: -.02, .08) than the indirect effect of prosocial motives (estimate of the difference of indirect effects: .29, 95% CI: .15, .58). Neither Hypothesis 3a nor 3b was supported, as prosocial ($B = .22, p = .055$) and self-interest motives ($B = -.05, p = .474$) were not significantly related to fairness judgments after controlling for justice. We did find support for Hypotheses 4a-b, as prosocial motives had a positive indirect effect on fairness judgments via attributed prosocial motives (estimate = .21, 95% CI: .06, .51), whereas self-interest motives had a negative indirect effect on fairness judgments via attributed self-interest motives (estimate = -.08, 95% CI: -.17, -.03). Consistent with Hypothesis 5a, attributed prosocial motives and justice interacted to predict fairness judgments ($B = -.13, p = .013$; Figure 3) such that the relationship was more positive when justice was low (-1 SD, $B = .45, p < .001$) versus high (+1 SD, $B = .16, p = .087$). Hypothesis 5b was not supported as attributed self-interest motives and justice did not interact to predict fairness judgments ($B = .04, p = .542$).

As seen in Table 8 (Models 1 & 2), supervisor motives were related only to the relevant attributed motives (i.e., prosocial [$B = .68, p < .001$], self-interest [$B = .34, p = .001$]). Moreover, both attributed motives were related to fairness judgments in the expected direction after controlling for justice (Model 5: attributed prosocial: $B = .30, p = .001$; attributed self-interest: $B = -.24, p < .001$). In line with our previous results, we support the proposed differential indirect effects of prosocial and self-interest motives on fairness judgments via justice. Although neither direct effect motive test was significant (though prosocial motives approached significance), we found significant effects of prosocial and self-interest motives on fairness judgments via each corresponding attributed motive, thus supporting our proposed attributional pathway. Finally, as

in Study 1c, our results demonstrate that attributed prosocial motives and justice interact, such that when justice is low, attributed prosocial motives have the strongest, positive effect on fairness judgments. As in Study 1c, justice did not interact with self-interest motives.

Mini-Meta Analysis

Although our theorizing about justice has not focused on facet-level differences, Scott et al. (2009) reasoned that justice motives should have a stronger effect on the types of justice behaviors supervisors tend to have more discretion over (e.g., interpersonal and informational). To test this proposition, we compiled the four relevant field studies (Studies 1a-b, 2, 3) into a mini meta-analysis (Goh et al., 2016) with individual correction based on alpha scores from the respective studies using the psychmeta 2.4.2 R package (Dahlke & Wiernik, 2019). Results of this analysis ($k = 4$, $N = 583$) suggest that supervisor prosocial and self-interest motives are most predictive of interpersonal (prosocial: $M_r = .37$, $M_p = .44$; self-interest: $M_r = -.18$, $M_p = -.20$), informational justice (prosocial: $M_r = .31$, $M_p = .37$; self-interest: $M_p = -.16$, $\rho = -.19$), and procedural (prosocial: $M_r = .27$, $M_p = .32$; self-interest: $M_r = -.15$, $M_p = -.16$). By contrast, the only estimate for which confidence intervals included zero was the estimate for distributive justice (prosocial: $M_r = .20$, $M_p = .23$, $-.004$, $.47$; self-interest: $M_r = -.15$, $M_p = -.16$; $-.41$, $.08$).

Although Studies 1a-c, 2, and 3 provide fairly consistent evidence in support of our theorizing, and in Studies 1c and 3, we temporally separated justice and fairness, causal inferences are best drawn from experimental data. Thus, in Study 4, we manipulate justice and attributed motives to test their direct and interactive effects.

Study 4: Method

Sample and Procedure

We recruited 301 undergraduate business students and offered extra credit for their participation (Texas A&M, Protocol 2017-0824M: Teaching evaluation study). After removing one participant due to technical issues, our final sample consisted of 300 participants. The participants identified as 50% female and as 70% Caucasian, 5% Asian/Pacific Islander, 4% African American, 15% Hispanic, and 6% Other/mixed.

We used a high involvement (3 X 2) design manipulating attributed motives (prosocial vs. self-interest vs. no motive [control]) and justice (adherence vs. violation) where participants provided an evaluation of a context familiar to them (Greenberg, 1993). We explained that the purpose of the study was to help the University understand the extent to which students rely on an instructor's evaluations to select classes. We asked participants to examine teaching evaluation summaries for a professor across three semesters. To enhance realism, we included five standard items (e.g., "considering everything, the instructor was an effective teacher"), holding the mean ratings constant. Our manipulations were embedded in the open-ended comments. Although our participants did not experience (in)justice directly, third-parties notice how others are treated, judge it similarly to treated parties, and incorporate such perceptions into their assessments (e.g., Colquitt, 2004; Siegel Christian et al., 2012; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004). Moreover, this design allowed for realism as students often rely on their peers' experiences with faculty. Participants made fairness judgments about the professor using 3-items adapted from Ambrose and Schminke's (2009b) overall fairness measure: "In general, the professor was fair," "Overall, I think the professor acted fairly," and "If asked, I think other students would say the professor was fair" (1: "Strongly Disagree" to 5: "Strongly Agree").

Manipulation of Justice Rule Adherence/Violation and Attributed Justice Motives

We manipulated justice adherence/violation by referring to justice rules in the professor's prior evaluations; some examples include: "Unlike some teachers, he was really good (not always good) about communicating important information in advance"; "Prof was very (not always) respectful of students." Participants also saw comments reflecting our motive manipulations embedded in each evaluation (unless assigned to the control condition): "Prof really wanted to help students in any way possible" (prosocial) vs. "Prof didn't want to look bad in front of students" (self-interest), "Prof was great at seeing things from the students' perspective and really putting himself in our shoes" (prosocial) vs. "You could tell his main focus was avoiding negative evaluations" (self-interest). To mask manipulations and enhance realism, we embedded filler comments within each evaluation, such as: "Wish this course was taught both fall and spring semesters," and "Scheduling was a pain."

Manipulation Checks. To check the efficacy of our justice and attributed motive manipulations, we asked participants how the professor was described in the evaluations using the items listed in the Appendix. We then conducted a MANOVA with justice (violation vs. adherence) and attributed motive conditions (self-interest vs. control vs. prosocial) as the independent variables and our three manipulation checks as the dependent variables. As expected, ratings of the justice check were higher in the justice adherence ($M = 4.12$, $SE = .07$) than in the violation condition ($M = 2.42$, $SE = .07$; $F [1, 294] = 307.17$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .51$) and were not affected by the motive manipulations ($F [1, 294] = 2.73$, $p = .067$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$). Similarly, as expected, ratings of the self-interest check were higher in the self-interest ($M = 4.30$, $SE = .10$) than in either the control ($M = 2.24$, $SE = .10$) or the prosocial conditions ($M = 2.15$, $SE = .10$) with the latter two not significantly different from one another ($F [2, 294] = 159.83$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .52$); these ratings were not affected by the justice manipulation ($F [1, 294] = .65$, $p = .421$, η_p^2

= .00). Finally, as expected, ratings of the prosocial check were higher in the prosocial condition ($M = 3.99$, $SE = .09$) than in either the control ($M = 2.96$, $SE = .09$) or the self-interest conditions ($M = 2.60$, $SE = .09$) and lower ($p = .014$) in self-interest as compared to the control conditions ($F [2, 294] = 64.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .31$). We note there was also an effect of the justice manipulation on the prosocial check such that ratings were higher in the justice adherence ($M = 3.68$, $SE = .07$) than in the violation condition ($M = 2.68$, $SE = .07$; $F [1, 294] = 93.14$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .24$). However, this effect was lower in magnitude and independent (i.e., we did not observe significant justice and motive interactions on any manipulation checks). Thus, these results increase our confidence that we independently manipulated each construct.

Study 4: Results

Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 9¹¹. We conducted a 2 (justice: violation vs. adherence) by 3 attributed motive (self-interest vs. control vs. prosocial) ANOVA with conditions as the independent variables and our fairness measure as the dependent variable. We then used pairwise comparisons (with Bonferroni adjustments) to test mean differences between specific cells (see Table 10). There was an expected main effect for justice, with ratings of fairness being significantly higher in the adherence ($M = 4.13$, $SE = .07$) vs. violation condition ($M = 2.84$, $SE = .07$; $F [1, 294] = 179.83$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .38$). We also observed (supporting Hypotheses 4a, not 4b) an effect of attributed motives on fairness ($F [2, 294] = 9.49$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$) such that ratings of fairness were higher in the prosocial ($M = 3.78$, $SE = .08$) as

¹¹ Across our studies, we observe strong correlations between justice and fairness judgments. Similarly, as seen in Table 9, in Study 4 we observe a strong correlation between our justice manipulation check and fairness judgments. This is expected as justice is thought to be the most important antecedent of fairness judgments. Moreover, it is in line with other correlational and experimental research. For example, Rodell et al. (2017) report correlations above .70 for the four facets of justice and fairness while Colquitt et al. (2015) found correlations ranging from .64 to .83 between facets of justice and fairness. Experimentally, Zapata-Phelan et al. (2009, p. 89) reported that their two justice manipulations “explained 24% of the variance in global fairness perceptions, with both procedural justice ($B = .66$, $p < .001$) and interpersonal justice ($B = .57$, $p < .001$) having effects of similar magnitudes.”

compared to the control ($M = 3.30$, $SE = .08$; $p < .001$) and self-interest conditions ($M = 3.37$, $SE = .08$; $p = .002$). Supporting Hypothesis 5a, differences between the motive conditions were significant in the justice violation ($F [2, 294] = 10.16$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, with prosocial being higher than the two other conditions), but not the justice adherence condition ($F [2, 294] = 1.54$, $p = .216$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, see Figure 3). Hypothesis 5b was not supported, as there were no mean differences for the self-interest versus the control condition in either justice condition¹².

General Discussion

As global assessments of fairness are commonplace and predict various beneficial outcomes at the individual, team, and organizational levels (see Ambrose et al., 2015), a better understanding of how fairness judgments are formed is an essential pursuit. To that end, we proposed three pathways by which factors beyond justice, and in particular prosocial and self-interest motives (actual and attributed), shape employees' fairness judgments: behavioral via justice, attributional via attributed motives, and interactively, in conjunction with justice. In sum, our findings suggest that when employees form fairness judgments, they not only consider the extent to which supervisors adhere to justice rules but also *why* supervisors do so. This sensemaking process differs for prosocial versus self-interest motives.

Across six studies, we find support for three pathways for prosocial motives. Our results reveal a positive effect of prosocial motives on justice, and by extension, fairness judgments across our field studies. In other words, prosocially motivated supervisors seem to be more likely to notice, attend to, and invest resources toward justice issues and demonstrate higher quality

¹² To ensure that our fairness measure represented a relevant consideration in students' evaluation of the professor, we added an enrollment likelihood measure. At the end of the study, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood they would enroll in a course taught by this professor. (1 = "Definitely not" to 5 = "Definitely"). The two measures were strongly correlated ($r = .79$, $p < .001$). In addition, we asked participants: "Would you be willing to nominate this professor for a teaching award?" (0 = "No," 1 = "Yes") and responses to this question were positively correlated with fairness judgments ($r = .46$, $p < .001$). Those that agreed then provided a written nomination.

efforts (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Kanfer, 1990). We also support an effect on fairness through attributed prosocial motives, controlling for justice in our field data. Thus, people accurately pick up on the prosocial motives of their supervisors (Maierhofer et al., 2000) and rely on those assessments to form fairness judgments. Finally, attributed prosocial motives and justice interact, such that, despite low justice, attributed prosocial motives are positively related to fairness judgments (Studies 1c, 3 & 4), supporting the idea that low justice leads to deeper cognitive processing when behavior and motives appear inconsistent to the benefit of authority figures.

A self-interest motive, in contrast, was only relevant to the behavioral and sometimes the attributional pathways. Our results revealed a negative effect of self-interest on fairness judgments through justice across our field studies. Although we did not specifically hypothesize a negative effect, a self-interest motive likely reduces the attention and resource investments needed to effectively and consistently engage in justice and may even highlight the utility of violating justice rules under certain circumstances (cf. Camps et al., 2019; Qin et al., 2018; Scott et al., 2009). We also observed a negative effect of a self-interest motive on fairness judgments via an attributed self-interest motive (Studies 1c & 3). Thus, employees seem to pick up on a supervisors' self-interest motive (Maierhofer et al., 2000) and rely on said attributed motive to inform their fairness judgments, independent of justice. The exception was our experiment (Study 4), which compared self-interest to a no-motive condition. If people assume authority figures engage in justice due to self-interest (e.g., Miller, 1999; Miller & Ratner, 1998), then comparing self-interest to a no-motive condition may have been too conceptually 'close.'

Finally, the effects of self-interest appear limited to the behavioral and attributional pathways as we did not find evidence of an interaction between an attributed self-interest motive and justice.

Theoretical Contributions

Explicating the Three Pathways

In line with recent conceptual developments distinguishing between fairness and justice (Colquitt & Zipay, 2015; Goldman & Cropanzano, 2015), our work further highlights how understanding fairness judgments requires considering not only justice but also the motives (actual and attributed) for these behaviors. Hence, employees not only take into account the extent to which supervisors adhere to justice rules but also *why* supervisors do so. Our findings also show that seemingly similar factors (e.g., prosocial and self-interest motives) can affect fairness judgments through different conceptual pathways and that these effects may vary based on whether justice is lower versus higher. For instance, a supervisor's prosocial motives increase fairness judgments by influencing justice and motive attributions, with the latter serving to mitigate negative employee backlash to lower justice. Thus, our framework provides a comprehensive theoretical template for future research attempting to consider and test whether, why, and how a theorized factor(s) can work through each of the three pathways. As in the case of motives, this may help reveal important theoretical distinctions and further clarify psychological and behavioral mechanisms that underlie fairness judgments.

A Holistic View of Justice Motives

Most empirical work on justice motives to date has relied on Scott et al.'s (2009) three cognitive motives to examine either supervisory motives (Scott et al., 2014) or attributed motives (Matta et al., 2020) at the event-level. Our work, however, points to the theoretical importance of considering alternative frameworks. For instance, Scott et al. (2014) hypothesized and found that all three motives were *positively* related to justice at the event level; by contrast, we rely on the broader motivation literature to theorize (and show that) self-interest motives are sometimes, on average, *negatively* related to justice. Also, although Matta et al. (2020) did theorize a negative

effect of an *attributed* identity maintenance motive on trust judgments following an event, their results were not supportive; by contrast, we theorized and found average negative effects of an attributed self-interest motive on fairness judgments across our field studies (1c & 3). Thus, our work not only expands our understanding of the role of justice motives to more global fairness processes and judgments, by theorizing about how actual *and* attributed motives work in conjunction with justice to influence fairness judgments, we also provide a framework that can further clarify when and how motives might harm supervisory efforts toward being seen as fair.

Although our work illuminates conceptual distinctions between self-interest and prosocial motives, which do not fully emerge from Scott et al.'s (2009, 2014) theorizing and empirical work, and we find prosocial and self-interest motives explain additional variance in justice (Studies 1a & 1b), we caution against direct comparisons. Because our focus was to use broader motives at the between-person level to predict justice and fairness judgments, and empirical examinations of the effect of the Scott et al. (2009) motives on justice have occurred exclusively at the event-level (Matta et al., 2020; Scott et al., 2014), these distinctions make direct comparisons difficult (cf. Grant & Berg, 2011). Thus, we urge future research to continue exploring justice motives using different methodologies and across different levels of analysis. Currently, the research question and theory should inform one's choice of motive framework.

Additionally, past work has examined the effects of justice motives by mostly considering their effects on justice behavior (Scott et al., 2009, 2014) without discussing their effects on fairness judgments, which are located downstream from justice. In this way, our work extends past theorizing by demonstrating that motives not only impact fairness judgments because they impact justice, they also have direct (self-interest and prosocial) and interactive effects (prosocial) on fairness judgments. Hence, we provide a more detailed picture of how

justice motives impact employees by theorizing and empirically examining the effects of motives on both justice behaviors and their impact on employee perceptions, controlling for said behavior. Finally, by combining our supervisory motive data into a mini-meta analysis, we provide additional empirical support for Scott et al.'s (2009) prediction that the effect of justice motives on justice behavior strengthens as discretion over justice increases.

Practical Implications

The idea that supervisors should always adhere to justice rules is commendable, yet most will fail to adhere to justice rules at some time or another, for example, because of increased workload or other demands in the environment (Brockner et al., 2009; Sherf et al., 2019). By examining actual and attributed motives concurrently, our work highlights that supervisors interested in being evaluated fairly by their employees should not only manage their justice behaviors but should also attend to their employees' motive attributions. For instance, supervisors may choose to engage in interventions designed to increase their benevolent values (Arieli et al., 2014). That said, because employees accurately assess their supervisor's motives over time, strategically trying to hold prosocial motives may fail. Although it is beyond the scope of our research, future studies should examine how justice motives are communicated.

Moreover, because justice is associated with many beneficial outcomes (Colquitt et al., 2013), an obvious way to 'sell' the value of justice, a time-consuming endeavor (Sherf et al., 2019), is by touting these benefits to supervisors (Brockner, 2006); yet doing so may inadvertently prime them with a self-interest motive. If, as our results show, a self-interest motive is counterproductive to justice, then focusing on the tangible benefits of justice as a way to motivate supervisors might backfire (Bowles, 2009). Thus, organizational leaders may want to

consider framing the value of justice by focusing on the benefits for employees, not supervisors. This is a subtle but potentially powerful distinction.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

As with all studies, there are some important limitations. First, Studies 1a-c rely on same-source data. To reduce common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), we surveyed respondents at different time points (Studies 1c-4) and relied on different sources (Studies 2-4). We also counter-balanced the order of our motive measures across studies. Also, Study 4, which seems to be the first experimental design to examine justice motives, manipulated attributed prosocial and self-interest motives. Although we felt the most controlled way to do so was to provide participants with specific information on how others attributed motives for the authority figure (i.e., third-party justice judgments), and there is evidence that third-parties notice how others are treated, incorporate such perceptions into their assessments, and judge situations/treatments similarly to treated parties (e.g., Blader et al., 2013; Colquitt, 2004; Siegel Christian et al., 2012; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004), future research should manipulate experienced justice. Future research should also examine how a supervisor's motives impact justice and fairness judgments within a group. For instance, it may be that a prosocially motivated supervisor violates rules of justice toward one employee to fulfill rules of justice toward another (cf. Derfler-Rozin et al., 2020). Indeed, research has suggested that feelings of empathy could lead those in authority to provide some employees with preferential treatment, though this effect tended to disappear when the decision-maker felt accountable to the group (Blader & Rothman, 2014).

Future research could also examine predictors of supervisory justice motives, such as empowerment or approach and avoidance antecedents. Because empowered leaders have the freedom and confidence to choose how they approach their jobs (Spreitzer, 1995), as well as

additional cognitive resources at their disposal (Tuckey et al., 2012), empowerment may help facilitate prosocial motives while simultaneously depressing self-interest justice motives.

Similarly, it may be that supervisors' motives have a different effect on justice based on whether they are motivated by approach or avoidance concerns (Carver, 2006; Elliot, 2006). Because some justice rules are more preventative (e.g., eliminating bias or ensuring consistency) whereas others are more inherently intertwined with promotive motivation (e.g., providing information or respectfully interacting with others), future work can build on findings highlighting that different regulatory foci affect justice behaviors and fairness judgments (Brebels et al., 2011; Cropanzano et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011; Park et al., 2017). Ultimately, this work can help inform actionable strategies to improve employees' fairness judgments.

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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations (Studies 1a & 1b)

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Study 1a (N = 146)															
1. Gender ^a	1.42	.49	-												
2. Age	41.40	11.35	.16	-											
3. Position tenure	6.37	5.30	-.03	.55**	-										
4. Justice rule adherence	4.31	.49	.05	.11	.19*	(.84)									
5. Prosocial motive	4.41	.48	.19*	.18*	.14	.39**	(.70)								
6. Self-interest motive	2.59	1.03	-.01	-.09	-.07	-.18*	-.09	(.92)							
7. Power motive	3.43	1.01	-.06	-.05	-.02	.01	.05	.52**	(.91)						
8. Effecting compliance motive	3.77	.94	-.02	-.06	.11	.10	.11	.36**	.52**	(.94)					
9. Identity maintenance motive	4.16	.71	.08	.05	.12	.19*	.35**	.25**	.45**	.44**	(.93)				
10. Establishing fairness motive	3.81	.87	.11	.08	.14	.28**	.51**	.10	.24**	.35**	.44**	(.89)			
Study 1b (N = 197)															
1. Gender ^b	.58	.50	-												
2. Age	38.14	9.39	-.07	-											
3. Position tenure	5.67	4.49	-.09	.48**	-										
4. Justice rule adherence	4.24	.49	.03	.15*	.10	(.77)									
5. Prosocial motive (faceted)	6.01	.85	-.04	.18*	.07	.44**	(.84)								
6. Self-interest motive (faceted)	3.71	1.47	.07	-.16*	-.13	-.25**	-.12	(.91)							
7. Prosocial motive (overall)	5.90	.96	-.07	.24**	.13	.48**	.76**	-.25**	(.88)						
8. Self-interest motive (overall)	4.81	1.41	.10	-.02	-.09	.02	-.02	.45**	-.01	(.89)					
9. Effecting compliance motive	5.27	1.22	.08	.14*	.10	.03	.08	.31**	.06	.34**	(.94)				
10. Identity maintenance motive	5.99	1.00	-.16*	.17*	.05	.26**	.30**	.08	.23**	.22**	.37**	(.95)			
11. Establishing fairness motive	5.39	1.21	.01	.23**	.08	.30**	.31**	-.01	.33**	.11	.46**	.47**	(.89)		
12. Negative affectivity	1.86	.60	-.10	-.14	-.07	-.33**	-.03	.13	-.12	.04	.04	-.09	-.16*	(.82)	
13. Positive affectivity	3.79	.60	.01	.18*	.10	.32**	.33**	-.08	.35**	.04	.06	.22**	.18*	-.19**	(.80)

Note. Numbers on diagonal represent scale Cronbach's α . * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. ^a 1 = Male, 2 = Female. ^b 0 = Female 1 = Male.

Table 2
Regression Analysis of Justice Rule Adherence (Studies 1a & 1b)

Variables	Study 1a (N = 146)						Study 1b (N = 197)					
	Model 1a		Model 2a		Model 3a		Model 1b		Model 2b		Model 3b	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	3.56**	.25	2.70**	.38	2.80**	.37	3.33**	.29	2.92**	.30	3.05**	.24
Effecting compliance motive	.01	.05	.04	.05			-.05	.03	-.01	.03		
Identity maintenance motive	.09	.07	.04	.07			.06	.04	.04	.03		
Establishing fairness motive	.14**	.05	.05	.05			.09**	.03	.05	.03		
Power motive	-.06	.05	.01	.05								
Negative affectivity							-.19**	.05	-.20**	.05		
Positive affectivity							.18**	.05	.10	.05		
Prosocial motive (faceted)			.30**	.09	.39**	.08			.18**	.04	.24**	.04
Self-interest motive (faceted)			-.10*	.04	-.07*	.04			-.06**	.02	-.07**	.02
R ²		.10**		.20**		.17**		.24**		.35**		.23**
ΔR ²				.10**						.11**		

Note. Table entries represent unstandardized parameter estimates.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations (Study 1c)

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1. Gender dummy 1 ^a	.54	.50	-													
2. Gender dummy 2 ^b	.01	.10	-.11	-												
3. Age	36.95	10.43	-.06	-.07	-											
4. Position tenure	5.09	5.09	.09	-.05	.42**	-										
5. Attributed prosocial motive (faceted) (T1)	4.66	1.35	-.06	-.08	-.18*	-.18*	(.96)									
6. Attributed self-interest motive (faceted) (T1)	3.17	1.43	.04	.05	.07	-.08	-.28**	(.95)								
7. Attributed prosocial motive (overall) (T1)	4.84	1.59	-.08	-.04	-.21**	-.18*	.91**	-.34**	(.96)							
8. Attributed self-interest motive (overall) (T1)	4.21	1.25	.01	.05	.15*	.04	-.23**	.68**	-.28**	(.72)						
9. Justice rule adherence (JRA) (T2)	3.83	.81	-.14	-.06	-.15*	-.14	.70**	-.30**	.71**	-.23**	(.88)					
10. Fairness judgments (T3)	5.76	1.40	-.06	-.09	-.17*	-.10	.69**	-.36**	.72**	-.33**	.71**	(.97)				
11. Attributed prosocial (faceted) X JRA ^c	.76	1.41	.06	.03	.19**	.24**	-.34**	.06	-.35**	.18*	-.42**	-.51**	-			
12. Attributed self-interest (faceted) X JRA ^c	-.35	1.26	.02	-.08	.10	.09	.08	-.02	.02	-.01	.10	.09	-.24**	-		
13. Attributed prosocial (overall) X JRA ^c	.91	1.65	.05	.02	.17*	.22**	-.36**	.02	-.39**	.14*	-.45**	-.51**	.94**	-.24**	-	
14. Attributed self-interest (overall) X JRA ^c	-.23	1.13	-.02	-.07	-.03	-.19**	.21**	-.01	.16*	-.12	.25**	.25**	-.41**	.65**	-.40**	-

Note. N = 193. T1 = Time 1, T2 = Time 2, T3 = Time 3. Numbers on diagonal represent scale Cronbach's α . ^a 0 = Male, 1 = Female;

^b 0 = Male, 1 = Non Binary; ^c Interaction of centered variables.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 4
Regression Analysis of Fairness Judgments (Study 1c)

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	5.76**	.07	5.76**	.06	5.94**	.07
Attributed prosocial motive (faceted) (T1)	.66**	.06	.37**	.07	.34**	.06
Attributed self-interest motive (faceted) (T1)	-.18**	.05	-.13**	.05	-.15**	.05
Justice rule adherence (JRA)			.72**	.11	.57**	.11
Attributed prosocial motive * JRA					-.25**	.05
Attributed self-interest motive * JRA					-.04	.05
R ²	.50**		.59**		.64**	
ΔR ²			.09**		.05**	

Note. N = 193. Table entries represent unstandardized parameter estimates. All independent variables were centered prior to analysis.

T1 = Time 1, T2 = Time 2, T3 = Time 3.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 5
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations (Study 2)

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Employee gender ^{a, b}	.55	.50	-										
2. Employee age ^b	38.77	12.91	.19*	-									
3. Employee job tenure ^b	6.30	6.97	.09	.55**	-								
4. Supervisor gender ^{a, b}	.33	.47	.41**	.09	.02	-							
5. Supervisor age ^b	46.38	10.07	.02	.40**	.28**	.08	-						
6. Supervisor job tenure ^b	10.78	9.46	.11	.20*	.38**	.18*	.44**	-					
7. Tenure with supervisor in months (employee reported)	41.95	53.77	.15	.27**	.51**	.01	.30**	.51**	-				
8. Justice rule adherence (employee reported)	4.00	.72	.09	-.05	-.06	.05	.09	.02	-.12	(.83)			
9. Self-interest motive (supervisor reported)	2.36	1.02	-.03	.01	-.02	.08	-.22*	.00	.11	-.27**	(.77)		
10. Prosocial motive (supervisor reported)	4.26	.61	.11	.13	.15	.05	-.06	.05	.12	.11	.16	(.92)	
11. Fairness judgments (employee reported)	4.57	.77	.00	.04	-.02	-.07	.11	.06	-.12	.73**	-.22*	.22**	(.95)

Note. N = 135. Numbers on diagonal represent scale Cronbach's α . ^a 0 = Male, 1 = Female. ^b Correlations involving these variables:

N = 127-133;

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 6
Regression Analysis of Justice Rule Adherence and Fairness Judgments (Study 2)

Variables	Justice rule adherence		Fairness judgments			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Intercept	4.00**	.06	4.57**	.06	4.57**	.04
Tenure with supervisor	-.001	.00	-.002	.00	-.001	.00
Prosocial motive	.20*	.10	.35**	.10	.20**	.08
Self-interest motive	-.20**	.06	-.19**	.06	-.03	.05
Justice rule adherence					.74**	.07
R ²	.11*		.13*		.56**	

Note. N = 135. Table entries represent unstandardized parameter estimates. All independent variables were centered prior to analysis.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 7
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations (Study 3)

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Employee gender ^a	1.67	.47	-												
2. Employee age	35.09	10.38	.00	-											
3. Supervisor gender ^a	1.63	.48	.18	-.04	-										
4. Supervisor age ^b	41.68	10.33	.04	.39**	.06	-									
5. Tenure with supervisor in months (T0) ^c	33.83	36.91	-.10	.34**	.05	.33**	-								
6. Self-monitoring (T1) ^d	5.30	.95	.02	-.08	.02	-.07	-.05	(.85)							
7. Prosocial motive (T1) ^d	6.24	.89	.23*	-.06	.20*	-.01	-.03	.17	(.88)						
8. Self-interest motive (T1) ^d	2.70	1.39	-.17	-.02	-.12	-.08	.06	-.25*	-.31**	(.90)					
9. Attributed prosocial motive (T2) ^c	5.85	1.22	.23*	-.09	.12	.02	-.06	-.13	.43**	-.01	(.94)				
10. Attributed self-interest motive (T2) ^c	3.11	1.39	-.14	-.03	-.04	-.09	.04	.05	-.05	.30**	-.24*	(.90)			
11. Justice rule adherence (T2) ^c	5.48	1.13	.07	.03	.27**	.03	-.03	-.11	.36**	-.03	.59**	-.30**	(.89)		
12. Fairness judgments (T3) ^c	5.98	1.15	.00	.05	.14	.04	.01	-.17	.34**	-.08	.61**	-.45**	.60**	(.97)	
13. Attributed prosocial motive*JRA ^e	.81	1.68	.09	-.01	.00	-.07	.08	.11	-.22*	-.08	-.23*	.15	-.39**	-.42**	-
14. Attributed self-interest motive*JRA ^e	-.46	1.43	-.10	.07	-.08	.17	.26**	-.09	.04	.08	.21*	.12	.23*	.20*	-.31**

Note. N = 105; T1 = Time 1, T2 = Time 2, T3 = Time 3; Numbers on diagonal represent scale Cronbach's α ; ^a 1 = Male, 2 = Female;

^b Correlations involving these variables: N = 104; ^c Reported by employee; ^d Reported by supervisor; ^e Interaction of centered variables.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 8
Regression Analysis (Study 3)

Variables	Attributed prosocial motive (T2) Model 1		Attributed self-interest motive (T2) Model 2		Justice rule adherence (T2) Model 3		Fairness judgments (T3) Model 4		Fairness judgments (T3) Model 5		Fairness judgments (T3) Model 6	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
	Intercept	5.85**	.10	3.11**	.13	5.48**	.10	5.98**	.09	5.98**	.08	6.10**
Tenure with supervisor (T0)	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Self-monitoring (T1)	-.25*	.11	.19	.14	-.19	.11	-.19*	.10	-.12	.08	-.10	.08
Prosocial motive (T1)	.68**	.12	.05	.15	.52**	.12	.22	.11	.15	.11	.11	.10
Self-interest motive (T1)	.09	.08	.34**	.10	.05	.08	-.05	.07	.02	.06	.00	.06
Attributed prosocial motive (T2)									.30**	.08	.30**	.08
Attributed self-interest motive (T2)									-.24**	.06	-.23**	.06
Justice rule adherence (T2) (JRA)							.54**	.08	.29**	.09	.21**	.09
Attributed prosocial motive*JRA											-.13*	.05
Attributed self-interest motive*JRA											.04	.06
R ²	.25**		.11		.16*		.41**		.46**		.49**	

Note. N = 105. Table entries represent unstandardized parameter estimates. All independent variables were centered prior to analysis.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 9
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations (Study 4)

Variables	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Gender ^a	1.50	.50	-								
2. Age	21.78	1.39	-.22**	-							
3. Justice condition (0 = violation, 1 = adherence)	.50	.50	.06	-.09	-						
4. Attributed prosocial motive dummy (1 = prosocial condition, 0 = other conditions)	.33	.47	-.03	.00	.00	-					
5. Attributed self-interest motive dummy (1 = self-interest condition, 0 = other conditions)	.33	.47	-.07	-.06	-.01	-.50**	-				
6. Justice condition manipulation check	3.26	1.20	.03	-.01	.71**	.09	-.08	(.87)			
7. Attributed prosocial motive manipulation check	3.18	1.19	.01	.04	.43**	.48**	-.35**	.50**	(.87)		
8. Attributed self-interest motive manipulation check	2.90	1.38	-.03	-.03	-.04	-.38**	.72**	-.09	-.16**	(.87)	
9. Fairness judgments	3.48	1.07	-.01	.02	.60**	.20**	-.08	.75**	.52**	-.04	(.96)

Note. N = 300. Numbers on diagonal represent scale Cronbach's α ; ^a 1 = Male, 2 = Female;

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Table 10
Cell Means of Fairness Judgments by Condition (Study 4)

Condition	Control	Attributed prosocial motive	Attributed self-interest motive
Justice violation	2.54 (.12) ^a	3.26 (.12) ^b	2.73 (.12) ^a
Justice adherence	4.07 (.12) ^c	4.29 (.12) ^c	4.02 (.12) ^c

Note. N = 300. Entries represent estimated cell means with standard errors in parentheses. Means with no letter superscripts in

common within the same condition variable differ significantly as indicated by Bonferroni adjustments test for multiple comparisons between means ($p < .05$).

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Figure 1
Theoretical Model




Figure 2

Interaction Between Attributed Prosocial Motives and Justice Rule Adherence on Fairness Judgments (Study 1c)




Figure 3

Interaction Between Attributed Prosocial Motives and Justice Rule Adherence on Fairness Judgments (Study 3)





Figure 4
Cell Means of Fairness Judgments (Study 4)



Appendix

Measures and Instructions Adapted for Studies 1a-b

“The next set of questions will refer to reasons why you might choose to engage in the types of justice behaviors described in the previous items. For instance, when deciding about employee pay, rewards, evaluations, promotions, or work assignments, supervisors often try to make sure employees feel fairly treated. You can do this, for example, by using consistent, accurate, and free of bias procedures, providing explanations or justifications that are truthful and timely, and communicating with employees in a respectful, proper manner.” “I am motivated to act fairly...”

Prosocial Justice Motive (De Dreu and Nauta, 2009)

1. Because I am concerned about the needs and interests of my employees
2. Because The goals and aspirations of my employees are important to me
3. Because I consider my employees' wishes and desires to be relevant

Self-interest Justice Motive (De Dreu and Nauta, 2009)

1. Because I am concerned about my own needs and interests
2. Because my personal goals and aspirations are important to me
3. Because I consider my own wishes and desires to be relevant

Prosocial Justice Motive (Rioux & Penner, 2001)

1. Because I want to help my employees in any way I can
2. Because I believe in being courteous to my employees
3. Because I am concerned about my employees' feelings
4. Because I like interacting with my employees

Self-Interest Justice Motive (Rioux & Penner, 2001)

1. To avoid looking bad in front of others

2. To look better than my co-workers
3. To avoid a reprimand from my boss
4. Because I fear appearing irresponsible
5. Because I want to stay out of trouble
6. Because rewards are important to me
7. Because I want a raise

Power Justice Motive

1. Because it will strengthen my credibility
2. Because it will increase my authority
3. Because it will enhance my influence
4. Because it will positively affect my power
5. Because it will positively affect my status in the eyes of my employees

Study 1c: Adapted Measures

Additional items unique to this study (other items used in Studies 1a-b were also included, for a total of 10-items for each motive)

Prosocial Justice Motive (Rioux & Penner, 2001)

1. Because my supervisor is concerned with the needs and interests of his/her employees
2. Because the goals and aspirations of his/her employees are important to him/her
3. Because she/he considers employees' wishes and desires to be relevant
4. Because she/he feels it is important to help employees in need
5. Because it is easy for him/her to be helpful
6. Because she can put him/her-self in employees' shoes

Self-Interest Justice Motive (Rioux & Penner, 2001)

1. To avoid looking lazy
2. To look like she/he is busy
3. To impress his/her coworkers

Fairness Judgments (Colquitt et al., 2015, with opposing items created for this study)

1. Does s/he act fairly?
2. Does s/he behave like a fair person would?
3. Does s/he do things that are fair?
4. Does s/he act **un**fairly?
5. Does s/he behave like an **un**fair person would?
6. Does s/he do things that are **un**fair?

Study 4: Adapted Measures

Justice Manipulation Check (5-point Likert scale; 1: “*Not at all*” to 5: “*Definitely*”)

The professor was described as...

1. Grading in a manner that is consistent across students
2. Clearly explaining grading criteria
3. Grades did not seem like they were based on performance (R)
4. Having vague grading criteria (R)

Self-Interest Justice Motive Manipulation Check (5-point Likert scale; 1: “*Not at all*” to 5: “*Extremely*”)

The professor was described as...

1. Prioritizing getting good evaluations
2. Focused on his research
3. Wanting to avoid looking bad in front of students

Prosocial Justice Motive Manipulation Check (5-point Likert scale; 1: “*Not at all*” to 5: “*A great deal*”)

The professor was described as...

1. Truly wanting to have a lasting, positive impact on students
2. Keeping students' feelings in mind
3. Seeing things from the students' perspective